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In the last twenty years, relational psychoanalysis has emerged as an important 
voice in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Relational approaches operate within the 
tension between intrapsychic and interpersonal levels of explanation. On the one hand, 
intrapsychic explanations assume the existence of a private inner life focusing on 
internal processes such as fantasy, desires, repression, and unconscious motivations. On 
the other hand, interpersonal explanations focus on transactions with others, the daily 
give and take of our relationships, and our inextricable participation in the social realm. 
Schools in the relational movement often struggle to integrate these two poles, but the 
risk seems to be collapsing one explanatory pole into the other. This work argues that 
framing this discussion within a wider philosophical horizon can suggest a compelling 
new way of thinking about these matters. The theoretical psychology of Jack Martin and 
Jeff Sugarman (1999, 2000), the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1977, 1994), and 
Martin Heidegger (1993, 1996), offer a view of selfhood that transcends the problematic 
internal-external dichotomy pervasive in relational approaches.  
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Introduction: Relational Psychoanalysis and the Modern Self 
 
In the last twenty years, relational psychoanalysis has emerged as an important 
voice in psychoanalytic theory and practice (Beebe & Lachmann, 2003, p. 379). Unlike 
many other psychoanalytic schools, relational psychoanalysis does not have a single 
founding theorist who introduced a clearly formulated theoretical model. Instead, a 
number of diverse and varying positions have coalesced around a unifying concept: the 
idea that relationships are the basic building blocks of the mind (Mitchell & Aron, 1999, 
p. xiii). The heterogeneity characteristic of the relational movement has understandably 
created varying views of what this new paradigm entails concretely (Mitchell, 2000, p. 
xiv). As a result, seemingly inconsistent views, sometimes about core concepts, have 
emerged within the movement. The underlying premise of this work is that conceptual 
clarification of these apparent incongruities could be philosophically and clinically 
enriching. There is, at the moment, a dearth of literature addressing the theoretical 
diversity within this approach, which underscores a clear need to bring its voices into 
dialogue to make sense of their differences. The aim of this work is to do so with the 
hope that it will accomplish greater theoretical lucidity and wider cohesiveness of 
relational views, without sacrificing their diversity.  
There is a notable area of disagreement in the relational movement that seems 
ripe for this type of exploration. Mitchell and Aron (1999, p. xviii) observed that 
relational approaches operate within the tension between intrapsychic and interpersonal 
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levels of explanation. This observation leaves open the issue of whether this tension 
could prove problematic. On the one hand, intrapsychic explanations assume the 
existence of a private inner life focusing on internal processes such as fantasy, desires, 
repression, and unconscious motivations. On the other hand, interpersonal explanations 
focus on transactions with others, the daily give and take of our relationships, and our 
inextricable participation in the social realm. Schools in the relational movement often 
struggle to integrate these two poles. Postmodern relational approaches have appealed 
primarily to the social level of explanation. In its radical variants, they define--perhaps 
even dismiss--the concept of the intrapsychic as a culturally constructed discursive 
practice; in essence, a culturally sanctioned way of talking about reality (Fairfield, 
Layton, & Stack, 2002, p. 2-3). On the other end of the spectrum, thinkers like Mitchell 
and Aron (1999) express their concern that the constructed self is incomplete without 
the contributions of an inner life in the formation of personhood. They aspire to retain a 
concept of intrapsychic reality as something more than just a way of talking. Although 
both groups embrace social levels of explanation, they disagree about how all-
encompassing this dimension should be considered and about the place of the individual 
subject in this new picture.   
 Martin and Sugarman (1998, p. 1) noted that a similar tension between the 
social and the individual is prevalent in much of contemporary social science. They 
claim this tension results from social science’s response to philosophical critiques of the 
modern understanding of selfhood. Among those that have taken issue with a modern 
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construal of the self, Charles Guignon (2004) notes that modernity brought about the 
birth of a new worldview in which the self came to be seen as “nuclear”, “a self-
contained, bounded individual, a center of experience and will, with no essential or 
defining relations to anything outside oneself” (p. 43). Charles Taylor (1986), a 
prominent contemporary philosopher, noted that divorced from the influence of 
anything outside itself, the modern self looks only within itself for guidance and 
fulfillment. Likewise, the well-known critiques of modernity found in Foucault (1982, 
2002) and Derrida (1980, 1997) provide a scathing indictment of the traditional 
disembodied and detached modern self.  These thinkers call for a much-needed 
contextualization of the self that acknowledges its history and cultural sources.  
Relational approaches embrace contemporary critiques of the nuclear self, albeit 
with some reservations, and are deeply aware of the pressing need to recognize its 
cultural embeddedness. This is a timely endeavor that opens up theory and clinical 
practice to considerations of social factors. However, Martin and Sugarman (2000) 
caution, in the enthusiasm to overcome a nuclear self, we risk privileging cultural 
factors to the point of eliminating notions of individuality altogether: “Psychologists are 
interested in how humans develop and learn as experiencing individuals. If there are no 
such selves to develop and learn, psychological commitments require not just 
adjustment or even reconfiguration but also radical reconsideration and quite possibly 
abandonment.” (p. 397). It seems then that contextualizing the mind involves a certain 
balancing act between the need to recognize the constitutive force of social context and 
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the reality of individual experience. At the same time, individuality requires a defense 
that avoids reverting to modern notions of a masterful or bounded self. The risk seems 
to be collapsing one explanatory pole into the other.  
The purpose of this work is to explore this problematic as it presents itself in 
relational psychoanalysis. In order to do this, relational perspectives must be presented 
and discussed in their dialogical tensions. In addition, it is argued that bringing this 
discussion into a wider philosophical horizon can both enrich our understanding of the 
problem and suggest a compelling new way of thinking about these matters. For this 
purpose, the theoretical psychology of Jack Martin and Jeff Sugarman, and the 
philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1977, 1994) and Martin Heidegger (1993, 1996), 
among others, will be considered as sources. 
Important conceptual changes within a field are seldom absolute or abrupt. 
Instead, they often evidence both continuity and rupture from the tradition that precedes 
them.  Psychoanalysis could be considered emblematic of this phenomenon; theoretical 
developments are often couched as a continuation of Freud’s work in some essential 
way, while drawing attention to important innovations that redirect the discipline’s 
concerns. There are two risks involved in doing this. Overestimating the continuity of 
thinking within a tradition can result in presentism, while overemphasizing its 
originality risks obscuring the sources from which that thinking sprung. However, when 
theoretical innovation is understood within the right relationship to its historical context, 
it illuminates both the past and the future of a discipline.  In keeping with this aim, this 
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work attempts to properly understand relational psychoanalysis by examining its 
influences.  
Lastly, asking about the nature of the mind is not just an issue of philosophical 
accuracy but also of clinical importance. Another working assumption of this effort is 
that there is a rich, complex, and mutually determinative relationship between theory 
and practice evident in the psychoanalytic encounter. In order to examine it, this 
dissertation will look at clinical material to understand the implications of theory in 
practice. In the process of doing so, a certain view about the relationship between theory 
and practice in psychoanalysis should become evident. I would like to defend that, 
ideally, there is a nuanced and reciprocal relationship between them, where theory 
guides our practice but never fully determines it or exhaustively explains it. In turn, 
effective psychotherapy practice ought to feedback into our theories. Of course, this 
ideal relationship is not always the case, and we often find discontinuities and 
puzzlement in the theory-practice relationship. 
This author believes that relational psychoanalysis has something to contribute 
to psychotherapy at large, and this is why this work has one foot inside and another 
outside of psychoanalysis.  As such, it is neither an introduction to psychoanalytic work, 
nor a scholarly treatise on psychoanalytic matters.  It intends to be more that the former, 
and less than the latter.  In doing so, the hope is that certain ideas become accessible for 
discussion within and outside of psychoanalytic communities.  Some might argue that it 
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is not only psychoanalysis that requires more dialogic cohesiveness, but the field of 
psychology as a whole (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999).  
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Chapter 1: The Influences of Relational Psychoanalysis 
 
Introduction 
 
Mitchell and Greenberg (1983) originally coined the term relational to describe 
a group of psychoanalytic approaches that believe the mind is constituted by the 
internalization of interpersonal relationships (Fossage, 2003, p. 411). Arguably, there is 
no central figure in the relational approach, yet Stephen Mitchell has been proposed as 
an organizing theorist who defined its loose boundaries and consolidated the unifying 
themes that helped in the “emergence of a tradition” (Silverman, 2000, p. 146; Mitchell 
& Aron, 1999, p. i). In spite of the spirit of openness and integration that relational 
approaches claim, Mitchell and Aron (1999) position the school as a competing 
alternative to traditional models: “Relational concepts do not provide understandings of 
different phenomena from those explored by the drive/defense model; relational 
concepts provide alternative understandings of the same phenomena” (p. xii).  
This description establishes a division of the psychoanalytic world into two 
spheres: those who apprehend the central roles of relationships in the formation of the 
mind, and those who don’t. This border between relational and classical psychoanalysis 
could be construed as somewhat arbitrary, particularly given Mitchell’s 
acknowledgement that Freud himself has important relational strands in his thinking 
(Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. vii; Frank, 1998, p. 141). It seems that there is a degree of 
continuity in psychoanalytic theorizing in its recognition of the social dimensions of 
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human existence. At the same time, there are important theoretical differences that 
cannot be easily overlooked. Indeed, the current theoretical landscape is complex and 
sometimes murky. As Spezzano (1995) tries to make sense of it he notes that:  
One danger is overgeneralization. Not all analysts who think of themselves as 
classical will see themselves accurately portrayed here, nor have all American 
analysts who think of themselves as not classical abandoned all the principles I 
label as classical nor embraced all the ones I have labeled as contemporary. 
Even these labels are problematic because what I call contemporary analysis has 
roots going back 80 years to Ferenczi in Europe and 50 years to Sullivan in the 
United States, while what I call classical analysis is still evolving as 
contemporary structural theory. (p. 44) 
 We can and often do encounter such gray areas when looking at the history and 
also the current state of psychoanalysis. We can find seeds of future thinking in earlier 
writings, and reinterpretation of early theory in light of new developments. Many 
contemporary schools overlap and differ concurrently across different important issues. 
As a result, there is a risk of overstating the differences between relational and classical 
approaches. Nevertheless, there are genuine differences across psychoanalytic schools. 
Acknowledging common threads between them should not amount to a hasty equating 
or leveling of all positions. Spezzano (1995) reminds us that there is also a danger of 
“blurring the differences” when conducting “an initial effort to define a school of 
analysis” (p. 44).  
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Relational approaches dwell in this theoretical richness and ambiguity because 
of the variety and wealth of their influences.  Understanding them requires placing them 
in the proper context of the history of ideas in psychoanalysis. In fact, the “relational 
turn” (Beebe & Lachmann, 2003, p. 379) that has gained such prevalence in 
psychoanalysis today is rooted in a series of gradual shifts that culminate in the 
retrospective analysis that Mitchell and his colleagues present. As such, tracing their 
influences helps understand their theoretical paradigm. In Mitchell and Aron’s own 
words: “The exploration of history is often helpful in shedding light on current 
controversies and in generating ideas about where we need to go” (p. xiii). However, it 
is difficult to provide a succinct and coherent narrative describing the precursors of 
relational psychoanalysis. The following account intends to do both more and less than 
that. Less because it will be selective in the psychoanalytic milestones it tackles, but 
more because it will zero in on these to discuss their relevance to relational approaches.  
Mitchell and Black’s (1995) description of the term relational lends itself as a 
good starting point for inquiry: “The term relational was used …to highlight the 
common theoretical framework underlying interpersonal psychoanalysis, British school 
object relations theories, and self-psychology.” (p. 263). What follows then is a brief 
examination of the aforementioned sources, object relations, self-psychology, and 
interpersonal psychoanalysis.  
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Interpersonal Psychoanalysis  
 
 Sullivan was a unique figure in the history of psychoanalysis: “…more 
identified with the psychiatric community than the psychoanalytic one” (Kuriloff, 2002, 
p. 306). Levenson (1992) notes that his thinking was not psychoanalytic in itself, but 
that: 
…his essentially open-ended postulates—which he scrupulously defined as 
Interpersonal Psychiatry —can be, and were, extended into a contemporary 
interpersonal Psychoanalysis. I really do not believe this was Sullivan's doing 
per se but rather, was the result of the merging of his American pragmatic 
psychiatry with European psychoanalysis through the contributions of his 
colleagues, especially Thompson, Horney and Fromm (p. 451) 
And so his thinking came to be associated with the group later dubbed culturalist within 
psychoanalysis, which included figures like Karen Horney and Erich Fromm (Mitchell 
& Black, 1995, p. 259). Clara Thompson (1979) confirms that: “the contributions of 
Sullivan and Fromm have come to be called the "cultural school, " because of the great 
emphasis of both on the interpersonal factors in personality formation and personal 
difficulties and the relative lack of emphasis on the more biologic drives as dynamic 
factors” (p. 200). This represents a clear departure from Freud’s emphasis on biological 
explanations. However, it is also important to notice that it maintains a significant 
theoretical distance from object relation approaches. In the development of relational 
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psychoanalysis, Sullivan’s focus on interpersonal interaction will offer the 
complementary balance to the analysis of interiority presented by object relations.  
 Although one is pressed to find an outright rejection of an inner-world in 
Sullivan’s theorizing, there certainly is a determinate and almost exclusive focus on 
interpersonal phenomena. However, it seems helpful to heed Mitchell ‘s (1988) advice 
that understanding Sullivan involves readjusting our basic concepts of the intrapsychic 
and the interpersonal: 
At first glance, it might seem apparent what is meant by “intrapsychic” and 
“interpersonal,” the former referring to processes within the mind, the latter 
referring to processes between persons. These are serviceable working 
definitions, but they don't take us very far if we are trying to distinguish 
Sullivan's position from classical psychoanalysis, since they clearly do not do 
justice to either mode of theorizing” (p. 473) 
Mitchell (1988) maintains that these concepts have been used as quasi-political 
banners that obscure similarities and polarize different theoretical positions (p. 473). He 
notes that he sees no outright rejection of social influence in classical psychoanalysis, 
just like there is no rejection of intrapsychic dimensions in a Sullivanian approach. 
Instead, there is a disagreement about how primordial each pole really is in explaining 
human behavior. So while Sullivan can acknowledge that interpersonal interaction 
unavoidably involves the subjectivity of the individual, he will not make it a focus in 
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and of itself. In its place, the starting point for understanding human behavior is not the 
individual mind but the interpersonal field: 
For Sullivan, situations are not outside the individual but inclusive of the 
subjective and behavioral activities of all participants. The arena of relevance is 
not behavioral but expanded to include a circuit of continuous interchange, 
permeating boundaries between the subjective "inner" and behavioral "outer." 
That intimate connection between them is what makes it possible to draw 
inferences about the subjective even though it cannot be directly observed… 
Thus personality is seen as a somewhat open system, inevitably engaged in the 
more inclusive social fields through which one moves in the course of living, 
beyond Freud's term of early childhood (Grey, 1988, p. 556). 
Commenting on the origin of this concept in Sullivan’s approach, Siegel (1987) 
notes that: “…using Kurt Lewin's (1951) concept of field theory, Sullivan tried to shift 
the focus in psychiatric and psychoanalytic thinking from the intrapsychic to the 
interpersonal field.” (p274). Lewin, a German exile who eventually led the Research 
Center for Group Dynamics at MIT, introduced field theory as a “corrective to earlier 
systems of thought” that were too individualistic (Viney, 1993, p. 368). Sullivan 
appropriated this notion of a field as a basic unit of analysis and introduces it to 
psychiatry. An interpersonal field can be seen as analogous to the system in family 
therapy, where the whole has an interactive force that shapes individual participation. 
The concept of an interpersonal field is central for Sullivan (Bromberg, 1980, p. 240) 
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and it will take up a central role in relational psychoanalytic approaches as well (Tubert-
Oklander, 2007, p. 115).  
 Sullivan defines the self as: “…a system or organization of interpersonal 
processes which are an embodiment or reflection … of selected attitudes of the culture 
acquired through contact with the significant people” (Thompson, 1978, p. 498). Rather 
than thinking of the self as a self-contained entity, Sullivan defines it as a structured set 
of interpersonal processes. Thinking of the self as a co-constituted phenomenon defies 
traditional definitions that attribute uniqueness and individuality to it. In fact, Sullivan 
does not leave much room for creative expression and uniqueness as usually understood 
(Klenbort, 1978). Yet, even though he appears intent on dismantling notions of personal 
uniqueness, Sullivan acknowledges the role of subjective experience in motivation. 
However, he departs from Freud’s focus on internal phenomena by substituting 
interpersonal needs in place of libidinal instinct as the motor for behavior: 
…while Freud sees the child's development as going on inevitably in terms of 
the child's sexual development and his libido, Sullivan's child is a product of his 
interaction with significant people. He assumes that the need for security is even 
stronger in the human being than the need for instinctual gratification or 
satisfaction and that these latter become problems only when they conflict with 
the need for security. Since man is the least instinct-dominated of all the 
animals, it behooves us according to Sullivan to concern ourselves chiefly with 
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the forces which do dominate man, and they are the social forces. (Thompson, 
1978, p. 495) 
Thompson identifies the central difference between their approaches by noting 
that Sullivan completely dismisses a hedonistic principle in explaining motivation. 
Sullivan views two sets of motivating factors in humans: needs and anxiety (Grey, 
1988, p. 556). Needs are biological urges such as hunger, thirst and the like. Sullivan, 
like Freud, acknowledges the role of biology in influencing human behavior. However, 
Sullivan speaks of needs as and their satisfaction as a way of drawing people together 
and ensuring the survival of the individual and the species. For him, biology sets us up 
in a sort of collaborative harmony from the starting point. Furthermore, our needs are 
plastically shaped by culture, which defines the ways in which satisfaction can be met 
(Grey, 1988, p. 557).   
 The other pole that explains human behavior for Sullivan is anxiety. He views it 
as a pathological phenomenon that regulates interpersonal functioning. Anxiety emerges 
from a threat to the individual’s security needs, an intrinsic human desire found in 
interpersonal approval (Grey, 1988, p. 557).  It represents more than just subjective 
discomfort, but rather “an experience of such catastrophic dimensions, so utterly 
disorganizing, that the patient will do almost anything to avoid it” (Levenson, 1992, p. 
452). In fact, the devastation that anxiety brings about causes us to systematically 
ignore or disavow those interpersonal experiences that can trigger it. Sullivan calls 
those instances of systematic inattention, along with other defensive maneuvers that 
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manage to stay out of awareness, security operations. The experiences associated with 
anxious affect are so distressing as to become dissociated from our sense of personal 
identity. 
  According to Sullivan, people are shaped by the effect of anxiety, which is 
present and absorbed within an interpersonal field. Indeed, the child comes to 
understand which experiences should trigger anxiety because affect is contagious in the 
first place: “…Sullivan termed this contagious spread of mood from caregivers to 
babies the empathic linkage” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 67). Certainly, therapists 
sitting next to a very anxious patient for a significant period of time can attest to the 
infectious nature of the state of mind. As the seed of motivation, anxiety is the affective 
state that the therapist must be intensely attentive to. But because it spreads within the 
interpersonal field, they should attend to it not only in their clients but also in 
themselves. Indeed, Sullivan believes therapists cannot fully extricate themselves from 
the therapeutic encounter, an idea that finds expression in another of Sullivan’s 
concepts: that of participant-observation.  
Interpersonal Psychoanalysis in Practice 
 
 Sullivan introduced the concept of participant-observation in psychiatry and it 
was later incorporated into psychoanalysis: 
In 1939, in his first lecture on Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, Harry Stack 
Sullivan referred to participant observation as, "the root premise of psychiatric 
methodology" (Sullivan, 1940), for the theory which had emerged at the 
 16 
beginning of his career as research psychiatrist. It arose out of thrashing 
discontent with how psychiatrists were functioning in regard to schizophrenic 
patients. (Spiegel, 1977, p. 372) 
 Like other Sullivanian concepts, it seems easier to grasp intellectually than to practice 
clinically. Green (1977) succinctly captures the essence of his idea when he notes that: 
“in all his teaching and writing, [Sullivan] assumed that the psychiatrist is inextricably 
and inescapably involved with all that is going on in the session” (p. 258). Part of 
Sullivan’s retreat from Freudian theory, which he considered too speculative, involved 
developing simple concepts that originate from clinical practice instead of speculative 
reconstruction (Hirsch, 2003, p. 222). This does not mean, however, that Sullivan is 
purely pragmatic and/or theoretically blank. He developed theoretical contributions that 
he believed derived from a firm experiential grasp of psychopathology and personhood. 
The use of participant-observation is an example of this practical simplicity paired with 
concrete theoretical direction.   
Distinguishing Sullivanian from classical models of analytic technique, Bruch 
(1977) observes that in the traditional model: “…the psychoanalyst was like a blank 
mirror onto whom the patient transferred his libidinal attachments”, while  “…Sullivan's 
concept of the psychiatrist's role as participant observer stands in opposition to this 
passive image” (p. 348). In Sullivan’s view, the psychiatrist cannot stand back and offer 
interpretations at appropriate moments while the transference takes place. On the 
contrary, he actively engages the client and her perspective in a joint inquiry into the 
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areas of her interpersonal functioning which stand out as problematic. In one sense, the 
role of the analyst is actively participative because “…the only way for the analyst to 
know what the patient is really talking about is to ask detailed questions” (Mitchell & 
Black, 1995, p. 72). However, the therapist participates in the clinical encounter in a 
deeper sense by joining and co-creating a new interpersonal field. For Sullivan, the 
analyst is embroiled with the client so that the analyst’s reactions to what is going on in 
the room, the countertransference in classical terms, becomes an important data point. 
As a matter of fact, he believes that clients will unavoidably reenact their interpersonal 
patterns of relatedness in the therapy session, and that the role of the therapist is to 
understand these and facilitate the development of insight in the patient through careful 
questioning. This process is mired by complexity and requires careful detail to the 
moment to moment exchange.  Sullivan (1953) writes that “…when we talk 
professionally with a person—whom I shall now call the patient—the speech behavior 
occurs in a situation including the two of us and an indefinite and shifting group of 
illusions and impressions as to each other.” (p. 45). He illustrates his point when 
discussing the treatment approach of a schizophrenic who: “…hated to have people 
stare at him, so he stayed at home. Why did people stare at him?  He does not know—
and is obviously and keenly uncomfortable…I comment looking at him that I see no 
reason to stare at him.” (1953, p. 46). In his response to the patient’s presentation of his 
problem, Sullivan engages the patient by communicating to him that he believes there is 
no reason why the patient should be stared at. Moreover, he phrases the question 
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directly, allowing the patient to feel trusted in his experience as opposed to challenged 
or kept at a distance:  
Consider in our example the substitution of “Did people stare at you” or “What 
made you think that people were staring at you.” The first is thoroughly 
disconcerting, thoroughly disorganizing to the direction of inquiry. Suppose I 
ask you your age, and, having been told, ask if it is so. The patient has clearly 
shown his belief—or his intention that I shall understand—that people stared at 
him. I am in no position to contradict this, even if I wished to do so. (p. 46)  
This ability to meeting the patient where he is, taking him at face value, allows him to 
remain involved in the interpersonal field because he can understand where the 
conversation is going. It may seem paradoxical when Sullivan states: “The patient is a 
stranger and is to be treated as a stranger” (p. 46), given his idea that we are always in 
relation to the other. However, what this statement means is that we should treat the 
patient as we would any other person that we meet for the first time, without making 
assumptions about who they are, especially about their capacity for judging a situation 
accurately. According to Sullivan, this openness to the other in participation and 
attentive listening establishes the manner of access to the interpersonal patterns of the 
patient, and with that an opportunity to examine what has remain conspicuously unseen 
in his retreat from anxiety. Understanding the involvement of the analyst in this sense is 
congruent with Sullivan’s consideration of the interpersonal field as an indissoluble unit 
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of analysis. There is a significant degree of consistency between his general theory of 
personhood and his clinical theory: 
This formulation of the therapeutic interaction is closely linked to Sullivan's 
theoretical considerations. Sullivan was first and foremost a clinician and the 
need for theoretical reformulation arose from his therapeutic experiences with 
schizophrenics and obsessives. (Bruch, 1977 p. 348-349) 
Arguably, this anticipates a “two-person psychology” (Silverman, 1996, p. 267) 
in which both members of the therapeutic dyad are seen as having an effect on the 
other. Mitchell (1988) sees this concept as the sine-qua-non of a relational approach to 
psychoanalysis. Hirsch (2003) agrees with this noting that: “…the relational turn in 
psychoanalysis began with Sullivan's (1953) shift in emphasis from a biologically or 
instinctually dominated theory of the mind to one emphasizing exclusively the study of 
interpersonal relationships as building blocks of the mind” (p. 224). However, it is 
important to notice that Sullivan does not focus on the relationship, but on the patient’s 
functioning. Relational psychoanalysis attempts to articulate what is going on between 
the therapist and the patient, considering their relative contributions. Although this can 
be characterized as an extension of Sullivan’s interpersonal psychiatry, is certainly 
moves beyond its parameters. As such, Sullivan remains an influence that, although 
shaped relational approaches significantly, cannot be simply equated with them. The 
emphasis on the exploration of a joint subjective experience in relational psychoanalysis 
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likely owes to the influence of object relations approaches and their focus on subjective 
experience.   
Object Relations Theory 
 
 As early as 1981, Stephen Mitchell noted that: “object relations theory has 
become one of the ubiquitous phrases within contemporary psychoanalytic literature” 
(p. 374). Along the same lines, Ogden (1985) observed that: “…object relations theory 
is not comprised of a discrete collection of principles; rather, it represents a diverse 
collection of contributions that, in my opinion, have been developed in the context of 
one of the most intense and fruitful of psychoanalytic dialogues” (p. 347). In this 
regard, the development of relational approaches mirrors this phenomenon. Again, a 
complete survey of object relations theory is beyond the scope of this work. Given that 
the purpose is to illustrate the influence of object relations on relational psychoanalysis, 
this work will follow Mitchell (1981, p. 375), and Mitchell & Black (1995, p. 112) who 
identify W. R. D. Fairbairn, and D. W. Winnicott as central influences in object 
relations theory. However, Mitchell and Black (1995) also note that: “…Melanie 
Klein…provided the conceptual bridge between Freud and modern British object 
relations theories” (p. 113). As such, a brief introduction to some of her concepts is in 
order. 
Melanie Klein 
 
By most standards, Klein was a controversial figure whose thinking departed 
considerably from Freud's, yet influenced psychoanalysis substantially. In fact, Mitchell 
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and Black (1995), note that: “Melanie Klein has had more impact on contemporary 
psychoanalysis than any other psychoanalytic writer since Freud” (p. 85). Although her 
contributions are lengthy and complex, her most significant contribution to the 
development of a relational perspective is her expansion of the role of the object in 
mental life. In this regard, Green (2000) comments that:   
In the history of psychoanalysis, there was a turning point after which the object 
left behind its status of referential exteriority. From then on, one was no longer 
dealing simply with a phantasy object as in Freud, but with what Klein called 
the internal object. It was no longer simply an object that could be seen from the 
angle of phantasy, but an object forming the basis of the subject's internal 
world… (p. 13) 
 Although Klein does not abandon Freudian metapsychology, she reconfigures it 
in an important way. Green identifies at least two significant moves that take place in 
Klein’s reconfiguration: the first is the internalization of the object. For Freud the object 
is an external figure towards which the drive aims. Klein (1932), on the other hand, uses 
the term object with a dual meaning, referring both to an external figure and to its 
internalized psychic representation: “As far as can be seen, there exists in the small 
child, side by side with its relations to real objects but on a different plane as it were, 
relations which are based on its relations to its unreal imagos both as excessively good 
and excessively bad figures. Ordinarily, these two kinds of object-relations intermingle 
and colour each other to an ever increasing extent.” (p. 213). Guntrip (1965), concurring 
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with the importance of this transition, noted that: “It is this conception of human beings 
living in two worlds at the same time, inner and outer, with mutual interference, that 
makes Klein's work of such momentous importance…” (p. 258).  
However, is it worth remembering, Ogden’s (2002) argument that the seeds of 
this line of thought, indeed of the school of object relations itself, can be traced to 
Freud’s developments in “Mourning and Melancholia” (p. 767). Mitchell (1981) lends 
support to this view when he notes that: “…although he never employed the term 
"internal object" as such, Freud, from the beginning of his work, had described clinical 
phenomena involving internal "voices, " images, parental values, etc.” (p. 375). 
Nevertheless, Klein’s contribution is her utilization of the object as an organizing 
referent for the individual’s entire psychic life, which is Green’s second point in the 
quote above. Klein is introducing an object not only as a form of mental content, but as 
a structuring force in subjective experience. This development served as material for 
Fairbairn’s work (Mitchel, 1981, p. 385), which nicely illustrates the way in which both 
continuity and innovation occur as psychoanalytic theory unfolds through history. 
Fairbairn, of course, would present a more radical challenge to the Freudian 
metapsychology that Klein would not abandon.   
W. R. D. Fairbairn 
 
While Klein herself described her contributions as an extension of Freudian 
metapsychology, Fairbairn departs from classical thinking more markedly: 
“…Fairbairn's rejection of Freud's tripartite division of the psyche into ego, id, and 
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superego, and replacement of it with a theory of endopsychic structure based directly on 
the vicissitudes of human object relatedness…is the crowning culmination of Fairbairn's 
thinking” (Rubens, 1984, p. 429). This culmination rests on a general reworking of the 
theory of the drives, and consequently a departure from Freud’s theory of motivation 
(Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 114). Beattie (2003) describes this theoretical shift by 
noting that Freud held excitatory discharge motivated our behavior, while Fairbairn 
believed that our intrinsic need for connection to others motivates us (p. 1172).   
To understand this transition it is necessary to grasp Fairbairn and Freud’s 
different views of the relationship between drives and objects. For Freud, our instinctual 
life is centered on the pursuit of pleasure, which he defined as the discharge of 
stimulation. According to Freud, we are organismically designed to discharge the build 
up of excessive stimulation that creates a sensation of discomfort or pain. The object of 
the instinct in this picture becomes secondary, acting solely as a means to the end of 
pleasure seeking. In other words, I seek out other people so that I can regulate the way I 
feel internally, but seeking out others is not considered an end in itself (Scharff & 
Birtles, 1997, p. 1086). Fairbairn argues that the reverse is true and that Freud is 
mistaken because he separates instinctual energy from the object it engages. He claims 
instead that from the very beginning our instinct is to seek objects rather than pleasure 
itself:  
Fairbairn understood Freud's position to be a direct consequence of his divorcing 
of energy from structure, for what goal could there be for structureless, 
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directionless energy other than indiscriminate discharge for the purpose of 
homeostasis. For Fairbairn, having initially postulated the inseparability of 
energy and structure, it followed that the goal (or aim) of self-expression could 
no longer be viewed as mere tension reduction (the discharge of energy, ending 
the 'unpleasure' of excitation and thereby definitionally resulting in pleasure) 
with little or no reference to the object by means of which this discharge is 
accomplished. Rather he completely inverted Freud's position, maintaining that 
the relationship with the object was itself the goal, and that the pleasure involved 
was a secondary consequence. (Rubens, 1984, p. 430) 
As Mitchell (1981) notes, Fairbairn claims that we are constitutionally designed 
to seek other people, and that: “…the main characteristic of libidinal energy is its 
object-seeking quality”, adding that “…pleasure is not the end goal of the impulse, but a 
means to its real end, relations with others.” (p. 386). This change speaks to the core of 
a relational orientation in psychoanalysis in describing the individual as inherently 
other-directed.     
In spite of its significant influence on relational approaches, Fairbairn’s view of 
intrapsychic life is not entirely equivalent with current relational thinking. He believed 
that internal objects only arise as compensatory structures as a result of faulty parenting 
(Carveth, 1996, p. 344). The child, in response to frustrating experiences with parents, 
fantasizes about good objects that she cannot encounter in the real world. These 
imagined others, or rather re-imagined others, are endopsychic structures split off from 
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the self that become necessary for maintaining a sense of connection with the frustrating 
parent. On the other hand, when things are going well the child is outward directed 
because it has no reason to create an internal replacement for an external object with 
which she maintains a satisfying connection. However, as Rubens (1984), points out: 
“…internal structural differentiation is a clearly pathological, albeit unavoidable, 
schizoid phenomenon which, to varying extents, diminishes the functioning of all 
human beings” (p. 434). According to Fairbairn, we all develop endopsychic structures 
because, to one degree or another, we all experience frustration and suffering as part of 
the human condition. But what about the internalization of good experiences with 
others? If no endopsychic structure is formed in these cases, how does Fairbairn believe 
that we internalize those structures? Apparently, Fairbairn did not elaborate on healthy 
development as much as he did on pathology, but he does argue that the internalization 
of good objects becomes part of an idealized object that is consciously integrated into 
the self (Rubens, 1984, p. 435). This dimension of his theory remained somewhat 
underdeveloped. Nevertheless, experiences with others, whether healthy or not, become 
the foundation of a person’s internal life and act as the basis for all motivation and 
behavior. For Fairbairn, relationships with others are the structuring blocks of 
subjective and interpersonal life.    
D. W. Winnicott 
 
 Winnicott is widely regarded as a deeply original contributor to psychoanalysis 
whose clinical style, as Ogden (2001) remarked, was mirrored in his writing style, itself 
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permeated by paradox and play (p. 299; Modell, 1985, p. 113). It is challenging to 
present a systematic account of his work because his thinking is elusive at times. As 
Kwawer (1998) points out: “Winnicott's writing always lends itself, in my experience, 
to adoption by readers of various persuasions; like ambiguous cloud formations in the 
summer sky” (p. 389). From the vantage point of examining his influence on relational 
approaches, there are a number of concepts that become relevant. Among them, 
Winnicott’s emphasis on subjectivity and the mother-infant dyad appear most relevant 
because of their direct association with relational ideas.  
 In many ways prefiguring self-psychology (Bodin, 1994, p. 41), Winnicott 
utilizes the concept of self as one central axis in his work. In his view, the possibility of 
developing a healthy self is mediated by an appropriate developmental process, which 
involves the mother's capacity to establish a responsive attunement to the child’s needs 
(Bodin, 1994, p. 45). According to Winnicott, the infant initially exists in a space of 
subjective omnipotence where there is no discontinuity between needs and their 
satisfaction. For example, when a baby cries in hunger the mother immediately satisfies 
this need and as a result the baby experiences herself as omnipotent. In order for this to 
work, the mother renounces her subjectivity to concern herself only, or at least 
primarily, with her infant’s needs: “In Winnicott’s view, the mother is not in her right 
mind. The state of primary maternal preoccupation is a constructive kind of temporary 
madness that enables the mother to suspend her own subjectivity to become the medium 
for the development of the subjectivity of the infant” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 126). 
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As a result, the baby cannot be considered an independent entity with its own mind in 
this stage of development. Ogden (2001) notes that: “The baby ‘does not mind’ because 
the mother is there “minding” him (taking care of him)” (p. 309-310). This is the reason 
behind Winnicott’s (1975) radical assertion that there is no baby in isolation, only a 
baby-mother dyad (p. xxxvii). Of course this assertion presupposes the concept of a 
relational space or joint subjectivity that a self-other dyad occupies, a concept that will 
influence relational approaches. However, for Winnicott this initial enmeshment gives 
place, in healthy development, to a process of individuation that ends when one is able 
to be alone.  As Ogden (1985) notes, this process takes place through the gradual 
introduction of frustrations that allow the infant to have desires for what is not readily 
available: “The delaying of the infant's awareness of separateness is achieved in large 
part by means of the mother's meeting of the infant's need before need becomes desire. 
The infant without desire is neither a subject nor an object: there is not yet an infant” (p. 
350-351). When the infant begins to notice the rupture between need and fulfillment 
introduced by gradual frustrations, this need becomes a desire and the infant gradually 
becomes a subject confronted by an object over which it does not have omnipotent 
control.   
 Through this process of frustrations, the child learns to inhabit the objective 
world after passing through a transitional period. Gradually the infant is pushed by the 
mother’s normal imperfections to acknowledge the reality of others. However, this 
movement is not merely one “…from dependence to independence, but the transition 
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between two different patterns of positioning the self in relation to others” (Mitchell & 
Black, 1995, p. 128). In spite of this growth towards individuation, the healthy adult 
never fully abandons a sense of core omnipotence and fantastic fusion with the maternal 
image. This core sense acts as a reservoir of coping resources to which she returns in 
period of stress that require creative adaptation to new situations. Within relational 
approaches, Mitchell shares this view of a core self that anchors identity and underlies 
the changing self in development across the lifespan. According to Winnicott, however, 
the healthy self is able to fluctuate between a fused and individuated positions but does 
not rigidly adheres to either one (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 128).  
 What remains somewhat unclear in Winnicott is his definition of an internal 
object and intrapsychic life. Whereas Fairbairn delineates what he means by 
endopsychic structures and ideal objects, it is not clear in Winnicott whether there is 
such a precise process of internal formation of the self. Kwawer (1998) suggests that 
Winnicott’s concept of object use provides a platform to understand his thinking in this 
area: 
Winnicott had written hintingly about this elusive concept of object use several 
years earlier, offering the provocative and foretelling idea that there is a stage of 
personal development beyond object relating, calling this the stage of “object 
use”; he notes that the question of what the appropriate environmental provision 
is during the stage of object usage is not yet clearly understood. In proposing the 
notion of “object use,” Winnicott is beginning to find his own voice, apart the 
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focus on an object-relations analysis (or in other words, the analysis of 
transference as a subjective phenomenon created by the patient). If this sounds 
like the conceptual shift from thinking about the transference relationship to one 
that encompasses the real relationship…(p394-395) 
If Kwawer suggestion is correct and Winnicott thinks about a stage beyond 
internal object relating into real object relating, then this would align him more closely 
to the interpersonal tradition of Harry Stack Sullivan. Kuriloff (1988) argues for such an 
affinity stating that: “Both Winnicott and Sullivan, if viewed through a particular lens, 
help the patient to renounce omnipotence, to tolerate subjectivity, to bear what the 
family has made toxic, unbearable, split off, distorted, because the therapist is willing to 
act in ways that illustrate and generate tolerance and survival, paving the way for him to 
be ‘used’ and used well” (p. 388). However, he adds that there are differences as well 
between Sullivan and Winnicott’s goals wherein the former tries to help the patient gain 
awareness of interpersonal patterns of relatedness and the latter: “hopes to aid in the 
creative apperception of the world, so that the place between what is real and illusory 
becomes a lively and creative experience” (p. 380). The blurred distinction between real 
and illusion remains an important concept in relational psychoanalysis, particularly its 
postmodern variants. Indeed, most relational thinking would take issue with Sullivan’s 
concept of an objective world that the analyst helps the patient see. Instead, something 
like a Winnicottian view of internal subjectivity ends up winning out in relational 
perspectives.  
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 Winnicott’s characterization of a true self that originates in the child’s 
spontaneity helps elucidate how he thinks of intrapsychic experience. He notes that 
when the mother appropriately meets this spontaneity of gesture, the child is allowed 
the illusion of omnipotence. In time this illusion is given up, yet it always remains as 
the basis for a generative creativity that underlies healthy experience. For Winnicott, 
illusion appears to be the ability to conceive of something as what it is not, without 
letting go completely of what it is. This core or true self cannot be a composite of 
internal objects, but rather a way of relating to others and the world at large. Winnicott 
does not abandon, however, a more classic idea of the intrapsychic as an internal 
subjective space distinct from an external world. He maintains that there is a private self 
that we can never fully access:  
Winnicott here puts forward the view that in every human being, at the core of 
every person there is a secret self, an 'incommunicado element' which is for ever 
silent. He assumes that even in the healthy individual there is a core of 
personality which never communicates with the objectively perceived objects 
and, further, that the individual person knows that there can never be a 
communicating with this core and that it will also have to remain unreachable by 
external reality. (Schacht, 1988, p. 527)  
This private self remains at the core inaccessible to objects and remains a 
somewhat mysterious element of his theorizing, which seems to be incongruent with a 
relational approach.  
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 However, Winnicott’s dramatic attunement to the needs of the client, his ability 
to be deeply engrossed and participate in the subjectivity of the client, is an important 
area of resonance he shares with relational approaches. Additionally, his notion of a 
position that structures the relationships of the self is consistent with relational notions 
of internalized relational configurations. Perhaps most importantly, Winnicott 
designates the ability to truly recognize the other in their objective existence as a marker 
of healthy development. This is a radical acknowledgement of a two-person approach to 
psychology that underlies relational views.  
Therapeutic dimensions of Fairbairn and Winnicott 
 
 Harry Guntrip is another important theorist closely associated with the object 
relations movement (Sutherland, 1980). In addition to the contributions he made to this 
psychoanalytic approach, another claim to fame he possessed is having been analyzed 
by both Winnicott and Fairbairn (Guntrip, 1996; Hazell, 1991). In a paper entitled My 
Experience Of Analysis With Fairbairn And Winnicott: (How Complete A Result Does 
Psychoanalytic Therapy Achieve?), Guntrip details his experiences as an analysand with 
both clinicians: “I had just over 1,000 sessions with Fairbairn in the 1950s and just over 
150 with Winnicott in the 1960s. For my own benefit I kept detailed records of every 
session with both of them, and all their correspondence.” (Guntrip, 1996, p. 740). This 
presents a unique platform from which to explore the therapeutic technique of Fairbairn 
and Winnicott. In addition, it allows an opportunity to investigate the relationship of 
their theory and clinical practice. However, given the complexity of these questions, 
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what follows should be considered an initial direction for research rather than a 
systematic account. 
 Guntrip (1996) observes that he came to analysis already knowing Freud’s work 
intimately and having abandoned what he termed Freud’s “psychobiology of instincts” 
(p. 748) to focus on his theory of psychopathology. In spite of his scholarly interest in 
psychoanalysis, Guntrip’s (1996) interest in psychoanalytic treatment was to gain relief 
from personal suffering rather than to develop new theoretical avenues. From Guntrip’s 
(1996) point of view, however, this distinction might not be valid given his view of the 
relationship between theory and practice: “…on the difficult question of the sources of 
theory, it seems that our theory must be rooted in our psychopathology.” (p. 753). 
Furthermore, he notes that: “…theory does not seem to me to be the major concern. It is 
a useful servant but a bad master, liable to produce orthodox defenders of every variety 
of the faith.” (p. 739). Guntrip is comfortable viewing and presenting himself as a 
patient because he does not find that this role conflicts with being a therapist. 
 Guntrip arrives to psychoanalytic treatment complaining of suffering from a 
recurring debilitating illness that is triggered by experiences of death or abandonment. 
This, he observes, originated from an early childhood experience:  
…at 3½ I walked into a room and saw Percy lying naked and dead on her lap. I 
rushed up and grabbed him and said: ‘Don't let him go. You'll never get him 
back!’ She sent me out of the room and I fell mysteriously ill and was thought to 
be dying. Her doctor said: ‘He's dying of grief for his brother. If your mother wit 
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can't save him, I can't’, so she took me to a maternal aunt who had a family, and 
there I recovered. (p. 746) 
Noting that he is amnesic for these events, he tells us that he learned about this 
incident from his mother’s report. Guntrip also comments that his mother was often 
aggressive and withdrawn with him. Her relationship with her sons was so problematic 
that his young brother died because she refused to breast-feed him. Later in life, Guntrip 
adds, his mother would complain of regretting having had children at all.  
 These are the themes that Guntrip explores in his therapy with Fairbairn, and his 
description of their work together is rich and telling. Guntrip often characterizes 
Fairbairn as intent on providing “his very intellectually precise interpretations” about 
the dynamics with his mother and brother (p. 744). Contact of a more personal nature, 
however, was reserved for extra-analytic activities: “…after sessions we could discuss 
and I could find the natural warm-hearted human being behind the exact interpreting 
analyst.” (p. 745). Guntrip presents Fairbairn as an orthodox therapist who does not 
work directly on building a relationship. This, Guntrip comments, is incompatible with 
Fairbairn’s theoretical beliefs, as he explicitly stated that the relationship is a central 
ingredient in treatment. Guntrip writes about Fairbairn that “…on another occasion he 
said: ‘You can go on analysing for ever and get no- where. It's the personal relation that 
is therapeutic’” and that  “…he held that psychoanalytic interpretation is not therapeutic 
per se, but only as it expresses a personal relationship of genuine understanding.” (p. 
741). Mitchell and Black (1995) also report that Fairbairn believed developing a new 
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form of relatedness, not a set of insights, was the motor for change in the patient (p. 
122). Yet Guntrip experienced Fairbairn as a technical interpreter, and even though he 
indicated feeling conceptually understood at times, he complained of lacking a lived 
sense of an open and personal relationship. His account of their last session certainly 
gives the impression that their intimacy was restrained: “As I was finally leaving 
Fairbairn after the last session, I suddenly realized that in all that long period we had 
never once shaken hands, and he was letting me leave without that friendly gesture. I 
put out my hand and at once he took it, and I suddenly saw a few tears trickle down his 
face.” (p. 745). Such a moving account of their termination speaks to a depth of feeling 
in Fairbairn that was not expressed or acknowledged before. This suggests that there is 
an incongruity between Fairbairn’s therapeutics and his theory. Indeed, Crastnopol 
(2001) confirms that Guntrip: “…was deeply frustrated and injured by his analyst's 
communicative style, which was indeed quite restrained and at times somewhat 
mechanical, notwithstanding the fact that Fairbairn had written about and must have 
believed in the theoretical importance of the analyst providing the patient with a good, 
warm personal relationship.” (p. 128). 
 It is not clear how to resolve this tension between Fairbairn’s writing and his 
disposition in analysis with Guntrip. Mitchell and Black (1995) suggest a plausible 
answer when they note that Fairbairn was not specific about the process through which 
the patient changes the way she experiences the analyst from a bad object to a healthy 
one (p. 122). Fairbairn’s idea that genuine understanding should be conveyed in the 
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interpreting process suggests that perhaps he believed interpretation was the primary 
medium for building relationships with patients. In spite of his emphasis on the 
relationship as a therapeutic agent, he still resorts to interpretation as a primary tool. 
Perhaps this illustrates how the pull for continuity with our tradition and influences can 
sometimes overpower our push for innovation. Undoubtedly, Guntrip’s analysis with 
Fairbairn demonstrates that we don’t always find an unproblematic relationship between 
theory and practice in which one wholly encapsulates and expresses the other. 
Recognizing the incompleteness in this relationship can provide the clinician with a 
useful corrective for theoretical dogmatism or pragmatic naiveté.  
 In addition to complaining about his lack of personal warmth, Guntrip (1996) 
also took issue with Fairbairn’s theoretical approach in their work. Guntrip 
acknowledged that Fairbairn helped him work through the internalized bad objects that 
he developed from the trauma with his mother. However, he also felt that beneath these 
difficulties lay another deeper issue which Winnicott was able to access because of his 
wider theoretical horizon: “…I had had a radical analysis with Fairbairn of the 
‘internalised bad-object defences’ I had built up against that, but we had not got down 
to what I felt was my basic problem, not the actively bad-object mother of later 
childhood, but the earlier mother who failed to relate at all” (p. 747). In this regard, 
Winnicott’s theory opened a therapeutic region that was not available to Fairbairn.  
Guntrip credits Winnicott with the theoretical insight that his trauma occurred 
before his brother’s death, dating back to his mother’s initial inability to relate to him or 
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his brother. Guntrip believed that Winnicott’s willingness to let him regress to the stage 
of that trauma allowed him to work through those issues and internalize a good object. 
According to Guntrip, Winnicott facilitated this experience because he found: 
“…content and interpretations were nearly irrelevant…what was crucial was experience 
of the self in relation to the other” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 134). On this basis, 
Winnicott attempts to provide an environment in which the patient’s subjectivity can be 
regenerated. As a result, Guntrip can transform his sense of internal deadness through 
Winnicott’s warm and protective relationship, which he had lacked from Fairbairn. 
 Among many things, Guntrip’s description of his work with Winnicott 
illustrates that practice is not always the unimpeded expression of theoretical principles. 
Guntrip notices that Fairbairn was: “…more orthodox in practice than in theory while 
Winnicott was more revolutionary in practice than in theory.” (p. 742). This suggests it 
is possible to be clinically competent without theoretically lucid. Kwawer (1998) lends 
support to this view by arguing that Winnicott’s originality was not fully captured in his 
theoretical writing: 
‘Winnicott’, I always find myself wondering, ‘why do you have to speak Freud 
or Klein? You're always more engaging to me and more clinically relevant when 
you speak in your own voice.’ Indeed, I think Winnicott was engaged in a 
lifelong and largely unsuccessful struggle to free himself from the powerful 
emotional, political, and probably economic constraints of orthodoxy, both 
Freudian and Kleinian. (p. 394) 
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All the richness of a therapeutic encounter can potentially remain inarticulate, or 
worse, misinterpreted, if there is no appropriate language to express it. However, the 
reverse is also true given that clinical practice can be misguided without a conceptual 
framework to organize and understand clinical phenomena. Kohut (1977) argued as 
much when he introduced theoretical developments that, in his view, responded to a 
need to appropriately grasp the phenomenon of narcissism.  
Self-Psychology 
 
 Kernberg (1997) sustains that Kohut’s developments provided an important 
basis for the emergence of a relational approach:  
Parallel to what I have characterized as the “mainstream” development, there 
has been (especially in the United States) a rapprochement between approaches 
derived from self psychology on one hand and the culturalist psychoanalytic 
tradition expressed in contemporary interpersonal psychoanalysis on the other. 
(p. 99) 
Kernberg then argues that the shift away from classical analytic concepts owes 
much to Kohut’s emphasis on the self-object transferences as a focus of treatment (p. 
99). In this framework, the function of the analyst becomes providing the right kind of 
experience, then internalized by the patient, by being carefully emotionally attuned to 
the patient. Certainly the intersubjective school of relational psychoanalysis headed by 
Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange (1999), argues the same when they intend to “paint a 
portrait of Heinz Kohut as a pivotal transitional figure in the development of a post-
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Cartesian, fully contextual psychoanalytic psychology that recognizes the constitutive 
role of relatedness in the making of all experience.” (p. 381). Agreeing with Kernberg, 
they note that Kohut’s emphasizes on subjective experience led them to a contextual 
view of treatment and personhood (p. 381). Goldberg (2002) also notes self-psychology 
in its ongoing evolution has played a role in “other psychoanalytic excursions such as 
seen in interpersonal and social constructivist concepts” (p. 2).  
In spite of the centrality of his role in contemporary psychoanalytic developments, 
Kohut trained as a traditional psychoanalyst, even presenting his initial findings in the 
context of official psychoanalytic circles (Meronen, 1999, p. 211). Furthermore, his 
early work presented empathic observation as an addition to classical approaches, not 
as a replacement. Kohut did not present empathy as a replacement psychoanalytic 
methodology, and he noted Freud himself was a pioneer in the use of empathy, thus 
establishing a sense of continuity with the tradition (Kohut, 1959, p. 463-464). 
Eventually, Grotstein (1999) argues, Kohut would become the profession’s Luther 
spearheading a reformation with empathy as its main thesis (p. 123). Indeed, Kohut 
(1979) presents his approach, which he calls a “psychoanalytic psychology of the self” 
(p. 3), as an alternative to classical analysis. Ultimately, his later work provided deep 
theoretical revisions centering on a transfiguration of the role of narcissism in 
development and of the view of personhood in general.  
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In his paper Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage, Kohut (1972) outlines 
the basic tenets of his theory. Glassman (1988) states that Kohut viewed childhood 
narcissism as a normal developmental stage that requires an “affirmative attitude” from 
the analyst—both clinically and theoretically-- because it grounds the possibility for 
maturity and growth. When the child—and the also the narcissistic patient—is not 
provided with experiences of empathic attunement that gratify her narcissistic needs, 
then the self becomes fragmented leading to experiences of emptiness and impoverished 
subjectivity. But appropriate empathic responses facilitate healthy development: “In 
order to relieve feelings of helplessness, the infant requires the parent to serve as a 
"selfobject," i.e., an object that can perform psychological tasks such as tension 
management and self-esteem regulation that the infant is unable to perform for itself.” 
(p. 601). 
In this model, caregivers are self-objects, extensions of the child’s self that perform 
certain functions that the child is unable to do. Self-objects are like appropriate 
scaffolding on which developmental experiences rests. The primary function of the self-
object is to be empathically attuned to the growing infant thus allowing feelings of 
grandiosity and merger to “ward off the threat of disorganization in the face of 
helplessness.” (Glassman, 1988, p. 601). Consequently, a child without these 
developmental experiences remains fragmented and unable to manage distressing and 
disorganizing affect. The healthy individual has been afforded the opportunity to 
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internalize good self-object experiences and thus grow into an autonomous maturity. In 
Kohut’s (1972) own words: 
…the experiences during the period of the formation of the self become the 
prototype of the specific forms of our later vulnerability and security in the 
narcissistic realm: of the ups and downs in our self-esteem; of our lesser or 
greater need for praise, for merger into idealized figures, and for other forms of 
narcissistic sustenance; and of the greater or lesser cohesion of our self during 
periods of transition, whether in the transition to latency, in early or late 
adolescence, in maturity, or in old age. (p. 369) 
These changes eventually led Kohut to reconfigure even the most central of 
psychoanalytic concepts, the oedipal conflict. First of all, Kohut (1982) diminishes the 
centrality of the oedipal stage—which he differentiates from oedipal conflict-- as “only 
a link, and not the deepest one at that, in a causal chain” in development (p. 402). But 
more importantly, he challenges the idea that the oedipal conflict is normative. He 
posits instead that: “pathological 'Oedipus complex' (as distinguished from the normal 
'oedipal stage' of development) refers not to the essence of man but, that they are 
deviations from the normal, however frequently they may occur…” (p. 402). Normal 
experience involves not intergenerational strife but collaborative maturation. For Kohut, 
the basis of his disagreement with Freud rests on holding radically different concepts of 
what a human being is.  According to Kohut, Freud introduces a “Guilty Man”; an 
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individual eternally conflicted by tensions between his biology and the limitations of 
reality, a view grounded in a naturalistic view of personhood. Kohut argues instead that 
man is a tragic figure, marred by his difficulty fulfilling the promise of early 
developmental experiences. Kohut (1982) believes that man is a “homo psychologicus”, 
and not “homo natura” like Freud suggests (p. 402).   
Self-Psychology and Clinical Practice 
 
 In 1979, Kohut published The Two analysis of Mr. Z, a vivid portrayal of the 
differences that theoretical approaches can have on therapeutic conceptualization, 
technique, and outcome. This work illustrates the differences between his approach and 
the traditional psychoanalytic framework. In doing so, he utilizes an underlying view 
about the relationship between theory and practice in psychoanalysis that is worth 
articulating. To put it briefly, he believes that a theoretical approach allows us to let 
relevant material call our attention.  In this sense, a theory provides us with the right 
kind of seeing, and also the corresponding appropriate response to what is manifest. In 
turn, clinical practice challenges our theoretical framework and can reformulate it, 
albeit only if we let it. This reciprocal movement is illustrated in Kohut’s description of 
his analytic work.  
 Mr. Z is a young graduate student who presents with somatic complaints, 
feelings of social isolation, and inability to establish relationships with women. In spite 
of these difficulties, he had managed to achieve a certain balance in his life through his 
relationship with his mother and a close friend. However, this equilibrium was disrupted 
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when his friend began a relationship with an older woman, prompting Mr. Z to seek 
treatment. In addition to his initial presentation, Mr. Z’s history is significant because 
his father left when he was 3 years old to be with another woman, but returned home 
approximately 2 years later. Lastly, Kohut mentions almost in passing, a camp 
counselor sexually abused Mr. Z at age 11 and this relationship was maintained for a 
period of 2 years. It is worth noting that the slight attention this last event receives in 
Kohut's paper also reveals the effect a theoretical framework has on treatment approach. 
 Kohut notes that initially during therapy, Mr. Z often brought up feelings of 
entitlement and moments of palpable rage:  
He blew up in rages against me, time after time—indeed the picture he presented 
during the first year and a half of the analysis was dominated by his rage. These 
attacks arose either in response to my interpretations concerning his narcissistic 
demands and his arrogant feelings of 'entitlement' or because of such 
unavoidable frustrations as weekend interruptions, occasional irregularities in 
the schedule, or, especially, my vacations. (p. 5) 
Kohut interpreted this dynamic as Mr. Z’s attempt to return to a pre-oedipal 
fusion with the mother in which he held and expected her attention exclusively: 
“Formulated in the traditional terms of early object relations, we would say that this 
phase of the analysis revived the conditions of the period when, in early childhood, he 
had been alone with his mother, who was ready to provide him with the bliss of 
narcissistic fulfillment at all times.” (p. 14). This childhood experience was a form of 
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“overgratification” (p. 14) that instilled in Mr. Z a sense of entitlement and a fixation on 
this stage. In this narrative, the return of the father represents a challenge, and 
eventually a defeat, from which he defended himself by retreating into the illusion of 
his narcissism: “…I interpreted the persistence of defensive narcissism as it protected 
him against the painful awareness of the powerful rival who possessed his mother 
sexually and against the castration anxiety to which an awareness of his own 
competitive and hostile impulses towards the rival would have exposed him.” (p. 6). As 
a result of this classic conceptualization, the therapist role is to help the patient 
relinquish this narcissistic defense by means of insight oriented interpretations and 
working through the resistance, so that repressed oedipal wished can come to the fore. 
Kohut reports that he accomplished this and Mr. Z’s rages diminished while his 
capacity to sustain relationships with women improved, and this marked the ending of 
the first analysis of Mr. Z. All the pieces of this analysis fit together with “logical 
cohesiveness” and “seemed impeccable”, completely consistent with the “precepts that 
were then firmly established in me as almost unquestionable inner guidelines in 
conducting my therapeutic work.” (p. 9). But in the face of such rotund clinical-
theoretical success, Kohut felt dissatisfied with an aspect of the termination. Mr. Z had 
failed to show emotional depth through termination, which stood in stark contrast with 
the rest of his emotional experience through the analysis. Curiously, Kohut found this 
difficult to articulate at that point: “What was wrong at that time was much harder to 
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describe than what seemed to be right” (p. 9). It is as if the theory was telling him that 
they were done yet their experience did not reflect that. 
 Indeed, Mr. Z contacted Kohut several years later and began the second analysis 
that would follow a different set of guidelines. Mr. Z returned to analysis complaining 
of a lack of satisfaction with his life: his relationships were shallow and he could not 
derive pleasure from his work in spite of his success. Exploring his current situation led 
to an analysis of Mr. Z’s relationship with his mother, who turned out to have a serious 
personality disturbance of her own. Mr. Z’s difficult childhood experiences of being 
dominated and controlled by his mother had left him with a chronic feeling of 
depression and hopelessness, something the oedipal narrative failed to pick up: “…this 
traditional pattern of explanations fails to do justice to… an underlying chronic despair 
which could often be felt side by side with the arrogance of his demandingness” (p. 14). 
According to Kohut, Mr. Z’s depression resulted from a lack of developmental 
experiences in which his autonomy was facilitated. Instead, his mother’s need for 
control turned him into an extension of her, and her love for him was always conditional 
on his willingness to play this role. However, it wasn’t the desire to perpetuate this 
pattern that rooted his pathology—as classical psychoanalysis would hold. These 
experiences, and the developmental arrest that they afforded, were pathological in 
themselves. The analysis provided a restorative space where these could be discussed 
and eventually opened up the possibility of Mr. Z identifying with his father through the 
recollection of positive memories of them. The narrative structuring the analysis is 
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radically different than the previous one. Whereas the expectation before was to help 
the patient face a painful reality, Kohut now sees his role as providing empathic 
attunement as a catalyst for growth: 
I relinquished the health- and maturity-morality that had formerly motivated me, 
and restricted myself to the task of reconstructing the early stages of his 
experiences, particularly as they concerned his enmeshment with the 
pathological personality of the mother. And when we now contemplated the 
patient's self in the rudimentary state in which it came to view in the 
transference, we no longer saw it as resisting change or as opposing maturation 
because it did not want to relinquish its childish gratifications, but, on the 
contrary, as desperately—and often hopelessly—struggling to disentangle itself 
from the noxious selfobject, to delimit itself, to grow, to become independent. 
(p. 12) 
Furthermore, with the classical theoretical framework came a certain disposition 
towards Mr. Z: “I can still remember the slightly ironical tone of my voice, meant to 
assist him in overcoming his childish grandiosity…” (Kohut, 1979, p. 14). In the first 
analysis, these interventions were met with instances of rage. Yet Mr. Z noted that, 
during the first analysis itself, he was able to overcome his feelings of rage when Kohut 
provided the following interpretation: “Of course, it hurts when one is not given what 
one assumes to be one's due” (p. 5). 
 46 
 Within this different therapeutic horizon, Mr. Z was able to achieve a sense of 
independence and full self-hood. The marker for therapeutic success in the second 
analysis became Mr. Z’s greater capacity for understanding and compassion, not the 
logical coherence of the approach from a theoretical perspective.  
 The preceding paragraphs explore Kohut’s self-psychology in clinical practice 
in contradistinction to a classical approach. We can observe the way in which the 
therapeutic interaction is guided by a theoretical principle in each analysis, and how 
they lead to different paths. But Kohut does not articulate explicitly the way theory and 
practice relate to each other.  Nevertheless, he does present useful case information 
from which to make inferences about this relationship. Upon reflecting on the first 
analysis, from the vantage point of having finished the second, Kohut recognizes that: 
“Crucial material…had indeed appeared, but…it had failed to claim our attention” 
(Kohut, 1979, p. 15). What Kohut appears to be saying is that what counted as crucial 
was different in the first analysis, and as a result the important material remained 
unexplored. Thus, having a background understanding of what counts as relevant, and 
what is peripheral, is what permits clinical phenomena to “claim our attention”. It is 
also telling that he does not speak of the clinician intentionally directing her attention, 
but rather about the conditions that make it possible for clinicians to be called by the 
appropriate phenomena. But this begs the question of how we are ever able to shift from 
one theoretical horizon to the next, if they are so determinative of what appears as 
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relevant clinical phenomena. Indeed, Kohut claims to have been able to change 
paradigms, so on what basis was he able to do so?  
 Kohut’s dissatisfaction with the ending of the first analysis provides a telling 
clue. As mentioned above, even though everything about the analysis made sense from 
a theoretical perspective, his experience of Mr. Z’s emotional thinness during 
termination left him perplexed. Somehow this datum was claiming his attention, even if 
his background theoretical understanding was not flagging it as relevant. From this it 
follows that theory need not exhaust nor determine the interpretive possibilities present 
before us. The therapeutic encounter, however guided by theory, does not have to 
remain within its confines, and often it does not. This is precisely what permits Kohut to 
work beyond classical interpretations by remaining open to the experience of the 
therapeutic encounter. We can see evidence of this concrete openness in the following 
paragraph, when he details how he shifts interpretive strategies when the client 
repeatedly asks personal information about him:     
 …I did concede that, after listening to him further and watching his reactions, I 
had to agree with him that the term 'curiosity' that I had been using had not been 
right—that what he was experiencing now was not a revival of sexual voyeurism 
of childhood but some different need. And I finally ventured the guess that it 
was his need for a strong father that lay behind his questions, that he wanted to 
know whether I, too, was weak—subdued in intercourse by my wife, unable to 
be the idealizable emotional support of a son” (Kohut, 1979, p. 15).  
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Only after “listening” and “watching his reactions” was Kohut able to provide 
an account that made sense to both himself and his client. What Kohut does not seem to 
grasp is that, because of the openness that permitted this revision, this interpretation 
itself is subject to further revisions given the right circumstances. Instead, Kohut 
dismantles classical orthodoxy to quickly assemble his own. But his account of the 
movement from one to the other helps understand how theory and practice coexist in a 
dialogical and mutually constitutive relationship.  
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Chapter 2: Relational Psychoanalysis 
Introduction 
 
Ghent (1992) identifies the series of events that shaped the relational perspective 
and allowed it to emerge concretely from the matrix of its influences. First, he notes that 
the brewing ground for this thinking occurred in the NYU Doctoral Program in Clinical 
Psychology where: “the academic values of scholarship, diversity of thinking, efforts at 
integration and synthesis, and, above all, open discourse” were fostered (p. xv). Within 
this openness, Ghent sees two important works that stimulated integrative discussion 
around the concept of relationality. One was Merton Gill’s (1983) paper: The point of 
view in psychoanalysis: Energy discharge or person?, in which he introduces the 
concept of a “person point of view” that incorporates insights from interpersonal and 
self-psychology traditions (p. xv). The second is Greenberg and Mitchell’s (1983) book: 
Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory, which also attempted to survey and 
integrate different approaches around ideas of relationality. Finally, Ghent notes, the 
development of a relational track in the aforementioned postdoctoral program, and the 
founding of the journal Psychoanalytic Dialogues: A Journal of Relational Perspective, 
gave more institutional substance to the burgeoning movement. However, defining with 
precision just what relational psychoanalysis is proves more difficult than tracking its 
development and influences.      
As mentioned before, rather than a coherent approach to psychoanalytic theory 
and practice, relational psychoanalysis is a: 
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 …tradition (that) has emerged within American psychoanalysis with a 
particular set of concerns, concepts, approaches, and sensibilities. It 
operates as a shared subculture within the more general psychoanalytic 
culture, not by design, but because it has struck deep, common chords 
among current clinical practitioners and theorists in this country 
(Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xii).   
This tradition is composed of various psychoanalytic subgroups that emphasize 
the importance that relationships and social context have in the constitution of the 
psyche. In the quote above, Mitchell and Aron suggest that there was no design in the 
development of this movement, but rather a recognition of similar goals as an organic 
process throughout various camps (p. x). Berman (1997) notes that: "Relational 
psychoanalysis is not a new school, but rather a broad integrative orientation focusing 
on Self and Other” (p. 185). This leaves room for ample heterogeneity and 
disagreement within the relational psychoanalytic movement, which consequently spans 
various fields including postmodernism, intersubjectivity, and gender theorizing, among 
others.  
 As previously mentioned, in spite of the decentralized character of the 
movement, Stephen Mitchell is generally recognized as its informal leader. In his early 
work with Greenberg (1983) they first proposed the categorization of psychoanalytic 
theorizing into two camps: those models that emphasize the drives as the building 
blocks of the psyche, and those that recognized the primacy of human relationships in 
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the constitution of mind. Admittedly, there are some limitations with such a dichotomy 
as it risks falling into simplistic and crass categorizing. Mitchell’s success, however, 
lies in his ability to name a real phenomenon in the unfolding of psychoanalytic 
theorizing. In this respect, Eagle and Wolitzky (in Freedheim, 1992) comment that: 
To a significant extent, the history of theoretical developments in 
psychoanalysis can be understood as a series of successive reactions to 
Freudian drive theory, with its emphasis on libidinal and aggressive 
wishes as the primary motives for behavior. Thus, following Pine (1990), 
the main foci of theorizing in psychoanalysis subsequent to drive 
theory—ego, object, and self—can be meaningfully viewed as entailing 
modification or abandonment of that drive theory. These theoretical 
developments gave greater primacy to interpersonal and social 
determinants of personality development and psychopathology (p. 105). 
Mitchell’s contribution rests in his recognition of this trend, but extends beyond 
this, because he challenged, developed, and integrated pivotal notions within it. 
Consequently, an account of relational psychoanalysis requires a presentation of 
Mitchell’s views. 
 Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of the movement does not allow one to present 
only Mitchell’s views. There are others contributors to a relational perspective, whose 
views don’t always agree with Mitchell’s own. As he points out, the term relational 
“grew and began to accrue to itself many other influences and developments: later 
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advances of self psychology, particularly intersubjectivity theory; social constructivism 
in its various forms; certain currents within contemporary psychoanalytic hermeneutics; 
more recent developments in gender theorizing…” (Mitchell & Aron 1999, p. xi). A 
systematic exposition of all these views lies well beyond the scope of this work. In 
order to present shared assumptions and theoretical diversity in the relational approach, 
two other camps--selected for their potential to widen and pose interesting challenges to 
Mitchell’s approach--will be explored, following a more lengthy exposition of 
Mitchell’s own work.  
The intersubjective approach of Stolorow (1995) and colleagues stands out as a 
significant contribution. Trained in the Kohutian School of self-psychology, these 
theorists have proposed a widening of psychoanalytic conceptions based on the 
continental philosophy of Martin Heidegger and others. Their main concern resides in 
overcoming the Cartesian heritage of psychoanalytic conceptions of mind. On another 
end of the spectrum, psychoanalytic gender theorizing also surfaces as an important 
subgroup of the relational approach. The social constructionist bent of their specific 
views at times collides with Mitchell’s position, but the emphasis on the social 
construction of the self—particularly our notions of gender identity—constitute 
important examples of relationality in psychoanalysis. Within gender theorists, Nancy 
Chodorow and Lynne Layton are particularly relevant for their attempt to integrate 
postmodern thinking with clinical practice and relational theory (Dimen & Goldner, 
2002). 
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 All these thinkers share an understanding of the inadequacy of the Freudian 
drive model. They read Freud as defending that endogenous forces shape the mind 
almost exclusively. According to them, Freud holds that the determining character of 
our biological make up pushes from the inside out and finds fulfillment in an external 
social world. Mitchell (1988) notes relationships are not considered to be direct 
causative factors of mental structure in Freud’s model, being at best a catalyst for the 
expression of internal drives. Mitchell (1999) sees in this a problematic 
decontextualization of the nature of desire and the development of the mind. Congruent 
with this critique, Gender theorists often complain about Freud’s essentialism, which 
reifies socially constructed gender stereotypes into natural categories. Finally, the 
intersubjectivists argue that Freud’s drive model is a direct extension of Cartesian 
postulates, which brings with it the ensuing problems of presenting the mind as isolated 
and separate from an external world. Each view is a variation on a common theme: a 
rejection of Freud’s drive model as reductive and distorting of the inextricable social 
nature of selfhood. However, there are also notable differences between these positions 
which, if brought into dialogue, can possibly bring about important theoretical cross-
fertilization. 
 What follows then is an exposition of these three views, with some 
consideration for their origins, points of contacts, and disagreements. This analysis will 
serve to represent some of the basic contributions of relational psychoanalysis as a 
group, but also to understand important differences between these positions in order to 
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open up a dialogue aiming to refine them. Ultimately, it will be argued that their best 
insights can be properly grasped and integrated by attending to a wider philosophical 
horizon. Certain points of contact between the work of relational psychoanalysis and the 
theoretical psychology of Martin and Sugarman constitute helpful and important 
stepping-stones towards a wider integrating vision.  
Mitchell and the Development of Relational Psychoanalysis 
 
 As mentioned above, Stephen Mitchell sees his work as an integrative effort to 
“bridge the traditions” within psychoanalysis that already shared some common ground 
(Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xi).  From these schools Mitchell would derive certain 
elements of what he later termed the relational matrix, a construct meant to widen the 
unit of study in psychoanalysis from the individual, to the relationships that constitute 
him. Mitchell developed the concept in his 1988 book Relational Concepts in 
Psychoanalysis: An Integration, and assigned to it three different poles: “The basic 
relational configurations have, by definition, three dimensions—the self, the other, and 
the space between the two.” (p. 33). These poles are mutually constitutive, requiring 
each other for their coming into being: there are no objects without a self that 
internalizes them, no self without a matrix of relationships, and neither self nor object 
can exist without the psychic space in which they fulfill their transactions. Mitchell 
notes that the object dimension in this configuration has been largely explored by the 
object relations school, while the concept of the self has been developed by other 
sources, particularly the work of Kohut and Winnicott. Finally, the concept of a psychic 
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space, a bridge between “subjective experience and psychological world” of objects, 
has been studied by developmental theorists like Stern, and the interpersonal school of 
Sullivan, both of whom are concerned with the transactions between self and others (p. 
33).  
The “relational matrix” replaces the drive’s role in motivating human behavior, 
because it presents human beings as perpetually struggling to maintain their relational 
configurations: “There is a powerful need to preserve an abiding sense of oneself as 
associated with, positioned in terms of, related to, a matrix of other people, in terms of 
actual transactions as well as internal presences” (p. 33). According to Mitchell, 
individuals seek to maintain coherence and continuity in both their interior life and in 
their relationship to others, creating a dialectic between interpersonal and intrapsychic 
life that “sometimes enhance each other and sometimes are at odd with each other, 
forming the basis for powerful conflicts” (p. 35). By definition, the relational matrix 
includes both interpersonal and intrapsychic elements in its formulation.   
 With the relational matrix Mitchell presents a new unit of study, inherited from 
Sullivan, and a new theory of motivation. Mitchell (Mitchell and Aron, 1999) views his 
theoretical contribution as an attempt to navigate the perceived demise of Freud’s 
metapsychology: “…we were struggling to break free of a ‘classical’ metapsychology 
and technique that many of us experienced as extremely deadening, both for the new 
generation of ideas and in trying to grasp what is at stake in the clinical process” (p. xii). 
This navigation demanded a twofold task: differentiating himself from other positions, 
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while integrating new burgeoning approaches into a wider framework that 
acknowledged their best insights.  
 One of Mitchell’s initial attempts to differentiate his position is found in his 
article: The Wings of Icarus: Illusion and the Problem of Narcissism (1986). This is one 
of Mitchell’s early works in which he develops some of the conceptual foundation that 
would later house his formulated ideas about relational psychoanalysis. In order to 
advance an understanding of the psyche as constituted by human relationships,   
Mitchell contrasts three views on the role of illusion in the treatment of narcissistic 
neurosis: Kernberg’s, Kohut’s and his own, demonstrating that each therapeutic method 
grows out of a theory of mind with which the approach is congruent.  
Mitchell (1986) notes that Kernberg believes that: “transferential illusions 
concerning the self or the analyst must be interpreted quickly and vigorously, their 
unreality pointed out, their defensive purpose defined” (p. 110). Mitchell also observes 
that “This traditional emphasis on aggressive interpretation of narcissistic phenomena 
derives in part from the original view of ‘narcissistic neurosis’ as unanalyzable, and 
narcissistic defenses as generating the most recalcitrant resistances to the analytic 
process” (p. 111). As a result, the patient must be rapidly confronted, challenging his 
narcissistic illusions in order to make way for therapeutic gain. According to Mitchell, 
this prohibitive view of narcissistic illusion owes much to Freud’s drive theory, which 
sees narcissistic investment as a libidinal cathexis of the ego that must be redirected 
towards objects again in order to respond to the reality principle.  
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 In contrast to what he deems a draconian view of narcissistic illusion, Mitchell 
(1986) presents Kohut as an alternative model in which “narcissistic illusion…[is] the 
core of the self and the deepest source of creativity” (p. 114). The concordant 
therapeutic approach is to treat kindly “the appearance of narcissistic illusions within 
the analytic situation”, because they “represent the patient’s attempt to establish crucial 
developmental opportunities…”(p. 116). As a result, and standing in profound contrast 
with the previous view, the therapist must respond with complete warmth and empathy: 
“Anything short of a warm acceptance of narcissistic illusions concerning both the self 
and the analyst runs the risk of closing off the delicate, pristine narcissistic longings and 
thereby eliminating the possibility of the reemergence of healthy self-development” (p. 
116).  
Kohut’s emphasis on pre-oedipal stages of development as foundation for 
healthy psychological life grounds his project of rebuilding a self through experiences 
of empathy. Since the aim is no longer a direct accommodation to reality, but rather an 
authentic engagement with the world based on the creativity of infantile narcissism, this 
condition in the adult is not an obstacle to be surmounted but rather the path towards 
growth. The result is that narcissistic illusion needs to be acknowledged and embraced.  
 However, Mitchell disagrees with both positions and presents a third way 
beyond these opposing alternatives by using the myth of Icarus as a structuring parable:  
Daedalus, the builder of the Labyrinth, constructs wings of feathers and 
wax, so he and his son can escape their island prison. The use of such 
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wings requires a true sense of Nietzsche’s dialectical balance; flying too 
high risks a melting of the wings by the sun; flying too low risks a 
weighing down of the wings from the dampness of the ocean…(p. 122).   
According to Mitchell, Narcissistic illusion operates under the same constraints 
of Icarus: it can be neither fly too high nor too low in order to allow for healthy living. 
If a person is overrun by narcissistic illusion he lives a restricted life marked by 
grandiosity, but if he has none then he falls prey to idealization and passivity. Balancing 
the levels of illusion is the task of the therapist, who should neither aggressively 
shortstop nor passively embrace the illusion of the narcissistic patient. The therapist 
must instead view the patient’s grandiosity or idealization as an invitation to participate 
in the analysand’s world, an invitation that must be both accepted and questioned:  
…the most useful response entails a subtle dialectic between joining the 
patient in the narcissistic integration and also simultaneously questioning 
the nature and purpose of that integration, both a playful participation in 
the patient’s illusions and a puzzled curiosity about how and why they 
came to be the sine qua non of the analysand’s sense of security and 
involvement with others (p. 125). 
The acceptance of the patient’s illusions allows him to engage with the therapist 
in his usual way of relating with others. In turn, helped by the therapist’s subtle 
questioning, this allowance reveals the patient’s way of relatedness as an option and not 
the only way of being with others. This is a fundamental point of departure for Mitchell 
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(1986) because he establishes that narcissism cannot be effectively conceptualized 
primarily as an internal phenomenon, be it libidinal cathexis or creative flourishing, but 
rather as “a form of participation with others” (p. 124). Both Kernberg and Kohut think 
of narcissism as a manifestation of internal pressures and tend to ignore how it functions 
as a mode of relating to others.  
 The theoretical revision and the clinical approach presented in this paper 
established fundamental concepts of Mitchell’s relational psychoanalysis. However, 
although he continued to differentiate his approach from other systems, his later work 
was characterized by an impetus to find new integrative schemes that would bring 
together related but distinct models of human functioning. In Relationality: From 
Attachment to Intersubjectivity (2000), Mitchell presents his final integrating vision 
based on a reading of Hans Loewald’s work: he introduces a developmental theory of 
intersubjectivity which he calls an “interactional hierarchy” (p. 53). The theory has four 
modes or stages that occur sequentially in our development, but that also continue to 
operate “in dialectical tension with each other throughout the life cycle” (p. 58). Each 
mode is an “interactional dimension… through which relationality operates” (p. 58).  
The first two modes describe phenomena in which the connectedness of the 
human condition is most evident: our behavior and our affect. Mitchell explains how 
pre-symbolic and non-reflective behavior shapes the responses of those around us, and 
vice-versa, creating a mutually regulating interactional field. On a more sophisticated 
developmental level, human beings also bond over the contagiousness of affect that 
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permeates through the individuals creating an intense affective connection. What is 
characteristic of the first two modes, Mitchell notes, is the inability to firmly distinguish 
between the self and the other. In the case of non-reflective behavior, the interactional 
behavioral cueing occurs in joint movement, like dance partners whose synchronization 
allows them to feel a continuity between their bodies marked by a sense of 
undifferentiation. In the experience of shared affects there is also a similar sense of 
boundless union that cannot be appropriately traced to the individuality of each 
participant. In romantic love for example, two people are said to be ‘in’ love precisely 
because it is an affective experience that transcends them as individuals. In these first 
two modes of development, behavioral and affective, it is also impossible to firmly 
distinguish between an I and a you, it is rather the I-you dyad that is experienced:  
powerful emotional experiences are registered in a fashion in which what I am 
feeling and what you are feeling are not sorted out independently , but rather 
form a unity, the totality of which I experience as me…[and]…actions and 
interactions function without an organized conceptualization of self and other. 
On this level, the question, Who started it? Is meaningless, because the actions 
of each participant have evolved, through microadaptations, in complementarity 
to those of others. (p. 62)  
 Once the individual reaches the third mode of development, he is able to 
symbolize the other, but this recognition of the other remains predicated on a 
relationship to the self. Mitchell speaks here of the internalization of self-other 
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configurations, or internalized representations of my relationships with others. Thus, my 
relationship with my father leaves me with a sense of who I am that becomes enacted in 
other moment of my life, consciously or not. But the other continues to be recognized 
only in relation to the self, revealing an inability for true recognition : “in each of these 
three modes, others are not organized and experienced as independent subjects in their 
own right…only in mode 4 are others organized as distinct subjects” (p. 63).  
 In Mitchell’s framework, the fourth mode constitutes the pinnacle of our 
development potential for relationality because this is when we are finally able to 
recognize the subjectivity of the other person. For Mitchell, this is important for cultural 
reasons given that: “being fully human (in Western culture) entails being recognized as 
a subject by another human subject” (p. 64). Recognizing the subjectivity of the other 
involves an understanding of self and others as agents, that is, as individuals with both 
“self-reflective intentionality” and “dependency”, both the ability to sustain individual 
intentions, and the necessity of others for their completion (p. 64). Inevitably, according 
to Mitchell, this creates a tension: “between our efforts to have our own way, as an 
expression of our own subjectivity, and our dependence on the other, as a subject in her 
own right, to grant us the recognition we require” (p. 64). But this struggle is reflective 
of our highest potential for human relatedness fulfilled in an intersubjectivity that 
requires we mutually acknowledge each other’s humanity. Mitchell illustrates his 
position through a description of  the act of declaring one’s love to a romantic partner. 
This event takes place in mode 4 because it requires an important level of self-reflection 
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and self-definition, at the same time that it seeks the recognition from the other partner. 
Mode 4 events are marked by a reflective intentionality that seeks recognition from the 
other.  
 Mitchell notes that, in spite of being developmental stages, all four modes 
remain operative in our interactions with others. I can simultaneously be influenced by 
mutually constituted behavioral patterns, intense affective experiences, self-other 
configurations, and intersubjective relationships. By revealing different dimensions of 
our relatedness the framework also orients the clinician in the therapeutic process. 
Sometimes the therapeutic relationship must be addressed on the basis of what 
behaviors are shaping it, whereas at other times it is more helpful to discuss the nature 
of the shared affective experience. However, Mitchell’s developmental account seems 
to imply that intersubjectivity remains at the helm of these dimensions by guiding the 
process with self-reflection, intention, and sought-for recognition. Within this 
intersubjectivity, we learn “to contain in dialectical tensions different mutually 
enriching forms of relatedness” (p. 101). The goal of therapy would be to help achieve 
or sustain an intersubjectivity in which experiences of the other modes, which 
sometimes challenge a defined and clear sense of self versus other, are contained and 
understood.  
Given that intersubjectivity is a shared process that involves mutual recognition, 
the analyst’s subjectivity is crucial to the therapeutic process because it helps define the 
subjectivity of the client himself.  The formative experiences that occur in therapy 
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require that the therapist recognize the subjectivity of the client, always from his own 
subjectivity. But because the therapist is embedded in a relationship, the therapist also 
seeks the recognition of his subjectivity by the client. As a result, the analytic 
relationship cuts both way and also defines the therapist in the process. Mitchell (2000) 
presents a compelling illustration of this phenomenon when narrating an episode of a 
client who challenged his impersonal way of greeting her when inviting her into the 
office. Mitchell changed his impersonal demeanor with that client seeing important 
therapeutic improvement. What's more, he also began changing the way he greeted 
other patients in the waiting room (p. 97).    
In addition to providing a clinical guide, the modes are also intended to be 
theoretically integrative by accommodating different relational theorists into a typology 
according to the emphasis each gives to the phenomenon described in each stage: 
Thus, for example, Bowlby was most interested in behavior: what 
mothers and children actually do with each other…Fairbairn was most 
interested in self-other configurations…Benjamin is most interested in 
intersubjectivity…(p. 82) 
This does not entail that these thinkers operate exclusively within that mode, but 
rather take it up as an area of emphasis. What is more, Mitchell proposes his 
developmental model in order to integrate approaches and guide clinical practice, but he 
“does not claim to carve nature at its joints” (p. 59). 
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 Mitchell’s work stands as the foremost proponent of a relational psychoanalysis 
that attempts to transcend Freud’s emphasis on the individual mind. His work rests on 
the assumption that the mind is thoroughly constituted by interpersonal experience and 
its internalization, not by the outward expression of internal mechanical forces. The idea 
of the human being as acorn, naturally developing out of its own internal plan, given 
certain environmental conditions, is replaced with that of an intersubjectively engaged 
agent who learns to be who he is in the context of his relationships..  
Mitchell (2000), however, suggests at times that culture operates within the 
possibilities of our bodily condition. He notes that speaking of culture assumes 
“relationality as universal and fundamental feature of human development”, because it 
is on the basis of our relatedness that we are cultural to begin with (p. xii), presenting 
relationality as a fundamental characteristic of human nature. Although he falls short of 
grounding it in biology, like Bowlby does, he does speak of what he calls the 
“materiality of the body and its attributes” and of humans being “constrained by our 
materiality and the weight imparted by psychodynamic continuity” (Mitchell & Aron, 
1999, p. xvi). Furthermore, Mitchell continues to speak in the language of interiority he 
sometimes criticizes in Freud by using concepts like inner-world, intrapsychic, and 
internalization. Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood (2001), primary representatives of an 
intersubjective approach, have criticized him for retaining Cartesian notions of mind. 
Social constructivist feminist thinkers on the other hand, criticize him for risking a 
retreat into essentialist biologism. An outline of these views is presented in what 
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follows in order to consider theoretical challenges to Mitchell’s and their own 
approaches.  
 Worlds of Experience: Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange 
 
The term intersubjective has been appropriated by the psychoanalytic tradition 
in various and sometimes contrasting ways (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002): 
…developmentalists such as D.N. Stern (1985) have used the term 
intersubjective relatedness to refer to the developmental capacity to 
recognize the other person as a separate subject. In a similar vein, 
Benjamin (1995)…has defined intersubjectivity as mutual recognition. 
Ogden, by contrast, seems to have equated intersubjectivity with…a 
domain of shared experience that is prereflective and largely bodily. (p. 
85) 
Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood (2001), the theorists considered here, define the 
term intersubjective more inclusively as a “relational context in which all 
experience…takes form” (p. 474). This relational context is a field in which the 
personal worlds of subjects come together and mutually influence each other (Stolorow, 
Atwood, & Orange, 2002). At least two features are of central import to this view: first 
the notion that the unit of study must be enlarged from an interactive dyad (Mitchell & 
Aron 1999), to the very world the subject inhabits. Based on Martin Heidegger’s notion 
of being-in-the world, the intersubjective approach sustains that the subject cannot be 
grasped without understanding the world to which he belongs: “…the experiential 
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world seems to be both inhabited by and inhabiting of the human being” (Stolorow, 
Atwood, & Orange, 2002, p. 34). The complete interpenetrability of self and world 
renders these poles inseparable and mutually constitutive. In this view, the subject is his 
world, the context in which his experience takes shape and meaning.  
The second feature central to an intersubjective approach, also derived form 
Heidegger’s philosophy, is the centrality of affective experience: “…affect—that is, 
subjective emotional experience—has become a centerpiece of our psychoanalytic 
framework” (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002, p. 10). Shifting the emphasis from 
drives to the primacy of affective experience allows Stolorow and colleagues to 
underscore the phenomenology of psychological life, which is deeply intertwined with 
the world. Affectivity, when properly understood, is a concept that reveals the 
inextricable relationship between subject and world and obliterates any sharp separation 
of these two poles.  
According to Stolorow and his colleagues, the development of the concept of 
experiential world, with its emphasis on affective encounter, evolved from a detailed 
and extensive criticism of the Cartesian heritage. With remarkable succinctness and 
philosophical breadth, Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange (2002), point out eight 
assumptions about the mind inherited form the Cartesian tradition and present in most 
psychoanalytic thinking (pp. 21-38). Many of these concepts require further 
philosophical elaboration that will be taken up later in this work.  
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The first assumption is a view of mind as self-enclosed and isolated, separate 
from any social constitutive context. Second, and underlying this view of mind, is the 
subject-object split, a belief that reality is composed of two separate kinds of 
substances: objects—or extended things--, and minds—or thinking things. Third, and 
also related to the subject object split, is a distinction between an  inner and outer 
reality, where the external is real independently of our perceptions, and the inner is 
subjectivity acting as a container of representations. The fourth and fifth attributes of 
the Cartesian mind are the object and method of Cartesian inquiry respectively: a) the 
search for a certain foundation b) through the rigor of logic and rational thought. The 
sixth inherited assumption is the view of mind as atemporal, abstracted from the 
influence of the past and the future and always present as an enduring object in the here-
and-now.   The seventh assumption is the representational view of mind and the 
correspondence theory of truth. Finally, the last Cartesian assumption about mental 
functioning they describe is the view of mind as a substance. This produces a reification 
and reduction of mental phenomena to the category of a thing, a philosophical mistake 
that permeates much of Freud’s metapsychological postulates.  
This detailed critique of a Cartesian view of mind is meant to challenge many of 
our unspoken assumptions as Western thinkers. It also serves as a prelude and 
justification for the introduction of a contextualist position that they believe transcends 
many of these problems and confusions. To what extent their approach is successful, 
even by their own standards, is an open question which will be analyzed later as part of 
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my thesis. Nevertheless their appeal to a wider philosophical horizon brings some 
apparent problems with Mitchell’s view into relief.  
Stolorow, Orange and Atwood (2001) claim, for example, that the notion of 
projective identification implicitly used by Mitchell’s accounts of therapists enacting 
the client’s maladaptive patterns assumes two separate minds that emit and receive 
thoughts onto each other (p. 476). Based on Schafer’s work (1972), Stolorow, Orange 
and Atwood (2001) point out that the idea of projecting thoughts involves a confusion 
of spatial notions of interiority and exteriority with subjective—non-spatial—concepts 
of mind (p. 476). Minds, they claim, do not have an inside or an outside, they are 
“pictured as an emergent property of the person-environment system, not as a Cartesian 
entity located inside the cranium” (p. 480). The phenomenon in which a client evokes 
affective responses in the therapist which he himself is feeling, would not be understood 
as a projection of mental content between two separate minds, but as a shared affective 
experience that emerges as a property of an intersubjective system.  
The intersubjectivists challenge an assumption deeply held by Mitchell: his 
allegiance to a distinction between real interpersonal relations and internalized self-
other configurations. According to Stolorow and colleagues, such distinction mirrors a 
dramatic split between external and internal reality predominant in Cartesian thinking.  
This separation seems to originate from his attempt to integrate an interpersonal and an 
object relations perspective, which contain the Cartesian assumption of separate 
inner/outer realms. Mitchell considers that the integration of intrapsychic and 
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interpersonal realms provides a full account of human subjectivity that each side alone 
misses. According to the intersubjectivists, however, any conservative strategy would 
betray a lack of philosophical sophistication because: “persisting dichotomies between 
the intrapsychic and the interpersonal, between a one and two-person psychologies, are 
obsolete—reified, absolutized relics of the Cartesian bifurcation” (Stolorow, Orange, & 
Atwood, 2001, p. 481). Retaining this dichotomy inevitably presents the mind as 
separate form the world, as a container within the subject and not as an emergent system 
between the subject and his environment, as intersubjectivists argue.  
The intersubjective approach presents an important challenge to relational 
psychoanalysis by questioning its Cartesian assumptions. Their challenge pushes 
relational psychoanalysis to widen its unit of study and become more relational in the 
process. Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood are able to pose this challenge and provide an 
interesting answer because they appeal to a wider philosophical horizon that both 
informs their work and illuminates their clinical practice. Their approach, for example, 
criticizes the ethic of personal disclosure that relational psychoanalysis foments by their 
focus on “present moment thinking” (Stolorow, Orange, & Atwood 2001, p. 472). From 
an intersubjective approach, this atemporal understanding of therapy overlooks the 
influence of the patient’s history and perception of his future. In addition, by focusing 
primarily on the therapeutic relationship, the therapist might be oblivious to other 
contexts of relatedness that the client inhabits most of the time. This is why Stolorow, 
Orange and Atwood prescribe a widening of the therapeutic dyad as a unit of study to 
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include the entire world of the subject.  In spite of its clinical and theoretical sagacity, 
the question of how well intersubjectivity lives up to its own philosophical insights 
remains open and will be considered later. 
Intersubjectivity attempts to differentiate itself sharply from postmodern 
approaches in psychoanalysis noting that: “contextualism in psychoanalysis should not 
be confused with postmodernist nihilism or relativism” and that “Relativity to context is 
not the same thing as a relativism” (p. 482). However, what they do share with 
postmodern gender theorists, who will be considered next, is the belief in the deep inter-
penetrability, if not the identification, of the mind and its context. To use Mitchell and 
Aron’s (1999) term, the “radical forms of constructivism” accept as true the complete 
social construction of the mind following the postmodern thinking of philosophers like 
Foucault and Derrida (p. xv). But Mitchell and Aron (1999) present an important 
challenge to theorists that grant an exhaustive priority to the social: “…from our point 
of view, constructivism in political and gender theory, in its dialectical swing away 
from essentialism, often becomes too airy and ungrounded, missing the way in which 
the past, the inner world, developmental continuities, all have claims on our present 
experience” (p. xvi).  
This question also challenges the intersubjective approach by proxy, given its 
emphasis on abandoning any form of biological grounding or interior private 
experience. If the mind arises out of a person-environment system, then how does the 
subjectivity of the individual become differentiated from the world itself?  Mitchell 
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seems to be asking whether we are obliterating the individual and his real corporeal 
existence if we conceptualize him as completely undistinguishable from his world and 
its constructions. What follows then is a brief exposition of the constructivist 
perspective in psychoanalysis with a consideration of Mitchell’s criticism of ignoring 
intrapsychic and bodily dimensions.   
Social Constructionist Perspectives in Psychoanalysis 
 
 Like the relational tradition itself, postmodern influences within it are varied and 
complex (Dimen & Goldner, 2002), and a detailed exposition of all its views is beyond 
the scope of this work. Leffert (2007, p.177) notes that postmodern approaches within 
psychoanalysis are related to, but should not be entirely conflated with, intersubjective 
and relational perspectives. Furthermore, he notes that there is ample heterogeneity 
within postmodern psychoanalytic thinking, and that integrative work is on order. A 
representative overview of thinkers in this position is offered by Fairfield, Layton and 
Stack (2002), who note the heterogeneity in the movement but recognize there is 
important common ground. The dialogue between psychoanalysis, feminism, and 
postmodern philosophy is one crucial shared goal, if not the unifying platform, for 
many of these theorists (Flax, 1990, Fairfield, 2001, Layton, 1998). From within this 
interdisciplinary crossroads, several thinkers welcome the philosophical influence of 
Foucault and Derrida, while others tentatively explore the tensions between their 
philosophy and the realities of clinical practice. 
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 Derrida and Foucault’s influence is most noticeable in several projects that 
challenge prevailing notions of gender. Butler, Corbett, Dimen, and Goldner (in Dimen 
& Goldner, 2002) write excellent examples of this line of scholarship, in which cultural 
understandings of gender are analyzed in light of language and power dynamics. 
Specifically, they question the customary dichotomizing of gender into opposite poles 
(male/female), which are usually construed as natural categories. In their view, such an 
analysis subverts the power structure maintained by those constructs. In the words of 
Goldner (2002):  
I argue that dichotomous gender categories, precisely because they are 
essentialized, mutually exclusive, and unequally valued, can be used for 
magical ends in the psyche, in the family, and, as we have already seen, 
in the culture to carry, solve, or exploit existential oppositions and 
dilemmas. (p. 75) 
 Underlying this project we find a set of assumptions about the nature of reality 
that guides the inquiry. There is, for example, a Foucaultian (1978) view of knowledge, 
personal and academic, as a form of discourse that is culturally enacted to sustain power 
relations. In addition, we find Derrida’s position on language as an instrument of this 
polarization and domination (Fairfield, Layton, & Stack, 2002, p. 2). These theorists 
hold   that all our concepts, including our understanding of selfhood, are not natural 
categories but socio-political constructions sustained by linguistic practices (Mitchell & 
Black, 1995, p. 198). As Jones (2003) notes: “the ‘intrapsychic’ is actually a mode of 
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the interpersonal or even the cultural” (p. 171) in postmodern views, because, as 
Fairfield (2001) explains: “They enact it, reiterate it performatively, within a cultural 
setting that allows for the legibility of that construct” (p. 228). 
 In spite of a general acceptance of these premises, some psychoanalytic gender 
theorists raise questions about the relationship between feminist psychoanalysis and 
postmodern philosophy. Nancy Chodorow (1991), for instance, advocates a formulation 
of postmodern thinking that rejects essentialism but includes the role of individual 
psychology in the creation of meaning:  “gender difference is not absolute, abstract, or 
irreducible; it does not involve an essence of gender. Gender differences, and the 
experience of difference, like differences among women, are socially and 
psychologically created and situated” (p. 100). This appropriation seems to stem from 
recognizing the problems inherent in ignoring individual psychology in favor of cultural 
practices: 
In this view, meanings are imposed as cultural categories rather than 
created in contingent individual ways. According to this hegemonic 
feminist viewpoint, cultural order takes precedence over a more nuanced 
and variable individual personal meaning, and the psyche is entirely 
linguistic (Chodorow, 1999, p. 70). 
This quote poignantly illustrates Chodorow’s discomfort with cultural 
explanations completely displacing individual experience. According to her, the 
linguistic constitution of the psyche cannot explain the profound variability in human 
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experience without appealing to a psychological dimension.  She notes that it is “not 
only that people create individualized cultural or linguistic versions of meaning by 
drawing on the cultural or linguistic categories at hand. Rather perception and the 
creation of meaning are psychologically constituted” (p. 71). In her view, although the 
self is embedded in social contexts, experiencing them is intensely personal colored 
through affectivity and fantasy, such that cultural categories can neither exhaust nor 
determine the possibilities of individual life.  
 Lynne Layton (1998), another gender theorist who recognizes the role of 
individual psychology in the creation of meaning,  places Chodorow’s protest within a 
general “tension between individual specificity and cultural processes [that] has been 
much discussed among clinicians who are also gender theorists” (p. 9). She attributes 
this dialectic to the philosophical blindness of defenders of individuality on one hand 
and social construction on the other, who both miss each others claims. Her recipe for 
the successful integration of individual and postmodern approaches is the recognition 
that “the cultural is psychologically constructed, and the psychological is cultural” (p. 
10).  She argues that understanding would permit retaining a sensitivity to the reality of 
individual experience as well as its interconnectedness with the social contexts to which 
it belongs. As a result: “the way a black middle-class girl construes a gender identity at 
any particular historical moment , the way she puts together the possibilities that 
circulate in her family and culture, in turn contributes to constructing the set of cultural 
practices that will define ‘black middle-class female’” (p. 10).  
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 It seems, however, that both Layton’s and Chodorow’s strategies raise many 
questions about the interaction between personal and social reality. For example, we are 
left wondering on what basis the individual can “put together…the possibilities that 
circulate” (Layton, 1998, p. 63) in her context, without appealing to cultural values and 
ideas that inform those choices. This is problematic because if the criterion for personal 
choice is itself cultural, then individuality seems to become undistinguishable from 
culture.  Chodorow suggests that our psychology differentiates us from culture and 
allows us to appropriate it individually. She rejects the notion that culture simply 
provides meaning, positing instead that meaning and perception are actively constructed 
through affect and fantasy. However, in attributing such constitutive strength to the 
psyche she displaces the role of culture. We are left wondering again on what basis 
affective and fantasy create individual meaning if not from cultural constructs. An 
appeal to naturalistic view of affective life is, of course, also precluded if Chodorow 
wants to avoid charges of retreating into essentialism.   
 Chodorow and Layton both navigate what Dimen and Goldner (2002) describe 
as “ensuring that we neither essentialize gender nor dematerialize it” (p. xvii). On the 
one hand, postmodernists who emphasize the role of social forces in constructing the 
self escape naturalism and essentialism with all its trappings. By contrast, thinkers who 
retain notions of psychological experience as co-constructor of selfhood avoid the 
“dematerialization” of the individual into social structures. But this dialectic places 
either position into an uneasy theoretical tension.  
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Mitchell and Aron (1999) effectively identified the “dematerialization” of 
individuality that radical social constructivists face. He criticizes them for ignoring the 
claims that the intrapsychic and the “materiality of the body” make on an individual’s 
life (p. xvi). According to him, even tough the self is socially constructed, the elements 
out of which it is built must count. Discursive practices risk being too “airy and 
ungrounded” as the self’s only building blocks, so we need to acknowledge the impact 
of body and psyche as particular realities in the construction of the self (p. xvi). This is a 
challenging critique that resonates with Chodorow and Layton’s defense of individual 
meaning making. Like them, Mitchell embraces the intrapsychic role in the formation of 
meaning. Also like them, it is not clear that he succeeds in retaining a notion of 
individuality that does not fade into the cultural practices that constitute it. Mitchell’s 
intrapsychic life is ultimately constituted by interpersonal transactions, which again 
raises the question of what this psychology is based on if it is not equivalent to culture.  
Mitchell appeals to the reality of the body as a grounding principle in the social 
construction of the individual, yet “any ways in which those bodily attributes are 
described are themselves social constructions” (1999). If the body also must be 
interpreted in and through culture, it is not clear that it can ground any sense of selfhood 
above and beyond the cultural practices that constitute it.    
These theorists embody a profound tension between privileging individuality or 
social construction in understanding selfhood. If they hold on to a personal psychology 
then they must explain how it develops as something different than culture, and if they 
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embrace the cultural constitution of the self then they must face the risk of 
“dematerializing” our phenomenological sense of personhood. This is a dilemma that 
Jack Martin and Jeff Sugarman have identified as confronting a “Hobson’s choice 
between scientism or relativism” (1999, p. 41), “between modern foundationalism and 
postmodern radical arbitrariness” (2000, p. 402) and between “modern essentialism and 
postmodern antisubjectivism” (2000, p. 403).  Their work attempts to provide a solution 
from the perspective of theoretical psychology. Understanding how they frame this 
difficulty that plagues modern psychology, including relational psychoanalysis, should 
clarify the issues at stake in and facilitate a path towards a better answer.  
Relational Psychoanalysis in Clinical Practice 
 
 Having explored the theoretical underpinnings of these three schools of 
relational psychoanalysis, it is important to also note how their theoretical departure 
from classical precepts informs their clinical practice. Just like in theory, there are both 
differences and shared ground between these approaches in clinical practice. Possibly 
the characteristic these approaches share most clearly is their belief in never privileging 
the subjectivity of the analyst over that of the client. This view derives from the 
assumption that the therapist is an active participant in a shared relational process. As a 
result, she is never in a position to somehow stand outside of the therapeutic 
relationship to provide neutral—and thus more objectively real—interpretations.  
In an early work entitled The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Homosexuality: Some 
Technical Considerations (1981), Mitchell illustrates the insidious way in which 
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unrecognized analytic authority can be abused to distort what is happening between the 
patient and the analyst. He brings up the now outdated issue, at least in psychoanalytic 
circles, of considering homosexuality as an illness that needs to be treated by suggestive 
techniques (p. 65). The oppressive dimensions of this approach are now readily 
apparent to the contemporary reader, but what is more interesting and still relevant for 
current practice is Mitchell’s discussion of the use of interpretation as a way to conceal 
the influence of the analyst. Mitchell references the following clinical vignette 
originally presented by Ovesey (1969): 
This example involves patient 2, who, after much pressure from the analyst, 
goes to bed with a prostitute and that night dreams: 'He was in the woods. He 
was a male fox among many others and one of the foxes inserted anally into 
him. Then all the foxes, including the patient, changed into men' (p. 140). This 
dream is interpreted as a flight from heterosexuality to a 'magical repair through 
homosexual contacts' (p. 141). Ovesey doesn't consider the possibility that the 
dream represents the patient's experience of being dominated and overpowered 
by the therapist, who had pressured the patient into the heterosexual situation. 
The therapist's interpretation of the dream, in fact, seems to have been 
experienced as a further domination and control. (p. 69) 
The analyst couches his suggestion—perhaps unconsciously—in a plausible 
interpretation. This has the double effect of concealing the real message being 
transmitted—avoid homosexual behavior—and disassociating it from its author by 
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appealing to its neutrality and theoretical correctness. The subjectivity of the analyst, 
the guiding set of concerns, expectations, and dispositions that structure this 
intervention remains wholly unacknowledged and anonymously dominant.  
 In a relational model all interaction must account for the participation of the 
therapist. Interpretations of their process are not accounts of something the patient does 
independently over there, but rather an account of what the therapist-patient dyad 
participate in together. In postmodern perspectives that approach is accompanied by 
refined sensibility towards the workings of power in theoretical constructs. Stack (1999) 
notes that:  
As long as psychoanalysis promulgates the concept of “penis envy,” as long as 
we use this image no matter how we understand its symbolic meaning, we reify 
the phallocentric narrative that men have/ are the desired object that women 
lack. This heterosexist trope of desire rambles through our personal lives, our 
work with patients, and our professional relations, reinforcing and reenacting its 
belief in itself each time it shows up (p. 77). 
As such, when she listens to repeated presentations at a conference of male 
analysts struggling with the erotic transference of a female patient, she sees both the 
enactment and reinforcement of this narrative. For Stack it isn’t only the thoughts and 
feelings of the analysts we need to worry about, but also how these are structured—and 
sometimes concealed—by theoretical constructions grounded in dominant forms of 
discourse. Postmodern relationalists introduce the social shared background, with its 
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concomitant power differentials, into the room along with the subjectivity of the analyst 
and patient. They see these practices as deeply constitutive of subjectivity to begin with, 
and as such they will unavoidably inform the therapeutic interaction. But, if “all of the 
content that arises in the analytic situation is generated from the mind of the patient” 
(Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 234) as classical theory would have it, then whatever role 
the analyst has in bringing about an erotic transference or in enacting cultural constructs 
remains completely concealed. Postmodern clinical practice expects the analyst to 
always question their stance in the room instead, to “put their own assumptions into 
question” as a sine qua non for belonging to the “postmodern episteme.” (Fairfield, 
Layton, & Stack, 2002, p. 4).  
 But admitting that the analyst has an active role in the room and that her 
subjectivity needs to be recognized is not enough; these factors should be considered 
constitutive for an analytic relationship to take place. In other words, it is not that 
recognizing the influence of subjectivity places us in a better position to achieve 
neutrality, but rather the criticism places subjectivity at the core of a therapeutic 
relationship. In classical models, for example, countertransference needs to be 
neutralized, while in relational approaches it is often meant to be disclosed: “What is it 
to be done with the therapists feelings? Probably the most important dividing line in 
current approaches to using countertransference is around the question of whether the 
analyst’s reactions ought to be in any way divulged to the patient.” (Mitchell & Black, 
1995, p. 247). And even though, as Stepansky (2002) suggests, the “surgical metaphor” 
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of cold detachment and acting upon the patient was questioned by Freud himself, 
certainly the idea of analytic neutrality remains a viable construct in many circles, one 
that urges restraint on the part of the therapist (p. 500).  
 For the intersubjectivists (Orange & Stolorow, 1998) the issue of disclosure is 
not whether one discloses or not, but rather how one chooses to do so: “Intersubjectivity 
theory is even more radical on this topic. It recognizes that within any particular 
psychoanalytic situation or intersubjective field, two subjective worlds are continually 
self-revealing and attempting to hide. Even withholding is a form of communication.” 
(p. 532). From this perspective, the dilemma of communicating or withholding is a 
pseudo issue because we are always conveying a message in the process whether we do 
so or not. The more interesting question becomes how and when do we speak. Orange 
and Stolorow (1998) present a clinical vignette in which disclosure played an important 
role in advancing towards significant material:  
Once Erica settled into treatment and began to feel understood, a curious pattern 
developed. At the beginning of each session she would ask how the analyst's 
weekend had been, or how she was…Erica would ask more, or wait for more 
response, before she seemed able to move on…She was reluctant to point the 
pattern out, imagining Erica would feel shamed. Yet the merely polite responses 
were evidently also problematic…Perhaps, the analyst thought, Erica needed her 
analyst to talk about herself. So, one Monday, when asked what she had done on 
the weekend, the analyst responded that she'd mostly done chores, had done 
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some reading, and had been to a concert. Since then, they have tended to “chat” 
for about three minutes at the beginning of each session. Erica has come to 
know a fair number of details about her analyst's interests and activities. (p. 
536). 
Eventually, while discussing the meaning of this changed interaction, the patient 
discovered that the function of this initial dialogue had been first to test the authenticity 
of the analyst, and then to also check her emotional state to see if she was healthy 
enough to trust her with her own psychological burden. One can imagine this same 
issue being address in a more restrictive frame and also being resolved. But without the 
accessibility of the therapist in that act of self-disclosure, it is also possible that the 
patient will leave with a different message about how to negotiate relationships outside 
the session. 
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Chapter 3: Beyond the Intrapsychic vs. Interpersonal Dualism 
Differing Concepts of Personhood 
 
So far this work has had three aims: 1) to highlight a point of theoretical tension 
within relational psychoanalysis regarding concepts of selfhood by bringing some of its 
variants into dialogue, 2) to present these relational schools in the context of their 
influences, and 3) to present ideas about the relationship between theory and practice in 
psychoanalysis. A more careful presentation of the praxis/theory relationship requires 
reviewing concepts that will be presented in the following chapter, and thus that line of 
investigation will be held until then. However, in order to address the problematic 
tension within relational schools introduced earlier, it would be helpful to articulate it in 
more detail.   
As mentioned before, relational psychoanalysis is unified by a series of critiques 
of traditional concepts of self in psychoanalysis. The three positions outlined above--
Mitchell, the intersubjective school, and postmodern psychoanalysis—all present 
related but subtly different critiques of traditional psychoanalytic notions of selfhood. 
Mitchell contends that classical psychoanalysis conceptualizes human beings too 
narrowly by viewing interpersonal relationships as merely epiphenomenal and innate 
drives as constitutional. In this view, intrapsychic conflict determines our behavior 
while other people and the world we occupy are the actors and stage that instantiate an 
internal script. This represents a one-person view of psychological life, according to 
Mitchell, which fails to consider the constitutive role of relationships in personhood. 
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Mitchell could be described as criticizing the individualistic tendencies of Freudian 
theory.  
The intersubjective approach criticizes traditional psychoanalysis from a 
different front by questioning the very concept of an internal private world. This 
constitutes a direct attack on notions of personal intrapsychic life. They propose instead 
that people have experiential-worlds, webs of meanings and relationships with others 
that constitute their identity. In this framework, subjectivity is constituted by the 
relationship with other subjectivities and their corresponding matrix of meanings, each 
from their own perspective. According to Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange (2002), the 
self is inherently intersubjective because there is no self without the subjectivity of the 
other. Intersubjectivists can be seen as primarily criticizing the cartesianism of Freudian 
theory—its notion of a private and separate subjectivity. Postmodern psychoanalysts 
focus their critique on Freud’s essentialism, the idea that human beings have an 
unchanging underlying core. They present instead a radically different view of selfhood, 
derived from poststructuralist philosophy,that denies it is possible to understand any 
phenomena in terms of unchanging and universal structures, like those provided by 
natural science. In its place, human beings are seen as constituted by language, which is 
itself always constrained by historical context. In this view, psychological life is 
constructed socially as a form of discourse, a consensual way of speaking about reality. 
As a result, the subject becomes de-centered, there is no core or center of selfhood but 
rather a multiplicity of selves that we enact in everyday life through our different roles.  
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All three critical themes, individualism, cartesianism, and essentialism, reflect 
similar concerns with the decontextualization of the self from the world. However, 
while Mitchell is sympathetic to the importance of contextualizing the self, he wants to 
retain notions of interiority and biological givens, and this puts him at odds with 
intersubjectivists and postmodern psychoanalysts. But if the other two groups are 
correct, retaining ideas of a private subjectivity and/or biological givens results in 
decontextualizing the self from social reality. Conversely, Mitchell poignantly asks if 
the self disappears into thin air if it is so thoroughly contextualized, wondering what 
happens to our mind and our body when it is so indistinguishable from that of others. 
As Ghent (in Skolnick & Warshaw, 1992) so lucidly articulates, it is possible that “The 
self as a center of activity and agency has somehow been neglected by placing the 
emphasis so firmly on a two-person psychology.” (p. xxi). 
It seems then that relational approaches defend what could be described as thin 
accounts of personhood:  theories that emphasize the self’s constitutive engagement 
with a social realm, plural and discontinuous character, discursive structure, and 
perpectival access to reality. These characteristics are prominently found in postmodern 
critiques of selfhood. On the other hand, some voices within relational psychoanalysis 
want to preserve aspects of what could be termed thick accounts of personhood: those 
that present the self as unitary and continuous, with a substantive and unchanging core, 
primarily engaged with mental contents, and biologically grounded. These are 
characteristics usually associated with a modern view of selfhood. Relational 
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psychoanalysis seems to occupy a tense space between these two positions, often 
oscillating between them. When one of its voices thins out personhood, another asks 
about the disappearance of a substantive self.       
Martin and Sugarman 
 
Martin and Sugarman (1999, 2000) tackle the problematic introduced in this 
work in a related yet different context. Their aim is wider in that they target the social 
sciences at large and tackle philosophical questions about agency and the capacity for 
choice. However, the phenomenon they describe is quite similar to the one present in 
relational psychoanalysis--this push and pull between thin and thick accounts of 
personhood—thus making their thinking potentially beneficial for the issues at hand. 
From their wider optic, Martin and Sugarman note that in recent decades the social 
sciences and psychology have come under heavy attack for presupposing and operating 
within characteristically modern views of human agency and the self. Cushman (1990, 
p. 604) notes that the social sciences operate under a modern view of selfhood as a 
"bounded, masterful self," that "is expected to function in a highly autonomous, isolated 
way" and "to be self-soothing, self-loving, and self-sufficient." Regrettably, Cushman 
argues, this inflated and overly autonomous modern self transforms into an "empty 
self," characterized by feelings of fragility, emptiness, and an emotional that oscillates 
between feelings of grandiosity and worthlessness (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 
1999). Likewise, Gergen (2001), takes psychology to task for being “essentially a by-
product of what is often called cultural modernism”, characterized by “three modernist 
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themes—emphasis on the individual mind, an objectively knowable world, and 
language as carrier of truth” (p. 803). Instead, Gergen argues, we should move “from 
individual reason to communal rhetoric”, “from an objective to a socially constructed 
world”, and in language “from truthful picture to pragmatic practice” (p. 805). 
Like in psychoanalysis, many influential postmodern thinkers in contemporary 
psychology (Gergen, 1985, 1994; Slife & Williams, 1997; Giorgi, 1970) have sharply 
critiqued the modern overly atomistic conception of the self, one that seems abstracted 
or detached from any meaningful social context. In its radical variants, these criticisms 
insist on the social construction of the self and human identity and usually argue for an 
epistemological perspectivism that appears to be potentially liberating for postmodern 
selves (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Although a minority standpoint in 
psychology and psychoanalysis, the postmodern/social constructionist influence has 
grown considerably in recent years. However, it has sustained a number of criticisms. 
Smith (1994) contends that the postmodern “flow of discourse leaves us bereft of 
anchors to stabilize a view of self and world”, leaving psychology with an “extreme 
version of antiscientific relativism” that “is gaining prominence at the margins of 
mainstream psychology.” (p. 408). Parker (1998) noted that reactions to postmodernism 
in psychology have centered on defenses of realism and scientific explanation, adding 
that postmodernism is “particularly pernicious in its embrace of relativism and 
amoralism” (p. 622). Eagle (2003) expresses his concern over the excesses of 
postmodernism, noting that:  
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…legitimate criticisms of some traditional psychoanalytic views have been 
transformed into untenable philosophical positions that do not constitute an 
adequate basis for psychoanalytic theory or practice. For example, skepticism 
toward the therapeutic value of insight and self-knowledge has been transformed 
into a philosophical position that rules out the very possibility of discovering 
truths about the mind. (p. 411) 
A number of voices within psychology find considerable fault with both modern 
scientistic and relativistic postmodern approaches to understanding human life. These 
critics speak in various ways of a need to move beyond the dualism of scientism and 
constructionism (Zeddies & Richardson, 1999; Richardson, et al., 1999). These 
critiques owe much to the work of Richard Bernstein, who in his book Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (1983) notes that: 
There is an uneasiness that has spread throughout intellectual and cultural life. It 
affects almost every discipline and every aspect of our lives. This uneasiness is 
expressed by the opposition between objectivism and relativism, but there are a 
variety of other contrasts that indicate the same underlying anxiety: rationality 
vs. irrationality, objectivity vs. subjectivity, realism vs. antirealism. 
Contemporary thinking has moved between these and other related extremes. 
Even the attempts that some have made to break out of this framework of 
thinking have all too frequently been assimilated to these standard oppositions. 
(p. 1) 
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Bernstein’s recognition of this academic and cultural malaise is now over 20 
years old yet thinkers who continue to point out this problematic are anything but 
anachronistic. This phenomenon certainly speaks to the force and endurance of these 
opposing contrasts, which Bernstein acknowledges. Certainly Martin and Sugarman are 
deeply aligned with such a critique and articulate its problematic very lucidly as it 
pertains to social science. What follows then is a preliminary analysis of their account 
of human agency and selfhood. Stating their view of the current problematic facing the 
social sciences will help frame the dilemma facing relational psychoanalysis in a new 
light. 
Beyond Modern and Postmodern Selves 
 
 In their book The Psychology of Human Possibility and Constrain (1999), 
Martin and Sugarman begin their investigation by responding to what they consider an 
important limitation of some variants of postmodern thought: the eradication of 
personhood as an ontological category. Against postmodern criticism they ask: “Is there 
nothing of value to be gained by retaining something of the individual psychology 
against the ever-present sociocultural fabric of human existence?” (1999, p. 3). 
However, their question does not represent a complete rejection of postmodernism, the 
authors claim, for it has provided useful critiques of atomistic views of selfhood. Martin 
and Sugarman acknowledge that challenging the idea that people can be understood 
separated from their history and surroundings, is a timely and invaluable notion which 
helps us understand personhood in a richer light. They also recognize that there is 
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important heterogeneity within social constructionist approaches, and that some place 
significant emphasis on the reality of individual experience.  Nevertheless, they note, 
“more radical versions of postmodern social constructionism seem to us…to erase both 
the psychological agent and the possibility of warranted psychological understanding.” 
(Martin & Sugarman, 2000, p. 399). In other words, radical postmodernists usually take 
their claims further than the phenomena requires. Martin and Sugarman also qualify this 
claim about radical postmodernists saying that: “it may be possible to interpret the 
strong version of postmodern social constructionism as advocating only a social 
relational constitution of the psychological agent”, although they do find indications 
that these radical perspectives tend to be reductive (p. 399). Although this is a topic 
worthy of discussion in itself, it is not important whether Martin and Sugarman 
accurately depict all variants of constructionist approaches but rather that they clearly 
delimit the positions they are arguing against. If it turns out that some postmodern 
variants can successfully defend a socially constructed self that does not loose its 
personhood, then that would be a type of postmodernism that Martin and Sugarman 
would likely embrace.    
 In sum, the problem as Martin and Sugarman (1999) see it is that a radical social 
constructionist view collapses psychological individuality with the social background 
from which it develops: “we believe that there is an important sense in which these 
various proposals conflate individual psychological experience with plausible 
sociocultural explanations for such experience.” (p.3). According to them, the 
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sociocultural level of explanation is not incorrect, but taken as the sole perspective it 
occludes the individual experience that a psychology of personhood tries to capture. 
Furthermore, when selfhood is understood solely from a social perspective a number of 
philosophical, and ultimately practical, problems ensue. For example, in such a system 
there is no room for the phenomenal experience of ourselves as individuals making 
meaningful choices within a social and cultural context. The social context becomes 
undifferentiated from the individual in such a way that making choices is impossible. 
However important the re-embedding of the subject in a historical and cultural life-
world might be, we are throwing the baby with the bath water when we weave them 
into the world to the point of virtual extinction. Martin and Sugarman respond to this 
problem by providing a fresh account--one that in its own way tries to move beyond 
tired and rigid dualisms--of how we develop and function as human agents in our social 
universe.  
Social Constructionism and Cognitive Constructivism 
 
According to Martin and Sugarman (1999) the entire discussion about the nature 
of the self and its relation to society in the human sciences, and elsewhere, is deeply 
affected by a problematic dualism.  At one pole of this dualism we find social 
constructionists, who claim that the self is constructed out of or largely the product of 
social interactions. The individual, through its immersion in conversational practices, 
learns to organize thought and experience into a meaningful framework. Society 
provides individuals with both the cognitive tools and the symbolic content that 
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constitutes their identity. The primary focus of explanation is at the social level. On the 
other pole, cognitive constructivism holds a more traditional conception of the self. This 
view posits that learning occurs through a series of innate mechanisms triggered in the 
individual through its interaction with the environment. As a child grows, he passes 
through several stages of cognitive development that regulate his thinking and 
experience of the world.  The focus of explanation is at the individual level.  
Each of these opposing views, according to Martin and Sugarman (1999), say 
something illuminating about personhood and society. Social contructionists point out 
how identity originates from society by means of the internalization of pre-existing 
social orders. But they have great difficulty explaining two phenomena. The first is the 
existence of novelty or originality. The second is the phenomenological experience of 
individuality and choice. If individuals are constituted by the social through and 
through, where do new ideas come from? In addition, if the category of the social 
suffices to explain psychological phenomena, what do we make of our rich individual 
experience of the world as we make choices and, often arduously, sort through a 
plurality of meanings in the process?  
Cognitive constructivists, on the other hand, are able to account for at least some 
of the generation of novelty by the individual as well as the experience of meaningful 
encounter that each individual has with the world. Nevertheless, they have a difficult 
time explaining how is it that we manage to communicate and cooperate so well with 
other people. It seems then that both poles reveal aspects of human existence that are 
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truthful: one emphasizes our personal encounter with the world while the other 
illuminates the shared nature of our identity. And so Martin and Sugarman (1999) 
observe that: 
With social constructionists such as Vygotsky (1934/1986), Mead (1934), 
Gergen (1985), and Shotter (1993), we contend that the individual arises from 
the sociocultural. However, concurring partially with the contrasting view, as 
represented by cognitive constructivists such as Bartlett (1932), Piaget (1954), 
Kelly (1955), and Mahoney (1990), we also contend that the individual is not 
isomorphic with, nor educible to, the sociocultural. (p. 5)  
However, they don’t consider this statement to be a conclusion, but rather the 
starting point of an integrative effort that needs to justify how to bridge concretely these 
apparently discrepant perspectives. The reason why this has been difficult, Martin and 
Sugarman tell us, does not reside in some important difference between these views, but 
rather in an important assumption they actually share. Both treat their central categories 
as closed fixed entities. What is required, the authors say, is a conceptualization that 
understands the social and the individual as mutable and mutually constitutive 
processes: “…the real problem with sociocultural-psychological dualism has less to do 
with the drawing of a divide between societal-cultural phenomena and individual-
psychological phenomena, than it has to do with treating that which is on either side of 
this divide, and the divide itself, as fixed and immutable.” (1999, p. 6).  
The Metaphysics of Dynamic Interactionism 
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 For Martin and Sugarman, if we operate under the assumption that the social and 
the individual are fixed and immutable entities, then we are forced to see them as 
mutually exclusive explanatory frameworks. If we consider the category of the social as 
something closed, fixed, and thus complete unto itself, then by necessity this category 
co-opts any explanatory power that we could find at the individual level. Of course, the 
reverse is also true. If cognitive constructivists assume that individuality is a closed 
category, they are forced to consider the social as nothing more than a derivative 
phenomenon. This underlying assumption of fixedness prevents each pole from 
understanding its relationship to the other. Martin and Sugarman argue that this 
assumption blocks each side from being receptive to the partly valid claims of the other. 
For the cognitive constructivist, it displaces the centrality of social contributions in the 
formation of individuality. In the case of social constructionists, it leads them to 
downplay—or outright ignore—the experience of agency and the individual’s encounter 
with the world.  
 Clearly, rejecting one pole in order to favor the other is an incomplete solution, 
but simply adding them together creates more questions than answers. How is it that we 
are constituted by social forces yet not determined by them? If individuality is 
something more than its sociocultural origins, from where does it get it? To answer 
these questions, Martin and Sugarman argue, we need to first challenge the assumption 
of fixedness that frames this dualism. Once we allow ourselves to think about 
alternatives to this assumption, we can begin to work out a better account of 
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personhood, culture, and their relationship: “the key to this bridging of atomism and 
holism is to treat societies and cultures not as things with effective causal powers, but as 
dynamic interrelational processes through which social and psychological practices are 
ordered over time.” (1999, p. 13).  
 Martin and Sugarman utilize Gidden’s (1984) theory of structuration to explain 
the interrelated process of individuals and social co-constitution. In this view, social 
structures have a regulatory function in the lives of individuals; they dictate parameters 
for action and meaning in societies. For example, the organization of the US 
government stipulates that no one should take hold of office by force. The democratic 
process gives its members a degree of power over the collective norms that rule their 
lives. However, this political structure requires the participation of individuals to breath 
life into it. In other words, there can be no democracy without a group of democratic 
individuals, but we cannot be democratic individuals without a democracy to constitute 
us as such. Society and individuals need each other to exist. Additionally, this 
relationship is not static. The structures do not rigidly determine individual behavior 
any more than the reverse occurs. Once within a structure, individuals re-work their 
beliefs and values in light of new situations and experiences. As a result, individuals 
have a historical effect on shaping the form and nature of these institutions as much as 
the institutions have an effect on shaping its members. Society and individuals are 
dynamically interactive and mutable.  
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Martin and Sugarman hold that change in societies arises through psychological 
individuality, yet they are enabled and constrained by the sociohistorical structures that 
they inhabit. In their discussion of dynamic interactionism, the theory they propose as a 
bridge between social and individual explanatory frameworks, they state that: 
An ineluctable condition of human existence is that at birth, humans are thrown 
into already existing societies and cultures that have evolved in a real physical 
world. As biological organisms equipped with rudimentary physical and 
perceptual activity, human infants are capable of prereflective embodied 
experience. (p. 17) 
 In their view, before we develop reflexive agency our capacity to understand is 
grounded in a precarious sensory and perceptual apparatus. This embodiment is an 
existential given that predates the existence of anything like a mind. However, as we 
become exposed to language and other symbolic mediation processes present in culture, 
we learn to organize our experience in a way that makes reflexivity emerge. We shift 
from an unmediated direct perception of the world as biological entities to a reflexive 
understanding of the world mediated by what these authors call theories of ourselves 
and the world. Once we develop the cognitive capacities of imagination and memory, 
we have the ability to hold such theories about ourselves and the world. This capacity to 
cognitively theorize about the world, the authors argue, is what gives us enough 
distance from the sociocultural and biological to make innovative decisions. Theories of 
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self and the world create enough of a separation between the individual and society to 
create new imagined possibilities: 
In our ontology of human existential givens, we rejected the idea of an initial 
separation of human psychology from its sociocultural context, but subsequently 
we argued strongly for possibilities of sociocultural innovation and change 
resident in an emergent, dynamic dualism, one that acknowledges a gradual and 
graduated separation of individual psychology from its largely sociocultural 
determinant. (pp. 130-131) 
Without this separation and emergent reflexivity, Martin and Sugarman tell us, 
there is no change and there certainly is no agency. People are initially originated by 
sociocultural structures and biological conditions, but at a given point individuals 
develop the capacity to transcend their sociocultural and biological origins. They are 
able to do so when they have become psychologically constituted. After internalizing 
societies interpretive practices, individuals develop the capacity to interpret themselves 
as meaningful actors in a social context. They form personal theories about themselves 
and the world, which allows them to influence their surroundings in an self-reflexive 
way. When this occurs, Martin and Sugarman tell us, the psychological has emerged. 
Once we are constituted as psychological beings, we develop the capacity to make 
choices, we become agents. 
Free Will and Determinism 
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Martin and Sugarman note that an important philosophical consequence of 
accepting radical social-constructionism, is the idea that we are fully determined by our 
environment. Society both originates and regulates the individual in its totality. As a 
result, the individual is never in a position to diverge from a given social structure, he is 
determined by it. Within the philosophical debate about freedom and determinism, 
radical social constructionists fall under the category of hard determinists. In stark 
contrast to this position, those who hold we posses free will believe we are able to make 
choices that transcend the situations that they are made in. People in this camp sustain 
that the individual is completely free to choose his own fate, regardless of the 
environment. There is also a third alternative to these two positions called 
compatibilism., which holds that an individual can be both determined and free.  
There are a variety of forms that compatibilism can take, but Martin and 
Sugarman identify one which in their view provides part of the basis for a sound theory 
of embedded agency. Their form of compatibilism states that individuals are both 
determined and free because their beliefs and desires are included as a variable in the 
causal process. If my desires and beliefs are also taken into account in the explanation 
of the causal chain, then I have made a free choice. For example, imagine you have 
been socialized to become a civil member of society and you hold civility as a belief 
and desire. Whenever you act from this belief, you are making a free choice even if the 
belief itself originates from your upbringing. Freedom in this sense requires congruence 
between your beliefs and your actions. In essence, once the self becomes part of the 
 99 
determinant of behavior, then the individual is both determined and free. The trick is 
that the self, according to Martin and Sugarman, is “underdetermined” by social forces.  
Underdetermination is a thesis that Martin and Sugarman’s propose in their new 
metaphysics of the self. It holds that fundamental dimensions of human existence, such 
as biology and society, have an impact in determining the self but cannot wholly shape 
it. These forces underdetermine the self, which in turn opens up a space for self-
determination. This self-determination does not occur in a vacuum, however, like many 
free will defenders claim. According to Martin and Sugarman, it is conditioned by 
social and biological realities. So, for example, as a member of modern society I can 
choose to be employed in a variety of professions, but I cannot choose to be a sixteenth 
century Italian poet, or a phrenologist. To put it another way, I can choose to run instead 
of walk, but I can’t choose to fly.     
Limitations of Martin and Sugarman’s approach 
 
Martin and Sugarman present a persuasive account of how an individual 
psychology emerges from the social, and how subsequently these two forces in turn 
shape or constitute each other. In the process, they also take a compatibilist position on 
the question of free will and human agency, which attempts to integrate our biological 
and social embeddedness with our experience of ourselves as the agents of our lives. 
Their view is compelling in many ways, and I take it to be more theoretically 
sophisticated than the conventional alternatives they discuss.  
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However, their account of what it means to be an individual that remains 
embedded in culture contains unexamined assumptions that need to be brought to light 
and critically examined. Ultimately, their solution invokes notions that run counter to 
some of its own tenets. For example, when they speak of the internalization of socio-
cultural practices they assume an idea of the mind as an inner-space that contains 
mental representations that mediate our experience with an external world. 
Additionally, they locate the source of individuality and free choice in cognitive 
faculties that allows the self to create a theoretical sphere of distance from the world. 
Lastly, they assume that psychology must be explained within the framework of a 
natural scientific paradigm. From a Heideggerian (1962) perspective, a source that these 
authors claim as an influence, their view of selfhood does not transcend the 
individual/society dualism that it attempts to move beyond. It seems that in their effort 
to retain an idea of selfhood they revert to the modern Cartesian self that they so 
thoroughly criticize.   
I am suggesting that Martin and Sugarman might want to develop the 
hermeneutic (Gadamer, 1977, 1984, 2000) dimension of their thought more fully, in 
order to better accomplish their aim of finding a way that truly goes beyond 
postmodernism and cognitive constructivism. Such development may be required if 
Martin and Sugarman’s account of selfhood and agency is to escape the theoretical dead 
ends and untoward practical consequences of postmodernism and cognitive 
constructivism that they so richly document for us.  
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Consider, for example, the question of free will and embeddedness touched 
upon briefly earlier in this work. Martin and Sugarman adopt a version of 
compatibilism, but Kane (1996) and Richardson and Bishop (2002) present strong 
arguments against this view. They point out that a careful analysis of compatibilism 
shows that it dissolves rather than preserves genuine freedom and agency. If our desires 
and choices are really just links in law-governed chains of efficient causes and their 
effects, they do not represent genuine freedom or agency but are quite determined by 
past or current events. If they do represent genuine freedom or agency, it would appear 
they can do so only as mysterious, unexplainable interventions from beyond the 
ordinary world and the events in it. The implication of their criticism is that when 
human beings are seen as another entity in the natural world of physics, the determinism 
in this perspective does not leave any room for the phenomenon of freedom as 
experiences in everyday life. However, according to Richardson and Bishop (2002), the 
pursuit of science relies on the ability to detach from the values and meanings of 
everyday life. That position "regards the world as it is independently of the meanings it 
might have for human subjects, or of how it figures in their experience” (p. 438).  
It seems that the problems with the individual/social dualism is not that we need 
to find a novel way to recombine these poles; we need to examine first how each of 
these categories are defined from the beginning as they carry over assumptions that 
render any kind of theorizing problematic. Their inability to provide a sustainable 
solution is didactic. It tells us that without a critical consideration of the concepts we 
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inherit we run the risk of repeating the problems we attempt to overcome in our 
theories. By that light, any additive solution of internal and external poles proposed in 
relational psychoanalysis that does not first engage directly the problems with 
individuality as defined by Freud—and ultimately by the Western tradition—will likely 
repeat the individualism that it criticizes. Of course, the issues discussed here about 
Martin and Sugarman also apply to the problems faced by relational psychoanalysis. To 
the extent that relational approaches continue to appeal to biology, as Mitchell does in 
response to postmodern approaches, or to the active role of the mind in constructing 
reality, as Chodorow does when supporting an individuated process of social 
construction, they revert to ideas of a separate subject.  
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Chapter 4: Rethinking Selfhood 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout this work, relational psychoanalysis has been characterized as an 
amalgamation of interpersonal and intrapsychic views that can sometimes be at odds 
with each other. Postmodern psychoanalysis, for example, views the individual as an 
expression of a socially constructed reality. Instead of a singular self, there are multiple 
selves constituted by socially dictated roles. Mitchell (2000), though agreeing that we 
are essentially relational and socially constructed, suggests that an authentic core must 
remain beneath all social participation as the condition for the possibility of genuine 
expression of selfhood. According to him, a multiple self can't explain the continuity of 
self-experience that is manifested in everyday life. As a result, Reis (2005) notes: 
“relational psychoanalysis shows itself to be rather tentative in its embrace of 
postmodernism…there is no fragmented incoherence of subjectivity here, no slip into 
merged mindlessness where one can no longer tell who is who” (p. 88). In appealing to 
an underlying core, an essence that is subjacent to all transformation, Mitchell has been 
criticized for falling back into an individualism that resists being shaped by cultural 
forces. In this light, Reis (2005) points out that Mitchell’s project remains at least in 
part “modernist”, in spite of his allegiance to a social construction paradigm (p. 88). 
This modern vs. postmodern dialectic in relational approaches reveals a problem: how 
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do we explain both the contextual and the individual character of human experience? 
How can the self be characterized as fundamentally relational while acknowledging 
uniqueness and individuality? Stern (2000) aptly summarizes the dilemma relational 
psychoanalysis faces in the following way: “The problem is to maintain some kernel of 
psychic life that cannot be completely dissolved in social relations, and to accomplish 
that without having to posit essences” (p. 762). Pressing for answers, these issues are 
not just academic given that clinicians, at least in part, rely on theoretical frameworks to 
structure and direct the therapeutic encounter.  
To make matters worse, attempts to overcome this dualism are fraught with 
conceptual difficulties that appear deeply problematic, if not completely 
insurmountable. Martin and Sugarman (1999, 2000) proposed a metaphysics of 
dynamic interactionism, in which individual psychology emerges from sociocultural 
and biological origins but then transcends its constraints by means of cognitive faculties 
like memory and imagination. Although it stands as a sophisticated proposal, their 
appeal to a cognitive distance that frees the individual from the impingement of a 
tradition is characteristically modern. It is worrisome that even after attempting to 
critically look at their assumptions, refined theorists like Martin and Sugarman fall back 
into positions they try to avoid. Taylor (2003) recognizes the perniciously adhesive 
quality of these ideas we struggle to bring into question. He notes that we have been 
spellbound by a set of assumptions about the nature of the self, and that “just saying 
you've abandoned them, and then not giving them any further thought…is a sure recipe 
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for remaining in their thrall” (p. 158). The reason for this, Taylor argues, is that “just 
saying that you reject a concept is not necessarily climbing out of the picture that 
embeds it. You also have to explore and bring to awareness how that picture holds you 
captive. Just walking away avoids doing this” (p. 168). Martin Heidegger (1993, 1996, 
2001) spent most of his life trying to spell out the “picture that embeds” (Taylor, 2003, 
p. 168) the dualism of intrapsychic vs. interpersonal, which he identified as Cartesian 
dualism. Heidegger’s philosophy provides a fertile ground to explore our tendency to 
remain engrossed in this picture. 
Martin Heidegger’s influence has extended beyond the confines of philosophy. 
Hubert Dreyfus (2002) writes that: “his work has been appropriated by scholars in fields 
as diverse as philosophy, classics, psychology, literature, history, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, religious studies, and cultural studies” (p. vii). This far-
reaching influence owes much to his innovative way of thinking about the nature of 
selfhood and its relationship to the world. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989, 1993, 2000), a 
student of Heidegger, incisively explored the phenomenon of human understanding as it 
presents itself in art and history, offering concrete insight into how human beings can be 
both relational and individual. Charles Guignon (2002, 2004), a contemporary 
continental philosopher, approaches these questions considering how they intersect with 
psychotherapy and modern culture. Together, these sources frame the aforementioned 
theoretical problems in a new light, suggesting plausible ways to rethink the dualism 
that Martin and Sugarman identify and that pervades relational psychoanalysis.   
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Martin and Sugarman (1999, 2000) already draw extensively on the ideas of 
hermeneutic philosophy (Heidegger, 1996, 1993, 1996; Gadamer, 1974, 1989) in 
outlining their theory. Relational approaches, particularly those of the intersubjective 
school (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002), also draw on Heidegger and hermeneutics 
to articulate aspects of their position. However, I would like to argue that these 
approaches do not do full justice to their sources. From a Heideggerian perspective, the 
risk of dematerializing the self in the process of contextualizing it only presents itself 
because the definitions of self and culture we utilize are not engaged critically enough. 
As a result, the question of the relationship between the individual and culture arrives 
too late and with too much baggage. What is required is a careful exploration of the 
underlying assumptions given in these concepts and how we could move beyond them. 
 
Martin Heidegger: Theory and Everyday life 
 
  Heidegger is well known, among many reasons, for his relentless criticism of 
the influence of the Cartesian heritage in modern thought. Although his primary area of 
philosophical research was ontology, the branch of philosophy that inquires about the 
meaning of being, he developed useful insights about the nature of selfhood in the 
process of addressing those wider questions. Throughout his work, Heidegger claims 
that the Western tradition provided us with a misleading way of thinking about who we 
are that obscures some essential aspects of our day-to-day experience. Under the 
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influence of Descartes, the “revered father of modern philosophy” (Cottingham, 1998, 
p. 1), we have learned to interpret ourselves as a “thinking, non-extended thing” 
(Descartes, 1988, p. 116), minds divorced from an external world of meaningless 
objects onto which we project meaning. Guignon (2004) argues that to be a person in 
this view: “…is to be a self-contained, bounded individual, a center of experience and 
will, with no essential or defining relations to anything or anyone outside oneself” (p. 
108). He adds that contemporary philosophers called this view of selfhood the “modern 
subject” (Guignon, 2004, p. 108), which is characterized by a number of defining 
features.  
Perhaps the most significant is that the subject is endowed with a mind, an 
internal region that holds the sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings that inform 
our experience of an external world. Heil (2003, p. 16) explains that the Cartesian mind 
is a non-spatial center of experience to which we have unmediated and private access. 
Although it seems like we experience things in space, in the Cartesian model of mind all 
of our experiences are non-spatial, as illustrated by the following:  
Consider the phenomenon of 'phantom pain', a phenomenon well known to 
Descartes and his contemporaries. Amputees often seem to undergo experiences 
of pains in their amputated limbs. Your big toe could be amputated, yet you still 
might continue to experience the very same kind of throbbing pain you 
experienced prior to its amputation, and this pain might seem to you to be in a 
region at the end of your foot formerly occupied by your big toe. This suggests 
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that although we experience pains and other sensations as occurring in various 
bodily locations, it need not follow that experiences occur at those locations. 
(Heil, 2003, p. 17) 
A consequence of this view is that we don’t actually experience external events, 
but only our representation of them. Of course, Descartes (1988) does not think that the 
mind arbitrarily formulates our experience without any correspondence to outside 
events. Its function is to represent what goes on externally. Rorty (1979) explains that 
this picture presents the “mind as a great mirror containing various representations” (p. 
12), of an external word composed of objects. Blackburn (1994) defines this position, 
called representationalism, as “the doctrine that the mind works on representations of 
the things and features of things that we perceive or think about”, acting as a “container 
for ideas” (pp. 328-329). Although the Cartesian mind is what makes us different from 
other types of entities in the universe, we also have an extended body that is a part of 
the extended world of objects. Cartesian dualism assumes this mechanistic worldview 
that gained prominence during the enlightenment (Taylor, 1995). Taylor (1995) notes 
that there is a “link between this representational conception and the new, mechanistic 
science of the seventeenth century”, which “undermined the previously dominant 
understanding of knowledge and thus paved the way for the modern view” (p. 1). 
Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999), note that “the early scientists could describe 
the world as a vast collection of objects on hand for our theorizing and technological 
control”, and “from this perspective, humans are seen as knowing subjects registering 
 109 
input from the external world, processing the data according to rational procedures, and 
striving to devise a correct representation of reality” (p. 240). This mechanistic view of 
the world continues to animate the project of modern natural science as the most basic 
description of the world (Matthews, 1989, p. 133). 
But even if Descartes project fit well with the emergence of a mechanistic 
worldview, his aim was more ambitious. Bernstein (1983) tells us that Descartes was 
seeking a unyielding ground for new knowledge “…that could serve as a foundation 
upon which we could construct a ‘firm and permanent structure in the sciences’…”, one 
that…“should not rely on unfounded opinions, prejudices, tradition, or external 
authority, but only upon the authority of reason itself” (p. 17). However, radical doubt 
deprives Descartes of an external departure point for reasoning, for he can trust none, 
and thus he is only left with the certainty of self-reflective clarity. Taylor (1995) 
explains that Descartes undertakes a “reflexive turn, where instead of simply trusting 
the opinions one has acquired through one’s upbringing, one examines their foundation, 
which is ultimately to be found in one’s own mind. “ (p. 3). Furthermore, Descartes 
does not only intend to find a secure foundation for the sciences, his project is also “the 
quest for some fixed point, some stable rock upon which we can secure our lives against 
the vicissitudes that constantly threaten us” (Bernstein. 1983, p. 18). According to 
Descartes, disengaged and self-reflective reason provides a foundation for a life that 
liberates individuals from the errors of prejudice. 
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 Many of these characteristics may sound intuitively correct to a contemporary 
reader. Yet Heidegger (1996) believes that their obviousness obscures our ability to see 
the ways in which we are most unlike a Cartesian subject in everyday life. In short, 
Heidegger thinks that this story about who we are keeps us from seeing how our 
identity is defined by the relationship we hold to the world, not by our ability to 
rationally detach from it. Relational psychoanalysis is clearly sympathetic to the 
Heideggerian critique of the subject given their emphasis on the embedded nature of 
selfhood. However, I would like to argue that ultimately, relational approaches do not 
understand it properly and successfully incorporate it.  
In an attempt to shake the tight hold that traditional thinking has on us, Heidegger 
introduces a radically different view of human existence, which he terms Dasein. His 
work offers a fresh perspective on the relationship between self and world that 
transcends the internal/external dualism that plagues modern thought, including the 
work of Martin and Sugarman (1999) and relational psychoanalysis.    
 
Dasein as human existence 
 
 Polt (1999) writes that the word Dasein is a German expression that  “parallels 
our word ‘existence’” (p. 29). Heidegger (1996) uses the term to “denote…this entity 
which each of us is himself” (p. 27), meaning that he intends to discuss human beings. 
Why choose a new term for such an old subject? Polt (1999) explains that “Heidegger 
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doubtlessly wants to avoid the tired old term “man” and invent a new usage, in order to 
get to look at ourselves with fresh eyes” (p. 29). Perhaps because of its departure from 
previous thought, Heidegger’s subtle vision of selfhood can lend itself to 
misinterpretation. As a result, it is useful to consider in a preliminary way how his   
understanding of Dasein can be misconstrued. One of the most common errors is to 
think of Dasein as a conscious subject. As Dreyfus (1991) explains, Dasein is not a 
replacement for the term consciousness, but instead “must be understood to be more 
basic than mental states” (p. 13). Dasein is not a mind that contains internal 
representations, but, conversely, it is nothing like an object we can encounter in the 
world: a kind of thing-like entity with properties. It is very important for Heidegger that 
we avoid interpreting Dasein as a mind or a thing, a subject or an object. In fact, 
Heidegger introduces the term Dasein precisely to stimulate reflection about who we are 
beyond these alternatives presented by the Western tradition.  
But if we are neither mind nor thing, what are we from Heidegger’s perspective? 
According to him, that question is loaded because it seeks a ‘what’ in terms of which to 
define our nature. Unfortunately, the bias of this question is deep-seated since we have 
interpreted human nature as a type of persisting substance, a core that lies beneath all 
changes, from the beginnings of Western thought (Guignon, 2004, p. 119). Simply 
stated, Heidegger’s solution is to shift the question from a ‘what’ to a ‘how’, from 
asking about what type of substance we are, to pondering about our way of being. His 
answer to this question comprises most of his major work Being and Time (1996), and 
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although an in-depth analysis of it lies beyond the scope of this work, it is possible to 
present briefly some of its major concepts.  
 
 Heidegger (1993) claims that Dasein has two defining features that make it 
different from minds and objects; the first is that Dasein cares about its own being: 
“Dasein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it 
is…distinguished by the fact that in its Being this being is concerned about its very 
Being” (p. 54).  Unlike rocks, computers, or even dogs, we are capable of caring about 
who we are and what happens to us. Heidegger does not mean by this that we are 
concerned with our survival, or that we are driven to avoid pain and seek pleasure. He 
means that we have the possibility of caring about what kind of person we are and about 
the choices we make in our lives. As Melchert (2006) explains: 
This feature of Dasein is so central that Heidegger points to it as the essence of 
Dasein. In each case—yours, mine—Dasein “has its Being to be” (BT, 33). It is 
as though Dasein can’t just be (the way spiders are, for example); Dasein has to 
decide about its Being. How it will be is an issue; its Being, for Dasein, is a 
problem to be solved; but it cannot be solved in a disinterested way; it is solved 
only by living—by existing. (p. 599).  
Because being is an issue for Dasein, it is always faced with the task of taking a 
stand for what he or she values in life, even if those choices are not thought about 
explicitly. For Heidegger, this is an ineludible aspect of our existence: the possibilities 
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we seize or avoid define who we become. As Polt (1999) explains: “ …my own 
existence is an issue for me: I am assigned the task of being someone, and the way in 
which I deal with the possibilities open to me will determine who I am” (p. 78).   
The second defining characteristic of Dasein, closely related to the first, is that: 
“The being which this being is concerned about in its being is always my own” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p. 40). In other words, Dasein needs to be understood in the first-
person, not as an abstract speculation about human nature but as the living out of one’s 
life. Dasein is always concretely you or me: “In accordance with the character of 
always-being-my-own-being, when we speak of Dasein, we must always use the 
personal pronoun along with whatever we say” (p. 40). In other words, as I am involved 
in the process of making decisions and sorting out the meanings in my life, I cannot talk 
about my existence as an abstract category. Heidegger seems to point out that there is an 
inescapable mineness to our existence, what he calls Jemeinigkeit, which makes it 
possible for us to be concerned about our being. Whether we like it or not, we always 
have ourselves to be, always remain accompanied by ourselves, even when we attempt 
to escape or avoid who we are: 
Because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very 
Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; 
or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only insofar as it is essentially something which can 
be authentic - that is, something of its own - can it have lost itself and not yet 
won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity. . . are both 
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grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. 
(Heidegger, 1996, p. 68) 
 In this passage Heidegger introduces the notion of authenticity, a concept that 
explains in his view how human beings are deeply embedded in traditions and a shared 
world of practices, yet are also able to achieve a form of individuation on the basis of 
this context. In the original German, the term authenticity, eigentlichkeit, is 
etymologically related to the word “own”, much in the way that the English word 
“authentic” derives from the Greek term authentes, which means “one who acted for 
himself” (Shipley, 1945, p. 34). In both languages the word points towards the idea of 
owning up to the choices we make and how they define who we are. Authenticity is a 
central concept for Heidegger, on the basis of which he explains how one can lead a 
truly individuated life that  (Guignon, 2004). But before exploring its implications, it is 
necessary to understand Heidegger’s notion of Dasein more fully. 
 Dreyfus (1991) points out that mineness needs to be clearly distinguished from 
the Cartesian self: “…it cannot mean that each Dasein has a private world of 
experience” (p. 25). Mineness does not refer back to a private “I” that is distinct from 
the world. Mineness means always having a personal stake regarding what happens 
because of one’s participation in a shared world. In fact, Heidegger strongly argues that 
Dasein always dwells in a public world of shared meanings and actions. Dasein, 
Heidegger (1996) argues, is “being-in-the-world” (p. 12). The hyphenation of the term 
emphasizes that our being, our engaged activity of sorting through our possibilities and 
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commitments in everyday living, only makes sense in the context of the world in which 
we make those choices. In Heidegger’s (1996) words: “the compound expression 
‘being-in-the-world’ indicates…that it stands for a unified phenomenon” (p. 49). Dasein 
cannot be understood separately from the world in which it acts. Its relationship to the 
world is constitutive of its identity such that there is no Dasein without a world in which 
it dwells.  
However, Dreyfus (1991) remarks, Dasein is in the world in an entirely different 
way than a stone is in the river: “in English we…distinguish between two senses of ‘in’: 
a spatial sense (‘in the box’) and an existential sense (‘in the army’, ‘in love’). The first 
use expresses inclusion, the second conveys involvement…Being-in as being involved 
is definitive of Dasein” (p. 43). Dasein relates to its “there” in an entirely different way 
than objects occupy space. Dreyfus’ use of the word involvement indicates that Dasein 
maintains an open relationship to places, not merely occupying space but belonging, or 
failing to belong, to them. When we ask someone where they are from, for example, we 
are not merely curious about the physical location of their birth, but rather about the 
influences that define at least part of their identity. The reader might wonder whether 
there is anything special or noteworthy about this observation, because obviously 
people are different than objects by virtue of being conscious. From Heidegger’s 
perspective, this rebuttal entirely misses the experience of what it is like to be involved 
in the world. The dominant scientific interpretation of the self as physical organisms 
with minds entirely passes over this phenomenon. As a result, being-in-the-world is 
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reduced to having internal ideas about external objects. If Heidegger is right, being 
involved is nothing like holding internal representations, but more like having an 
inarticulate sense of how and why things matter to us, which he calls having an 
understanding of being.  
Polt notes (1999) that: “…we have a ‘there’ as no other entity does, because for 
us, the world is understandable” (p. 30). For Heidegger, our having a “there” relies on a 
background intelligibility that he calls a “vague and average understanding of being” 
(1996, p. 4). But for Heidegger, this type of understanding is not an intellectual grasp of 
a fact, but rather an ability to cope practically with a situation. Grodin (2002) observes 
that: 
In this regard, one who “understands” something is not so much someone 
endowed with a specific knowledge, but someone who can exercise a practical 
skill. A good cook, a good teacher, a good soccer player is not necessarily an apt 
theoretician of his trade, but he “knows” his trade, as the English locution puts 
it. This “knowing” is, of course, less cognitive than practical, as one “knows” 
how to swim. So it is with the basic understanding on which we thrive and by 
way of which we sort our way through life. (p. 38) 
 Understanding for Heidegger, is first and foremost a lived grasp of a situation 
on the basis of concrete possibilities of Dasein. As we go about our daily business, we 
have a lived understanding of what things mean and how we have to deal with them. 
For example, responsible driving requires knowing how to seamlessly operate the 
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vehicle, understanding the rules that govern being on a shared road, and maintaining a 
vigilant awareness of changing conditions in the environment. But driving expertise is 
not a cognitively explicit grasp of these realities, but rather a situated and lived 
understanding that allows someone to respond appropriately and skillfully to a given 
situation. We rely on this background familiarity and coping ability, for example, when 
we have to break to avoid an accident. An intellectual grasp of the car’s manual and 
traffic rules does not make an expert driver. When we need to break in a mere instant, 
there is no time to form mental representations that serve as a directive for action. If we 
had to become cognitively aware of the situation before making the decision to break, it 
would get in the way of our ability to cope skillfully with a potential accident. Before 
we engage in any act of thematic cognitive reflection, we already have an inarticulate 
sense of what things are and how they matter in the world. According to Heidegger, this 
background sense of what is real precedes any thought process and provides the 
condition for the very possibility for its existence. To oversimplify, Heidegger is saying 
that being precedes and grounds thinking, thus deliberately reversing the well-known 
Cartesian dictum cogito ergo sum.    
 Clearly, there are times when we can and do abstract away from our lived 
understanding of the world for certain purposes, as in the case of scientific 
experimentation. Scientists keep the object they study at a personal distance in order to 
develop theories that describe it a way that is detached from everyday opinions and 
attitudes. They are trained to conduct randomized clinical trials, for example, to 
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eliminate the possibility of affecting the results through experimenter bias. Certainly 
this is appropriate when evaluating the effectiveness of a new drug in cancer treatment. 
How the physician feels about the drug, whether she has a family member who is in the 
late stages of the disease, or whether a pharmaceutical company whose success depends 
on a positive outcome funds her, cannot enter into the equation.  But that attitude of 
neutrality and indifference is only a modification, a temporary one, of an engaged 
understanding we maintain in our everyday dealings with things. This becomes evident, 
for example, when the results of the research provide a favorable outcome and the 
researcher meets this with marked enthusiasm.  As Mulhall (1996) notes, Heidegger:  
…begins by pointing out that our dealings with the world typically absorb or 
fascinate us; our tasks, and so the various entities we employ in carrying them 
out, preoccupy us. Theoretical cognition of entities…should therefore be 
understood as a modification of such concern, as an emergence from this 
familiar absorption into a very different sort of attitude. (p. 43) 
 Heidegger is saying that explicit theoretical representation is not the most basic 
way in which we relate to the world. The average and most familiar way in which we 
are in the world, he tells us, is concerned involvement. By being engrossed and 
occupied in the activities of daily living we take up certain possibilities that define who 
we are. We are always engaged in practical coping, dealing with this or that possibility, 
in a shared context of significance. Even when we choose to turn away from our 
everyday dealings with things to become an objective observer, the attitude of 
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indifferent detachment is itself a mode of relating to things for certain purposes in a 
determinate context.      
In this light, the idea that our individuality might arise from cognitive abilities, 
or from an internal psychological space, becomes suspect. Rather, this idea seems very 
close to the Cartesian view of personhood that Heidegger, and often Martin and 
Sugarman themselves, criticize. The Cartesian subject comes into its own precisely by 
separating itself from its surroundings and traditions, seeking always to represent them 
in neutral and objective ways. Charles Taylor (1993) explains that such a “disengaged 
perspective” is actually “a rare and regional achievement of a knowing agent whose 
normal stance [is] engaged” (p. 323). Our more fundamental “implicit understanding” 
or what Heidegger calls “pre-understanding is “not a matter of representation” It 
involves a “background sense of reality” that is “nonrepresentational, because it is 
something we possess in--that is inseparable from--our actual dealings with things” (p. 
327). Only occasionally and for a time do we actually hold explicit theories about the 
world, and then only in the context of a lived understanding of the possibilities that our 
culture and traditions offer us as participants in them.  
Likewise, the idea that we relate to others by reenacting internalized 
representations of relational patterns also becomes suspect. It seems more appropriate to 
speak of our way of being with others, where relationships are neither inside a mind nor 
objectively present in an external reality, like a fully formed object waiting to be 
discovered. Relationships, and cultural participation for that matter, carry us forward 
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through shared practices and common meanings in a way that is not captured by talk of 
subjective or even intersubjective experience. That way of interpreting who we are 
presupposes that meaning resides in the subject and then becomes outwardly projected 
onto a neutral reality. If Heidegger is right, the relational matrix that relational 
psychoanalyst describe cannot originate from a mind or even from a communion of 
minds. Relationships would precede any kind of mental representation of them. 
Furthermore, locating them in the individual as a projection of meaning, even if it is 
mutual, interactive, and negotiated, attributes to people an unreasonable level of control 
over their relationships’ direction and shape. Intersubjective space cannot be 
appropriately grasped as a combination of separate individuals, however egalitarian.  
Vessey (2005), addressing Gadamer’s (2000) ideas on dialogue, comments that 
current discussions of intersubjectivity derive, or at least parallel, Martin Buber’s 
concept of an I-Thou relationship. According to Vessey this is problematic because: “I-
Thou relations embody a mystifying substantialization”, and we should look instead at  
“dialogical approaches”, which  “invoke "the between" as the space of the encounter 
between I and Thou; a space that cannot be grasped intellectually” (p. 62). This in-
betweenness, for lack of a better term, cannot be grasped as a mixture of two positions, 
but rather as a space within which positions come to be expressed and understood. In 
other words, I can share my point of view with someone only because there is a prior 
shared engagement that makes this possible and intelligible.   
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Here, Gadamer’s (1975) reflections on our participation in history are applicable 
to our participation in relationships as well: 
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a 
self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of 
subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a 
flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. (p. 278).  
Gadamer is indirectly referring here to a feature of human existence that 
Heidegger (1996) calls our “thrownness” (p. 174), the fact that we always find 
ourselves in a situation with its set of constraints and available meanings, inherited from 
our past. In its most radical sense, Heidegger means that we are thrown into the world, 
without having chosen our gender, race, religion, place of origin, and all other 
constitutive conditions that we are born into. But also in everyday life, as we navigate 
the challenges of any given moment, being thrown means that we arrive at that moment 
from a past that gives it a determinate shape with its set of conditions and possibilities. 
In other words, Heidegger is saying that at any given moment, we never have the option 
of jumping out of our own skins. As Dreyfus (1991) puts it: “I am always already 
surrounded by objects that matter in some specific way.  Dasein is thus always already 
given and then needs to take a stand on what it is. It is a self-interpreting foundness. 
Heidegger calls this foundness or givenness thrownness” (p. 173).  
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Our thrownness becomes intelligible to us, according to Heidegger, through our 
moods. However, far from being an intrapsychic phenomenon, he thinks that moods are 
a way of being attuned to our situation. Again, Heidegger cleverly uses his native 
language to make his point, as the German word for mood, Stimmung, also means to 
tune an instrument (Inwood, 2000, p. 41). Instead of a type of mental content, 
Heidegger sees in moods a disclosive relationship to our situation. Moods bring our 
involvement in situations into relief. In contrast to emotions, that have a specific object 
towards which they are directed, moods reflect the whole of our experience at a given 
time. For example, when one is in a depressed mood everything appears as negative or 
defeating. As Beck (1979) has persuasively argued in his approach, a depressive state 
colors the whole structure of our thinking. For Heidegger, however, a depressed mood 
does not represent a failing or distortion on our part, but rather it reflects our ongoing 
attunement to our situation. And situations, according to Heidegger, are always already 
meaningfully given to us from a past from which we are thrown. We always arrive to 
situations as having already been somewhere before. Hence, when we come across an 
acquaintance that is visibly upset, we immediately ask what happened to them to cause 
them to feel that way.  
Although our relationship to a past informs the meanings that are available at a 
given time, Heidegger (1996) finds that having a future is a more important dimension 
of human existence. As Inwood (2000) explains: “Dasein's potentiality or possibility is 
prior to its actuality: Dasein is not a definite actual thing, but the possibility of various 
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ways of being” (p. 23). Because Dasein is its agentic involvement in the world, and not 
a fully formed thing located in the present, having future possibilities is its defining 
characteristic. As initially stated, being concerned with its own being is what makes 
Dasein different than other entities. For Heidegger, being human entails that we are 
always confronted with the need to make a choice and projecting ourselves towards a 
future. Of course, the range of one’s possibilities is always constrained by the past. 
Heidegger does not believe we are pure choice detached from our history. As Warnke 
(1987) explains: “the way in which we have understood the past and the way our 
ancestors have projected the future determines our own range of possibilities” (p. 39). 
At the same time, Warnke (1987) notes that “the way in which we anticipate the future 
defines the meaning the past can have for us” (p. 39). This indicates that we are not 
constituted by the accruing weight of past circumstances; rather the very meaning of our 
past events depends on the possibilities that I am pursuing. For example, a person 
training to become a professional violinist who looses a pinky finger might be more 
affected than another individual who looses a hand.  
As a result of having both a past and a future, Dasein is always already ahead of 
itself and being carried forward by projects, explicit or implicitly pursued, that become 
possible by drawing on its past. Dasein is not only thrown into a past, but also throws 
itself into a future; he or she is not only embedded in a tradition but is also being carried 
forward by motives and projects. As Dreyfus (1991) notes: “Dasein is thus already in, 
ahead of itself, and amidst” (p. 244). Dasein always finds itself always caught in this 
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ongoing embedded projecting within which the meaning of a situation becomes 
apparent. In other words, things matter to us because we have a past and a future, and of 
course a present in which their significance opens up to us. For Heidegger, time is the 
basis on which things matter for us, the ground upon which we are concernfully 
involved in the world. However, when Heidegger identifies Dasein with its situated 
involvement, he is not saying that it needs to be reduced to the actualities that surround 
him at the present time. Quite the opposite, Dasein can only be present in a situation 
insofar as it is already pressing forward into a future on the basis of a past. Guignon 
(2002) explains that, for Heidegger: “to be in a situation…is to be part of an unfolding 
story with a distinctive temporal structure”, and as a result  “the I is historical” (p. 83). 
Consequently, the Heideggerian self needs to be grasped as an unfolding event rather 
than a kind of enduring substance, like the tradition has typically defined it. Guignon 
(2002) fleshes out this embedded view of selfhood, so inextricably tied to situations, by 
exploring Heidegger’s account of a climber reaching the summit of a mountain: 
…watching the sunrise at the top of the mountain, I experience myself not as a 
subject having experiences, and certainly not as an organism functioning in a 
geographical location. Instead, I experience myself as the climber who prepared 
for days, who rose before sunrise, who braved the cold, who reached the summit 
after a difficult climb, and who is now in touch with the beauty of nature. Far 
from being one item among others in this scene, my identity as a human is 
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constituted by the entire lived context that makes up my dwelling in the world. 
(p. 84). 
Guignon (2002) illustrates how the self is, in its very essence, defined by its 
lived relationship to the situation in which it participates. Looking for an underlying 
substantial self that is separate from its situation, that then somehow internalizes it, 
misses the way we actually live through those experiences. Additionally, Guignon 
(2002) also explains Heidegger’s (1996) point that our ability to be engaged and open to 
the world is only possible on the basis of our relationship to time. In other words, we 
can be part of the world because we have a past where we come from, a future towards 
which we head, and a present with which we are concerned. As Mulhall (1996) 
explains: “for Dasein to disclose entities is for it to manifest a present concern for them, 
that grows from its having taken on a project and being oriented towards its future 
realization” (p. 155). Heidegger holds that having this relationship to the three temporal 
structures, what he calls being historical, allows us to be involved in the world.  
However, Heidegger (1996) criticizes our usual definition of time for being too 
focused on the present, claiming that we understand it as “a continuous stream of nows” 
(p. 463). Scharff (1971) notes that, according to Heidegger, “everyday common sense is 
perfectly well satisfied to think of time as an objective structure through whose phases 
things, others, and oneself ‘pass,’ moment by moment” (p. 28). In contrast, Heidegger 
proposes that we reverse our focus on the present to recognize that our moment-to-
moment involvements are only possible on the basis of having a relationship to the past 
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and the future. In other words, my being concerned with an ongoing activity at a given 
time point is dependent on having already been engaged on a preceding activity that 
continues to be directed on the basis of a concrete possibility. As a result, time is 
understood as an unfolding event or trajectory, which has a ‘from’, a ‘towards’, and a 
‘here’—past, future, and present—as opposed to a series of linear time points that 
stretch infinitely and homogeneously backward and forward. Existential time, as 
Heidegger (1996) calls it, is what makes it possible to be engaged actors in an unfolding 
meaningful life drama, because it allows us to have a temporal orientation: a specific 
relationship to our tradition, our future possibilities, and our present involvement. In 
turn, this constitutes the basis of our identity that, according to Heidegger, is itself the 
unfolding plot of our life.   
Ultimately, Heidegger (1996) can be seen as radicalizing the insights of a 
relational approach by stating that Dasein is an unfolding relationship to the world.  
However, he contextualizes a relational insight within a critique of traditional Western 
philosophy, allowing him to understand the self as an ongoing unfolding event rather 
than an enduring fixed core. In this picture, the “core” of Dasein has the unity of a story 
unfolding from birth to death. Although selfhood has a narrative structure, it is not a 
text like postmodernists claim at times. Rather, selfhood is a happening that has the 
structure of a story as an unfolding occurrence with meaning and continuity. We can 
and often do stop to articulate our life trajectory explicitly, enriching its meaning and 
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clarifying its direction. At these times we confront ourselves, and often reevaluate who 
we are, as we articulate our experiences on the basis of who we want to be.  
Psychotherapy is a specific form of that explicit articulation of one’s aims and 
participation in life, an activity that can be seen as an exercise in self-understanding. 
This type of reflective activity is not circumscribed to psychological self-examination; 
one often takes stock of one’s life in several contexts, like civic engagement, religion, 
and more pervasively in open dialogue with our immediate family and friends. What is 
common to all these experiences is the act of self-examination, so well captured in the 
expression taking stock of one’s life, which refers to a careful assessment of the 
cumulative meaning of life in light of what needs renewal, replenishing, or change.  
Unfortunately, Heidegger (1996) claims, in modern times our ability to pause to 
take stock of one’s life has become increasingly difficult for a number of reasons. First 
of all, we often find ourselves having no time because of the endless stream of ongoing 
engagements that claim our attention and dispose us in constant hurried busyness. 
Ironically, the very engrossing business of everyday living prevents us from reflecting 
on the ultimate aims of our activities in light of our life as a whole. Equally perplexing, 
Heidegger notes, is that the cultural meanings on the basis of which we need to evaluate 
our life as a whole have been de-legitimized by enlightenment critiques and scientific 
thinking. In the current cultural ethos, meaning and values are seen as either objectively 
real or subjectively created (Taylor, 1989). As a result, we are left with no recourse but 
to either accept the traditional values as given or to reject them as arbitrary and create 
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our own. Of course, either option is problematic, especially in the context of 
psychoanalysis where the explicit aim of treatment is to achieve change that is grounded 
in a reworking of meanings rather than passive acceptance or wholesale rejection of 
them.  
Yet the modern condition leaves little room for a middle road, because as a 
series of fully formed moments in a deterministic chain of cause and effects, “the role of 
culture and language always threatens either to engulf life in simple determinism, as in 
Western science, or else leave us with little to do except continually engage in a vigilant 
‘decentering’ or ‘deferring’ of whatever is just now being said” (Scharff, 1997, p. 4). 
The second alternative references postmodern appeals to embrace a vigilant and ironic 
detachment from our traditions, which become materials for a project of individualistic 
self-construction. The problem with this approach, Zimmerman (2000) tells us, is that it 
leaves us feeling empty once the exhilarating openness of boundless possibilities turns 
into disorientation and shallow overstimulation: “many people find themselves 
confronted with captivating, seductive, and expansive options that allow people readily 
to exchange one identity for another, such as Internet chat rooms…despite all the 
excitement, some people report feeling disintegrated, superficial, even dehumanized” 
(p. 123).  
Gilles Lipovetsky (2005), echoing Heidegger, notes that postmodernism brought 
“the concomitant triumph of consumerist norms centered on living in the present”, 
which “indicated the advent of an unprecedented social temporality marked by the 
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primacy of the here-and-now” (p. 29). This presentism promotes an asphyxiating 
absorption into the tasks of the modern moment, leaving no time for reflections about 
origins and purposes. In this light, Heidegger’s appeal to open up to a different temporal 
orientation, one in which there is a sense of unfolding continuity with a tradition that is 
meaningfully retrieved in light of current concerns, becomes poignantly appealing. 
Heidegger will call this type of historical orientation an authentic one, which leads to 
the emergence of an authentic self. 
Authentic selfhood 
 According to Guignon (2004), Heidegger (1962) views selfhood as “an 
unfolding event or happening that is so thoroughly enmeshed in a shared lifeworld that 
there is no way to draw a sharp line between either self and world or self and others” (p. 
120). However, Guignon observes that Heidegger also speaks of an authentic self that 
provides cohesiveness to the multiplicity of our social and worldly involvements, which 
seems to clash with his other account of a socially enmeshed self. Guignon’s 
examination reveals a tension between individual and social accounts of selfhood that 
echoes the conceptual problems of relational approaches. However, unlike relational 
psychoanalysis, Heidegger is not concerned with defending some form of intrapsychic 
reality as the basis for individuality. Heidegger’s (1962) authentic self is not a 
psychological substance but nevertheless has the “constancy” (p. 166) and 
“selfsameness” (p. 168) of individual identity while remaining part of a shared world. In 
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Heidegger’s view, authentic individuality is not a way of transcending our ties to 
society in the name of self-realization, but a way of existing within it.  
 Everyday life is only possible, Heidegger (1996) tells us, because of public 
meanings and activities. Even being alone is possible only because we are temporarily 
withdrawing from a shared world, and even when we are unaccompanied we can’t 
escape into a private language or culture. As Guignon (2004) notes, the “ongoing 
happening of our lives never exists in isolation from the wider context of the world” (p. 
123). Daily interaction requires this public horizon of conventions and interlocking 
goals through which we can reach an understanding. However, as noted before, 
Heidegger is critical of the way in which our engrossed participation in the modern 
world engenders a presentism that prevents us from reflecting on life purposes and the 
basis for our decisions. In this sense,  the social world is a double-edged sword because: 
“in the complacency of worldly existence we become so absorbed in the things that 
show  up on the current scene” that we become “assured that everything has already 
been worked out and nothing really calls for a decision” (Guignon, 1993, p. 30). 
 Heidegger (1962) holds that certain experiences help us break out of our 
quotidian contentment. Although he initially identified anxiety in the face of death as 
the most important of those experiences, in his later thinking he gave equal weight to 
other ones such as profound dissatisfaction, joyous elation, and serene reflection 
(Pattison, 2000). The importance of those moments rests on their power to shift our 
attention from the things in the world to our responsibility for our existence. Heidegger 
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(1962) calls that change in focus a “moment of vision” (p. 376) in which we face up to 
the task of living, because we grasp our existence as a “story unfolding ‘between life 
and death’” (Guignon, 1993, p. 8) in which decisions must be made and not everything 
is possible. Within this orientation, “the overall shape our lives take is an issue for us” 
(Guignon, 2004, p. 127) and what really matters stands in sharp relief, granting a degree 
of clarity to our choices without rendering them easy or simplistic. Heidegger argues 
that this committed examination of our life as a whole builds an enduring selfhood that 
is based on how we live, not on what we are.   
  
 Heidegger’s authentic selfhood rests on understanding our mortality as the 
contour within which life can be grasped as a whole thus making our choices 
meaningful. Yet according to Gadamer (2000), Heidegger’s appeal to mortality 
personalizes our experience of finitude at the expense of minimizing the inherently 
dialogical nature of self-understanding. For Gadamer, the unfolding story that 
constitutes selfhood is not a monologue but a conversation within which we understand 
what is most important and make our decisions. In his view, our being comes into relief  
only in dialogue because “I experience my own limitation through the encounter with 
the Other” (Gadamer, 2000, p. 285). As a result, dialogue provides the contours within 
which our life gains coherence. As Vessey (2002) argues: 
For Gadamer we exist in conversation or in dialogue with one another and it is 
through these conversations that we fully come to realize our limitations. 
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Dialogue is an irreplaceable means for self-understanding. There are insights 
about ourselves attainable through dialogue that we would not be able to attain 
any other way. This view, if true, would undermine Heidegger's argument that 
authenticity is attained only by turning away from others and finding the one 
thing that will definitively individuate us. Instead authenticity requires turning 
toward others and engaging others in dialogue. (para. 3) 
 In this light, selfhood is understood as inescapably relational because it emerges  
and endures by participating in an ongoing cultural conversation (Taylor, 1994, p. 32).  
Gadamer enriches Heidegger’s authentic individual by making its struggle to define  its 
identity a shared pursuit rather than the individual commitment prevalent in 
Heidegger’s early thought (Pattison, 2000). Later in his work, Heidegger (1968, 1971) 
would focus on the role of language and our participation in history in taking up our 
existence authentically. Gadamer’s account of dialogical understanding can be 
construed in part as a continuation of this thinking.  
 
Gadamer and understanding 
 
 Within academic circles, Gadamer (1975) is well known for his development of 
philosophical hermeneutics, an approach aimed in part at challenging prevailing ideas 
about the role of method in the humanities and social sciences. As Warnke (1987) 
notes: “his ideas on understanding and interpretation have been applied to a wide-
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ranging series of discussions: to questions of interpretation in the study of art and 
literature, to issues of knowledge and objectivity in the social sciences; to related 
debates in such disciplines as theology and jurisprudence; and even to re-evaluations of 
the project of philosophy itself” (p. ix).  
Gadamer’s principal aim, however, was to develop a philosophy of human 
understanding that builds on Heidegger’s insights regarding the inevitable influence of 
tradition and its impact and self-understanding. Blackburn (1994) defines hermeneutics 
as “the method of interpretation first of texts, and secondly of the whole social, 
historical, and psychological world” (p. 172). This definition is faithful to the origins of 
hermeneutics as a method for the interpretation of biblical writings, and later as a 
general theory of interpretation that rests on correct utilization of methodology 
(Warnke, 1987, p. 1-6). But for Gadamer, hermeneutics is not a methodological 
discipline but a philosophical exploration into the conditions for the possibility of 
understanding in general.  
The heart of Gadamer’s (1975) hermeneutics is reflected in his effort to subvert 
the modern meaning of the term prejudice as an undesirable bias: “…if we want to do 
justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being, it is necessary to fundamentally 
rehabilitate the concept of prejudice and acknowledge the fact that there are legitimate 
prejudices” (p. 277). For Gadamer, prejudice is the condition for the possibility of any 
understanding, because in order to make sense of our experiences we need to have a 
certain ground from which to begin to grasp what addresses us. In other words, 
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understanding is not the imprinting of a external piece of information into a mental 
blank slate, but the dialogue between our background sense of reality and the matter 
that addresses us in the foreground. Heidegger’s (1996) thinking is a clear point of 
departure for Gadamer, noting that: “interpretation is never a presuppositionless 
grasping of something previously given…what is initially “there” is nothing else than 
the self-evident, undisputed prejudice of the interpreter, which is necessarily there in 
each point of departure” (p. 141). Thus, we are always relying on pre-judgment in order 
to make sense of our experience because we need a working stance from which to make 
sense of what we encounter. According to Gadamer, if we really had to suspend belief 
for anything that we had not explicitly judged, then it would be impossible to get along 
in the world. In this light, Bernstein (2002) portrays Gadamer’s project as an attempt to 
correct the Enlightenment’s view of understanding, in which authority and tradition 
were seen as dogma that required the emancipatory power of critical reason. From 
Gadamer’s perspective, grounding our understanding on critical rationality that aims to 
be free from assumptions fails to grasp that “all understanding requires prejudices or 
prejudgments—prejudgments that are inherited from tradition” (p. 272).   
 However conditioned and prejudiced, understanding in Gadamer’s sense does 
not have to become provincial. First of all, prejudices are rooted in cultures that are 
composed by various heterogeneous voices. While some may remain dominant, it is 
always possible to retrieve less prominent ones in light of changing circumstances. 
More importantly, although we begin to understand from our prejudices, we do not need 
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to remain stuck in them but are capable of revising them in light of new situations and 
experiences. For example, the civic dialogue that unfolded profoundly challenged the 
prejudices present before the civil rights movement. In the hermeneutic view, such 
transformation does not come about by escaping prejudice, but by critically engaging it 
on the basis of a better understanding. This better understanding itself does not arise 
from some enlightened rationality that transcends the limits of cultural prejudice. It is 
itself an understanding developed by reworking already existing possibilities within the 
tradition. The ideal of equality was already available as part of the civic discourse in the 
1950’s. However, this idea had to be appropriated and reinterpreted in light of current 
needs and concerns for it to open up the political possibilities that it did. This 
engagement with a possibility inherent in the tradition, in the form of critical 
appropriation, allowed members of society to change their social standing. Such 
possibilities would only be marginally available in other periods, or perhaps not be 
available for appropriation at all.  
However, Gadamer (1975) recognizes that critical appropriation, and in fact all 
dialogue, requires an openness that grants us the freedom to think critically and confront 
perspectives. Gadamer characterizes this freedom as a distinctively human 
phenomenon: “other creatures  do not have a relationship to the world, but are, as it 
were, embedded in their environment...man’s relationship to the world is characterized 
by freedom from environment” (p. 444). Echoing Heidegger, he reminds us that Dasein 
holds an open relationship to a world rather than being instinctually determined by an 
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environment. According to Gadamer (1975), this openness is realized in language, 
which  grants us a “free, distanced orientation” (p. 445) in the process of “coming to an 
understanding” (p. 446) with others. In other words, having a shared language opens up 
a space of meanings and concerns that allows us to consider different perspectives. By 
enacting language in dialogue, we try to reach an understanding about a common matter 
giving ourselves over to the conversation itself.  As Guignon (2004) explains: “in his 
description of authentic conversation, Gadamer shows how the participants in the 
conversation can leave behind their self-preoccupation”, letting the “ongoing play of 
ideas...carry the matter forward” (p. 165). Clearly this open engagement is not a 
distance from meaning, as in objective detachment, but rather a meaningful distance in 
which we are able to let what we encounter address us in its otherness.  In this sense, it 
represents an example of what Heidegger calls Gelassenheit, or releasement, which 
Dreyfus (1992) describes as “a serene openness to a possible change in our 
understanding of being”  (p. 339). This releasement, requires “letting beings be” as an 
active process of receptive and engaged understanding (Heidegger, 1993, p. 125). 
However, understanding in this sense is not just an intellectual exchange of ideas, but a 
“ life process in which a community of life is lived out” (Gadamer 1975, p. 446).  
 From a hermeneutic perspective, coming to an understanding in treatment does 
not mean avoiding oppression and maintaining equality, but actively engaging with the 
patient by quieting our expectations and giving ourselves over to the matter at hand. 
This kind of active listening, which should be familiar to a practicing therapist, has a 
 137 
binding force that has nothing to do with being free in the modern sense. Nor can this 
listening be free from assumption or prejudice, given the situated nature of 
understanding. To be sure, there is a risk of becoming too one-sided in our prejudices, 
but Gadamer believes there is always a corrective in dialogue, in letting the other’s 
claim show us our limits. Of course, this presupposes that we enter into dialogue 
authentically, meaning that we are always seriously open to the truth value of what our 
partner says. Seen from this light, the self is this ongoing authentic conversation that 
reminds us of our limits and effectively shapes the meaning of our life.  If for Heidegger 
the self is an unfolding story, for Gadamer it is better understood as an unfolding 
conversation.  
 
Personhood and Embeddedness 
 
Martin and Sugarman (1999) are right in attempting to transcend the either/or of 
modern and postmodern approaches to selfhood. Both fail to address important aspects 
of our existence: our capacity for agency and our belonging to a social structure. After 
all, we are all people whose identity depends on social frameworks of meaning, but who 
are also capable of innovation and agency. However, recognizing these two realities 
does not necessitate that we posit a theoretical or psychological distancing from our 
traditions. Doing so entails at least partly assuming a Cartesian view of personhood, one 
that fails to see that originality and agency arise mainly from engaged interpretations of 
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our historical possibilities rather than mainly from neutralizing and objectifying our 
world in order to obtain the distance needed to exercise our distinctive human agency.  
In relational approaches, Mitchell’s (2000) appeal to an enduring core ends up 
betraying a retreat into the individualism that it tries to escape. Whatever core remains 
through and behind social construction must be unaffected by it, and thus at least 
partially solipsistic. But beyond this, Mitchell wants to retain the concept of an 
intrapsychic life, and from Heidegger’s perspective this proves problematic in many 
ways. The most important of these problems is that doing so places meaning inside a 
subject rather than in the unfolding of a storied or conversational self.  
On the other hand, postmodern critiques of this notion of interiority involve a 
total dissolution of the self, which brings about problems of its own. Even if we 
acknowledge that there are multiple selves, it is hard for postmodernists to explain how 
we maintain a sense of enduring identity. Clearly, thinking of the self as singular and 
enduring can be limiting, rigid, and oppressive. But living in constant fragmentation and 
ambiguity does not seem like an appealing alternative. Postmodernists readily accept 
that there is no longer an absolutely secure foundation for our identity, and in the face 
of this they often retreat into a pragmatic relativism. But their position betrays an 
underlying belief that absolute knowledge is the only type of knowledge, and in the 
absence of this we are left with nothing but individual subjectivity. Their resulting 
ironic detachment is not too different from scientific indifference. A socially constituted 
self is never in the position to arbitrarily pick and choose his or her beliefs. As Gadamer 
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notes, our prejudices set the playing field for the possibility for understanding. Even 
though we can challenge them, improve them, or embrace them upon further 
examination, what we can never do is to think that we can detach from them in such a 
way that we are in the position to merely reject them.   
 The psychoanalytic intersubjectivists (Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood, 2001) 
present a more nuanced approach. They recognize that appealing to intrapsychic 
experience is problematic in many fronts. In fact, they often criticize their relational 
colleagues for remaining enthralled by modernism. But their discussion of individual 
worlds is inconsistent with Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s philosophy. For them, the world 
is never something that is individually constituted. It certainly depends on the 
participation of individuals, but it is not contained within them or carried along with 
them as personal structures of meanings. Even though we can have many different 
experiences in the world, we are still part of the same social reality. Of course, this does 
not mean that everyone’s experience is the same. Differences and conflict in our 
experience of the world based on gender and race are real, but they always presuppose a 
common arena of social engagement within which we have our disagreements and 
conflict. After all, if we were all truly inhabiting our own worlds, we would not have so 
much to disagree on because we would not be relating to each other to begin with.  
 Many of these conflicting views do a good job of exposing the shortcomings and 
problems with the other side of the argument, and in doing so they may intimate a fresh 
approach of a third way beyond these extremes in the mind of a sensitive reader. 
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However, they say very little about what that third way or genuine path would be. I 
believe the hermeneutic view I have discussed here sketches such a view in a broad but 
credible way. Although there are many details to be filled in and many questions to be 
answered, it seems to me hermeneutics offers a fresh point beyond these clashing 
perspectives. In the end, it seems best to understand hermeneutics not as offering a 
theoretical replacement to relational approaches, but rather as providing a wider context 
within which their best insights can be incorporated and some of their limitations 
transcended. Construed as an authentic conversation that is always open to revision 
through partnering dialogue, the self can be understood as both essentially relational yet 
also capable of agency and responsibility. 
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Chapter 5: Clinical implications 
 
Introduction 
 
As previously stated, an inquiry into our understanding of selfhood is limited if 
it does not inform the realities of clinical practice. Unfortunately, according to several 
prominent psychoanalytic theorists, the relationship between theoretical innovation and 
clinical practice in psychoanalysis is far from being understood with clarity. Loewald 
(1970) warns us that “an investigation of the relationship of psychoanalytic theory to 
the psychoanalytic process and method is fraught with difficulties and pitfalls” (p. 45), 
and Greenberg (1986) notes that “few issues in psychoanalysis are quite so muddled, or 
tend to generate quite so much confusion in the mind of the clinician, as the relationship 
between theory and technique” (p. 87), while Ornstein and Ornstein (2003) note “there 
is a high degree of ambiguity in the psychoanalytic literature about the precise role and 
function of theory in the psychoanalytic treatment process” (p. 157). 
Nevertheless, many psychoanalytic thinkers also argue that even if we can’t 
properly grasp their relationship, theory and practice are inextricably tied. For example, 
Smith (2003) makes the case that  “theory ‘thinks’ in the analyst” (p. 1) by providing a 
framework for the selection of relevant information in what would otherwise be an 
overwhelming amount of possible interpretations. Conversely, while theory frames the 
clinical encounter, Loewald (1970) reminds us that it needs to “keep faith with our work 
as analysts”, such that its abstractions are valuable only insofar as they respond to the 
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particulars of the session (p. 45). In other words, theories must helpfully address the 
here-and-now reality of the session. This need to make the theory relevant to the 
particulars of the encounter requires the analyst to apply it in specific ways. According 
to Greenberg (1986): 
Theory applied is, inevitably, theory interpreted. Personal predilection gives the 
application an idiosyncratic, and decisive, cast. By the time it is run through the 
analyst's particular vision of human life, not to mention his personality, the 
impact of theory is difficult to trace. (p. 87) 
The interconnectedness of personal and theoretical positions does not amount, 
according to Greenberg (1986), to a subordination of “theory to intuition, empathy, and 
pragmatism” (p. 87). Even if the application of theory requires adopting a first-person 
perspective, the substance of those theoretical principles still compels the analyst to 
pursue certain directions in treatment, even if it cannot prescribe action directly and 
unequivocally.  For example, the classical dictum to avoid gratifying the patient stands 
in stark contrast to the relational emphasis on participative disclosure.  
On the other hand, Fonagy (2003) is right in qualifying the influence of theory 
on practice by noting that “it has been impossible to achieve any kind of one-to-one 
mapping between therapeutic technique and theoretical frameworks” (p. 25). 
Additionally, Fonagy (2003) argues, psychoanalytic theory has often been driven by 
clinical discoveries, which casts doubt on the traditional image of technique organically 
flowing from a refined theoretical position. Fonagy’s (2003) observation certainly gains 
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support from Kohut’s (1979) and Guntrip’s(1996) clinical grounding for their 
theoretical shift. It seems then that there is an interplay of theoretical and practical 
dimensions in the clinical encounter and in the development of theory. Ornstein and 
Ornstein’s (2003) reflections on the influence of theory on practice are particularly 
relevant here:  
Each clinical presentation we listen to quickly reveals the existence of two 
artificially separable, but in reality thoroughly intertwined, layers of experience 
in the analytic situation. The first layer of experience consists of the clinical 
atmosphere created by the analytic dyad: for example, how patient and analyst 
greet each other; how the issues regarding the fee are negotiated; how silences 
are tolerated by each; and so on. The experiences in the first layer are affected 
by the experiences in the second layer. The impact of the analyst's particular 
public theory can be more readily discerned in the second layer, based on what 
the analyst selects to comment on— what areas he or she chooses to investigate 
and to interpret” (p. 159) 
 Ornstein and Ornstein (2003) present theory and practice as interrelated 
layers of psychoanalytic experience that mutually inform each other, arguing that 
personal, interpersonal, and theoretical positions all influence the therapeutic encounter. 
In spite of their acute observations, we are left wondering just how this interrelatedness 
unfolds in the consulting room. How is it that theory affects practice and vice versa?  
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Greenberg’s (1986) observation that “theory applied is, inevitably, theory 
interpreted” suggests that utilizing theory is like following the assembling instructions 
for a new piece of furniture. Clinical judgment enables a therapist to respond at the right 
time and for the right purpose rather than follow rule-based behavior. In fact, we read 
manuals when we lack the expertise to do something. Dreyfus (2000) notes that the 
mark of a novice is precisely this need for rules, while expertise is characterized by 
knowing “how to perform the appropriate action without calculating and comparing 
alternatives” (p. 159).  At the point of expertise “theory ‘thinks’ in the analyst” (Smith, 
2003, p. 1) organically informing the ongoing dialogue. However, as a context bound 
interpretive process, the voice of theory in practice must respond to the realities of the 
analyst-patient relationship rather than dictating the direction of treatment. For that 
reason, effective practice involves listening to the voice of theory as much as 
developing useful clinical theory involves listening to the unfolding relationship 
between analyst and patient. Yet, once more, it is far from entirely clear how this 
process unfolds, or should unfold, in treatment. 
 
Theory and practice reconsidered 
 
Part of what obscures the concrete relationship between theory and practice is a 
working definition of theory that is based on the natural scientific model of 
understanding.  As mentioned before, theory in this sense as the dispassionate 
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contemplation of objects independent of human meanings and practices, serves an 
essential purpose when pursuing natural science. Desirable advancements in medicine, 
agricultural production, and communication, to name only a few areas, have been 
achieved as a result. But Guignon (1993) notes that in psychology :“many therapists and 
mental health professionals continue to feel that the mainstream ‘scientific’ theories 
designed to explain and guide psychotherapy fail to capture much of what actually goes 
on in the practice of therapy”, adding that “standard theories fail to make sense of the 
rich and complex forms of moral discourse that characterize therapeutic dialogue” (p. 
216) . Psychoanalysis itself is already deeply involved in the process of debating its 
identity as a natural science or a culture-bound interpretive discipline (Gedo, 1999). The 
work of Strenge (1991), Schafer (1992), and Stern (2003) stand as examples of theorists 
who reject the framework of the natural sciences as inadequate for capturing the 
psychoanalytic process. The reason for this, according to Taylor (2002), is that the very 
object of psychology is essentially different from that of the natural sciences: 
in Truth and Method, Gadamer shows how understanding a text or event, which 
comes to us out of our history, has to be construed, not on the model of the 
“scientific” grasp of an object, but rather on that of speech-partners who come to 
an understanding (Verständigung). If we follow Gadamer's argument here, we 
come to see that this is probably true of human science as such. That is, it is not 
simply knowledge of our own past that needs to be understood on the 
“conversation” model, but knowledge of the other as such. (pp. 126-127) 
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Taylor (2002) goes on to argue that the inadequacies of a natural scientific 
model emerge when contrasting human beings to physical objects or processes. First, 
and particularly relevant for psychology, unlike objects, human beings talk back thus 
making any kind of theory development a bilateral endeavor. Second, the goal of 
enquiry in the human sciences is different because it does not seek “attaining some 
finally adequate explanatory language, which can...exclude all future surprises” (Taylor, 
2002, p. 127). Third, and most important, because we are asking questions about human 
beings:  
The end of the operation is not control, or else I am engaging in a sham, 
designed to manipulate my partner while pretending to negotiate. The end is 
being able in some way to function together with the partner, and this means 
listening as well as talking, and hence may require that I redefine what I am 
aiming at. (Taylor, 2002, p. 127).  
 As a result of having a radically different object of study, a theory in the social 
sciences, particularly one as practically concerned as psychology, needs to reflect and 
respond to the realities of human relationships. Doing so would lead to a permeable 
integration of theoretical and practical dimensions of social scientific practice.  
The theory-practice relationship articulated in this sense can be captured, and 
potentially enriched, by Gadamer’s (1975) account of dialogical understanding. From 
this perspective, theory speaks in practice as much as it listens to it; both inform but 
cannot dictate the other. The domination of theory risks dogmatism, while its 
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abolishment risks foreclosing the possibility of reflecting on our practices.  Theory has 
the potential to let crucial material stand as relevant and thus become part of the 
discussion. Conversely, it cannot exhaust the issues that become relevant in treatment. 
Furthermore, from a hermeneutic perspective, treatment is embedded in a larger cultural 
horizon suffused by rich meanings and possibilities that make the theory-praxis 
relationship possible in the first place. In Gadamer’s (1974) language, theory and 
practice are part of this wider cultural horizon within which analyst and patient strive to 
understand each other.  
 
Hermeneutic dialogue as a model for the theory-practice relationship 
 
 As previously noted, Gadamer (1975) holds that all understanding is historically 
situated and conditioned by the prejudices that we bring along to the situation: “we 
started by saying that a hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we 
bring with us. They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, for they 
represent that beyond which it is impossible to see” (p. 306). Such a statement could 
lead the reader to believe that all understanding blinds us to anything that stands outside 
our prejudice, but Warnke (1987) explains that Gadamer strongly rejects the idea that 
“because we are prejudiced, or, otherwise put, because we speak a certain language and 
use certain categories we are cut off from their languages, other cultures, and even our 
own past” (p. 81). As Taylor (2002) points out, for Gadamer “the road to understanding 
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others passes through the patient identification and undoing of those facets of our 
implicit understanding that distort the reality of the other” (p. 132). 
 What is more, our situated understanding is never fixed or complete but always 
in the process of becoming revised in light of something new. Gadamer (1975) notes 
that it is an “error in thinking to claim that the horizon of the present consists of a fixed 
set of opinions and valuations” (p. 306), but we should notice that “the horizon of the 
present is continually in the process of being formed because we are continually having 
to test all our prejudices” (p. 306). This ongoing reworking of our own meanings in 
light of the truth of the matter under discussion is not a prescription, but rather a 
common feature of human existence. Even in the most desperate of situations, Gadamer 
tells us, people often strive to reach a common understanding that is based on shared 
discussion about a common matter. Although Gadamer has been taken to task by 
Derrida (1989) for what he considered to be an overly optimistic view of humanity’s 
good will to engage in dialogue, Gadamer has a strong argument in his observation that 
any communicative act presupposes the desire to be recognized and the belief that it is 
possible. Surely there are better and worse versions of this, but the act of trying to reach 
an understanding on a common matter is a universal feature of human existence, 
according to Gadamer. 
 There are always risks and limitations when we try to understand. But Gadamer 
utilizes the concept of a horizon to emphasize that in understanding “one learns to look 
beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it but in order to see it 
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better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion” (p. 305). Simply stated, in 
maintaining awareness of our finite take on things, we are able to transcend it by 
appealing to a broader context and enriched horizon. This does not mean that we 
somehow reach a point where we can understand free of prejudice, instead, our 
prejudices become transformed by richer and wider horizons. The goal is not to 
transcend prejudice because, as a positive phenomenon, prejudice always makes 
understanding possible in the first place by providing a ground from which to make 
sense of a situation.  
 According to Gadamer (1975), hermeneutic dialogue of this kind involves two 
constitutive movements: the anticipation of completeness and application. The first 
movement involves granting provisional authority to the claims of the person, text, or 
experience that we encounter and engage in dialogue. This is a difficult task, because it 
requires a person to take what Gadamer (1975) calls an attitude of “being negative 
towards itself” (p. 461), in order to let the meaning of what is confronted truly assert 
itself. This demands a special kind of rigor in listening that requires the granting of at 
least temporary authority to the claim of the other. But it does not mean that we have to 
surrender our views to passively accept what is presented to us. That would not be 
understanding but indoctrination, and the corrective to this possibility is what Gadamer 
calls application, which entails considering the other’s claim in light of our own situated 
horizon. Scharff (1997) effectively illustrates how application and the anticipation of 
completeness functions in open dialogue: 
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When I am disposed to listen, I no longer state, or speak out of, "my position." 
Nor do I try to keep myself out of the affair and merely paraphrase or say back 
the other's words. Rather, I draw upon my own determinate materials--my own, 
current, yet always only partially explicit understanding--to form a listening 
statement. And I let the other correct it. (p. 1) 
 Scharff’s comment draws attention to several feature of hermeneutic dialogue. 
First, he notes that it requires a disposition to listen, a type of openness to the claim of 
the other that compels us to curtail our tendency to speak from a set of already formed 
ideas about what should be said, what he calls a position. Nevertheless, he points out 
that listening always occurs from a particular vantage point, albeit not a fully 
determinate one, from which to respond to what is said. Lastly, this act requires an 
involvement in the situation, and thus responding by merely paraphrasing what was said 
illustrates a detachment and lack of understanding. This kind of involved openness from 
one’s incomplete perspective also reveals that anticipation of completeness and 
application are not sequential steps in a method, but rather a concrete disposition in 
dialogue with others. These movements occur simultaneously, meaning that I can only 
listen if I can both grant some authority to the other’s claim, however minimal, while 
making sense of it from the concrete realities of my situation. What is more, personal 
prejudices are not arbitrarily created; they are embedded in shared traditions handed 
down through history, such that understanding becomes “situated within an event of 
tradition, a process of handing down” (p. 309). In other words, Gadamer does not think 
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that dialogue occurs between two separate subjectivities, it is a shared unfolding event 
that is historically situated in the larger conversation of the tradition. This is why 
Gadamer (1975, p. 278) claims that we belong to history before it belongs to us. 
  Gadamer’s notion of authentic dialogue can inform treatment while explaining 
how this process shapes the self. As previously noted, Gadamer contextualizes 
Heidegger’s critique of a substantive view of the self by bringing to light  how we 
define our identity by means of an ongoing conversation with culture and others. To the 
extent that this conversation is authentic, it allows a person to confront their limits and 
gain a renewed sense of identity and purpose.  Under the model of selfhood as an 
ongoing authentic dialogue, the self is a conversation stretched from birth to death, and 
therapy is an opportunity to reexamine our unfolding history, to rework our history in 
light of present concerns as it is oriented towards a future.  Rather than focusing on the 
self in isolation from context, therapeutic dialogue is a working through of our being-in-
the-world as it opens up in one’s history and future possibilities. In the end, the insights 
of a hermeneutic approach, of authentic dialogue with one another, are not terribly new. 
When therapy is done well, it already incorporates many of its features. In essence, it 
points to the importance of the telling of stories that help make sense of our identity and 
our life.  
 In this sense, a relational approach is a concrete theoretical advancement that 
captures the best insights that motivated Freud himself. Spezzano (1995) reminds us 
that: “Ironically, toward the end of her life, Anna Freud told the American 
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psychoanalyst Robert Coles that…she lamented that Freud the confessional storyteller 
had been replaced in the minds of analysts by Freud the theorist” (p. 21). As Mitchell 
(2000) states, Freud was always concerned with making sense of human relationships 
(p. ix). Retrieving this hermeneutic dimension in Freud, who at one point recognized 
that establishing a theoretical psychology based on a natural science model is perhaps 
unachievable (Flyvbjerg, 2001), is necessary in light of our need to enter in authentic 
dialogue with the tradition of psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy at large. Gadamer’s 
notion of authentic dialogue provides the opportunity to retrieve relational and classical 
insights while providing a corrective to their partial allegiance to modern ideals of 
context free individuality. 
 
 
Hermeneutics and treatment 
 
 It is difficult to concretely spell out how a case, the analysis of Mr. Z for 
example, would exactly play out from this hermeneutic perspective. Certainly, appeals 
to internal and determining psychic structures would draw attention away from an 
engagement in history and crafting future possibilities. Instead, there is a real need to 
help the patient articulate the nature of their dissatisfaction in light of their best 
understanding of their situation and how they project themselves in the future. Mr. Z is 
isolated, anxious, and arrested in history, still dominated by an experience that he seems 
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to be repeating, stuck in an eternally recurring present. This repetitive attunement to his 
history is not something to overcome through rational insight, as an objectively 
detached observer.  Neither can it be just catharted out, like a purely emotive experience 
also detached from the binding meanings of the past. Mr. Z is forced to truly face 
himself and confront the experience that continues to be repeated in an ongoing event of 
interpretation. This involves a carefully monitoring of his actions, thoughts, and feelings 
in light of his history and how he already knows it falls short of where he would like to 
be. To be sure, this occurs in the context of partnering dialogue, where Mr. Z can be 
given the opportunity to thematically rework the meaning of that experience as a matter 
of shared concern. Mr. Z needs to articulate with earnestness, what is it like to continue 
to be that injured child in light of his need to be an adult in the world. Not because he 
needs to be cradled or because he needs the compassion to heal a narcissistic injury. 
Certainly compassion is an integral part of this confrontation and rewriting of one’s 
history and thus self-understanding. But the direction of that questioning is provided by 
what Mr. Z already knows: he is not living well, and there is more to life than what he is 
experiencing. Of course, the classic alternative of helping Mr. Z renounce childish 
wishes for wholeness is also inappropriate here. Mitchell and Aron (1999) are right in 
pointing out that there is value in opening an alternative between merely validating the 
patient’s feelings and asking them to achieve a stoic rational insight into their situation. 
The careful process of helping patients see their relationship to others, so that modifying 
it is an option, is neither colluding nor criticizing the client. It involves engaging in 
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dialogue to help them confront the ongoing event that they are, in light of their present 
dissatisfaction with how their life is unfolding.  Clients are aware, however remotely,  
that they fall short of who they need to be. Articulating that pre-reflective understanding 
in open dialogue with another brings it into the open so it can be thematically reworked. 
For the client, engaging in this process requires both trusting the claims of the therapist 
who helps understand their limits, but also applying the therapists voice in light of their 
experience. What emerges in that process, when it is conducted authentically, is 
perspicuously described by Guignon (2004) in the following manner: 
the locus of this activity as we experience it is not my mind and yours, but rather 
the “between” made concrete in the issue of the truth of the matter we are 
discussing. In vital, intense discussion, egos fall away and are replaced by 
something much more important: the matter that matters. (p. 165).  
 From a hermeneutic perspective, what matters in the unfolding of people’s life is 
always shaped by shared cultural values and meanings. Taylor (1985) notes that these 
constitute “inescapable frameworks” (p. 1) that provide the basis for meaningful action 
and identity. In this sense, the therapeutic endeavor involves examining and reworking 
the values and commitment that already shape our identity. But because dialogue is 
always done through a partnering effort, it follows that the therapist cannot 
meaningfully partake of that conversation unless they also engage and comment on the 
meanings and values that are shaping the client’s life. Certainly relational approaches 
are quick to acknowledge the role of the analyst in shaping the direction of the therapy 
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(Mitchell & Aron, 1999; Fairfield, Layton, & Stack, 2002), but it is not clear that they 
let the implications of this observation sink deeply enough.  Zeddies and Richardson 
(1999) note that after criticizing traditional notions of the therapist as wise expert, 
Mitchell (1998):  
suggests that ‘the analyst's expertise lies, most fundamentally, in his or her 
understanding of a process — what happens when one person begins to express 
and reflect on his or her experience in the presence of a trained listener, in the 
highly structured context provided by the analytic situation” (p. 21). In this sense, 
Mitchell's approach offers “a view of the analyst's knowledge and authority that 
portrays the analyst as an expert in collaborative, self-authorizing self-reflection” 
(p. 26). 
 However well intentioned, and likely based on a deep respect for the autonomy 
of the other, Mitchell’s observations miss that it would be impossible to truly listen 
without already participating in some shared meanings. What is more important, if 
listening is not to become a mere parroting but a way to help the patient reframe their 
experience in richer  and more constructive ways, Mitchell must rely on frameworks of 
meaning that will inevitably transforms the personal search for meaning of the client. In 
other words, therapy cannot exercise what Mitchell (1992) calls the facilitation of 
“personal meaning” (p. 285) without somehow bringing to the table a viewpoint that 
informs what enriches meaning in everyday life.  
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 The modern fear of indoctrinating the client clearly presents itself here 
(Guignon, 2004, p. 232), and it is not without reason given the degree of trust the client 
places in the therapy and the potential for abuse. But it becomes essential to see that this 
respect for the autonomy of the other, perhaps reminiscent of the Hippocratic dictum to 
“first do no harm”, is itself a meaningful framework that shapes the direction of 
treatment. As part of a larger modern project of promoting personal emancipation from 
oppressive structures, explicitly embodied in the feminist approach of Fairfield, Layton, 
and Stack (2002), we respect the client’s individuality and tentatively offer our theory. 
But this underlying respect for autonomy tends to obscure other values that make a 
treatment outcome successful. Buechler (2004), in her recent book Clinical Values: 
Emotions that Guide Psychoanalytic Treatment poignantly articulates some of the 
resources upon which treatment draws to achieve its aims: 
Treatment is, I believe, inherently a life-and-death struggle. It takes enormous 
energy and commitment from both participants. I don’t think we can muster, 
sustain, and inspire this over a career if all we believe we have to offer is one 
among many possible perspectives. Theories making such modest claims appeal 
to the mind more than the heart or soul. They don’t engender enough hope, or 
joy, too sustain a real fight for life. (p. 2) 
Mitchell (1993) views hope as an essential aspect of successful treatment, and his 
description of this phenomenon in clinical practice is rich and nuanced. Yet, as 
Buechler accuses, relationality as a theory of self can be found thin and wanting in light 
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of the wealth of meanings Mitchell describes in his therapeutic vignettes. Relational 
psychoanalysis clearly attempts to thicken psychoanalytic descriptions of selfhood with 
its emphasis on the interconnectedness of human experience, which echoes Aristotelian 
values of politically embedded personhood. Yet Hillman (1994), in an article exploring 
psychology’s view of the patient in light of Aristotelian notions of selfhood, explains 
that:  
the patient cannot, definitely not, by definition, become a citizen, so long as the 
model of the psyche which therapeutic analysis serves remains fixed where it is. 
this model locates psyche either as intrapersonal (within human subjects) or 
interpersonal (between subjects in relationships, transference, group dynamics, 
and family systems). Soul is not in the world of systems like trees, rocks, cars 
and ashtrays, nor is it in the world of systems like education, finance, party 
politics, language and technology (p. 30).  
 Mitchell’s (1993) rich description of hope and dread in the psychoanalytic 
situation evidences a masterful grasp of the subtle dynamics of human interrelatedness 
that have binding and healing force. To the extent that this phenomena is subsumed 
under the facilitation of personal fulfillment, it misses its structuring power and reduces 
it to an instrumental means to an end. In the case of Mr. Z, it is likely that his feelings 
of isolation and anxiety would become reinforced if the treatment is modeled on the 
ideals of individuality and self-determination rather than engagement, commitment, and 
openness to others. Hirsch (2003) describes the analytic situation in relational 
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approaches as working under “ the assumption of a universal conflict revolving around 
the wish to remain enmeshed within internalized familial configurations, on one hand, 
and the striving for the freedom and the loneliness of separation and individuation on 
the other” (p. 217). It is clear to see how the alternatives repeat the seemingly 
inescapable dilemma of the self either collapsing into a determining history, or stoically 
detaching from it to face a lonely fate. Mr. Z cannot bear either alternative, he cannot 
continue being who he is, and he would not do well in becoming more individuated. 
 We can find an alternative in authentic dialogue, one that rests on carefully 
interpreted cultural meanings, as a helpful possibility for Mr. Z.  Treatment in this sense 
cannot use the cultivation of  “a capacity for a certain responsiveness to oneself”(p. 
184), as Mitchell (2001) suggests, as a yardstick for its success. In authentic dialogue 
there is a cultivation of a responsiveness to the ongoing conversation, always reliant on 
the participation of its members but also transcending their individual outlooks and 
carrying them forward. The mark of success in treatment, from a Gadamerian 
perspective, is suggested by the development of phronimos (Vessey, 2002), a lived 
practical wisdom, which allows patients to respond appropriately to situations. In other 
words, the patient is able to masterfully respond to the challenges presented by life. 
Zeddies (2001), and Flyvbjerg (2001) identify phronesis as the sine qua non for 
successful psychoanalysis and social science respectively. They explain, however, that 
it is different from a technical orientation to life, wherein our behavior is seen as means 
to obtaining some end rather than being intrinsic to the end itself. In this sense, 
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phronetic dialogue involves careful deliberation about one’s ends in life, in light of 
one’s best understanding of our values and commitments. Of course, as Zeddies (2001) 
remarks: “Thinking about analytic work as a moral enterprise stands in sharp contrast to 
what has heretofore been the conventional “wisdom” within analytic circles of what 
psychoanalytic therapy is and how it should work” (p. 228). Yet psychoanalysis, and 
psychology at large, is already involved in this process whether or not it becomes 
explicitly aware of it. Ultimately, heeding Heidegger and Gadamer’s thought requires 
contextualizing relational and classical approaches in a wider philosophical horizon that 
allows us to retain the best of their insights, while suggesting directions for 
improvement. As such, the effort of this work constitutes merely a point of departure, 
and requires further deliberation about how an authentic dialogical effort could be 
practiced in treatment.  However, if we take Heidegger and Gadamer’s thought to heart, 
we can never reach any final take in matters of self-understanding.  
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